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i 
ABSTRACT 
Financial constraints influence corporate policies of firms, including both 
investment decisions and external financing policies. The relevance of this 
phenomenon has become more pronounced during and after the recent 
financial crisis in 2007/2008. In addition to raising costs of external financing, 
the effects of financial crisis limited the availability of external financing 
which had implications for employment, investment, sale of assets, and tech 
spending. This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
financial constraints on share issuance and repurchases decisions. Financial 
constraints comprise both internal constraints reflecting the demand for 
external financing and external financial constraints that relate to the supply of 
external financing. The study also examines both operating performance and 
stock market reactions associated with equity issuance methods.  
The first empirical chapter explores the simultaneous effects of financial 
constraints and market timing on share issuance decisions. Internal financing 
constraints limit firms‟ ability to issue overvalued equity. On the other hand, 
financial crisis and low market liquidity (external financial constraints) restrict 
availability of equity financing and consequently increase the costs of external 
financing. Therefore, the study explores the extent to which internal and 
external financing constraints limit market timing of equity issues. This study 
finds that financial constraints play a significant role in whether firms time 
their equity issues when the shares are overvalued. The conclusion is that 
financially constrained firms issue overvalued equity when the external equity 
market or the general economic conditions are favourable. During recessionary 
periods, costs of external finance increase such that financially constrained 
firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity. Only unconstrained firms are 
more likely to issue overvalued equity even during crisis. Similarly, small 
firms that need cash flows to finance growth projects are less likely to access 
external equity financing during period of significant economic recessions. 
Moreover, constrained firms have low average stock returns compared to 
unconstrained firms, especially when they issue overvalued equity.  
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The second chapter examines the operating performance and stock returns 
associated with equity issuance methods. Firms in the UK can issue equity 
through rights issues, open offers, and private placement. This study argues 
that alternative equity issuance methods are associated with a different level of 
operating performance and long-term stock returns. Firms using private 
placement are associated with poor operating performance. However, rights 
issues are found empirically to be associated with higher operating 
performance and less negative long-term stock returns after issuance in 
comparison to counterpart firms that issue private placements and open offers. 
Thus, rights issuing firms perform better than open offers and private 
placement because the favourable operating performance at the time of 
issuance generates subsequent positive long-run stock price response. Right 
issuing firms are of better quality and outperform firms that adopt open offers 
and private placement.  
In the third empirical chapter, the study explores the levered share repurchase 
of internally financially unconstrained firms. Unconstrained firms are expected 
to repurchase their shares using internal funds rather than through external 
borrowings. However, evidence shows that levered share repurchases are 
common among unconstrained firms. These firms display this repurchase 
behaviour when they have bond ratings or investment grade ratings that allow 
them to obtain cheap external debt financing. It is found that internally 
financially unconstrained firms borrow to finance their share repurchase when 
they invest more. Levered repurchase firms are associated with less positive 
abnormal returns than unlevered repurchase firms. For the levered repurchase 
sample, high investing firms are associated with more positive long-run 
abnormal stock returns than low investing firms. It appears the market 
underreact to the levered repurchase in the short-run regardless of the level of 
investments. These findings indicate that market reactions reflect both 
undervaluation and signaling hypotheses of positive information associated 
with share repurchase. As the firms undertake capital investments, they 
generate future cash flows, limit the effects of leverage on financial distress 
and ultimately reduce the risk of the equity capital.  
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION  
1.1. Introduction  
Corporate financing policy is an integral part of the operations of companies. 
Its importance underpins several decisions and affects both investing and 
financing decisions of the firm. Policies relating to investments in capital 
projects including research and development, cash distribution to shareholders 
in the form of dividend payments, and share repurchase decisions among 
others, have overarching effects on both the short term and long-term prospects 
of the company. On the basis of these decisions, investors determine whether 
or not to provide money to the company. The recent financial crisis of 
2007/2008 highlighted the significant effects of financial constraints on 
corporate financial decisions including employment, tech spending, and capital 
spending (Campello et al. 2010). This thesis explores the effects of financial 
constraints on share issuance decisions and share repurchase programmes of 
firms. Specifically, the thesis explores the choice between share issuance and 
non-issuance when firms are financially constrained. Further analysis of share 
issuance examines the differential long-term stock returns associated with 
share issuance methods.  
The first empirical chapter explores the effects of financial constraints (both 
internal and external) on share issuance decisions. Specifically, this chapter 
examines the simultaneous effects of mispricing and financial constraints on 
share issuance. Thus, it describes whether firms time their share issues even 
when they face extreme internal and external financial constraints. Further, it 
focuses on the type of firms, in terms of size and the time period when market 
timing of share issues is more plausible to limit the adverse stock price 
reactions. In the second empirical chapter, the thesis investigates whether the 
different long-term stock returns associated with equity issuance methods is 
driven by the level of firm operating performance. The literature on equity 
issuance methods asserts that stock returns differ according to the issuance 
method used. This chapter uses long-term operating performance to explain the 
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choice of equity issuance methods and the associated long-term stock returns. 
The third empirical chapter explores the motivation for unconstrained firms to 
borrow to repurchase their shares.  
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the thesis. Section 1.2 presents the 
background and motivation for the study. Section 1.3 discusses the study 
dataset and the reasons for the choice of both UK and US sample firms. 
Section 1.4 sets out the research questions and provides the key findings of the 
thesis. Section 1.5 discusses the contribution of the study. Finally, section 1.6 
provides the organisation of the thesis and briefly presents the content within 
each chapter.  
1.2. Background and Motivation  
There is an extant literature on securities issuance and repurchase and the 
effects on other corporate decisions have been extensively explored (for 
example Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Campello et al, 2010; Dong et al, 2012). In 
particular, corporate share issues are related to investments where firms with 
significant growth opportunities need external financing to undertake them. 
Moreover, share issues and repurchase alter the capital structure of the firm. 
The effects of corporate financing on capital structure began with the seminal 
paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958) where they argued, among others, that 
whether or not firm is made up of equity or debt does not matter, under the 
assumptions of perfect information, homogenous firms, no discriminating taxes 
and transaction costs of financing. However, several subsequent studies have 
challenged these assumptions and proved that in fact the source of financing 
has significant effects on capital structure, including the value of the firm and 
the costs of financing. Again, the effects on the firm of share issues and 
repurchase are reflected in the stock prices of the issuing or repurchasing firms. 
These stock price reactions are consistent across several jurisdictions and have 
informed corporate financing and investing policies.  
Several theories have been postulated to explain equity issues and the stock 
price effects including information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1991), pecking order (Helwege and 
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Liang, 1996; Frank and Goyal, 2003), market timing (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz, 2010; Dong, Loncarski, ter Horst, and 
Veld, 2012), agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), and static 
trade-off (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999).  Equity issues are generally 
associated with negative abnormal stock returns that has commonly attributed 
to market underreaction to the information (Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1997). Firms also repurchase their shares in response to 
undervaluation (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996; Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998), information signalling effects (Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 
1991), and free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 
2004), among others. These motivations are consistent with divulging positive 
information about the prospects of the firms and hence stock returns associated 
with share repurchase announcements are positive.  
The first empirical chapter explores the effects of financial constraints on share 
issuance decisions. Since the work by Modigliani and Miller, corporate 
financing decisions have evolved over the years, even though the theoretical 
explanations for stock returns still remain consistent. An important factor 
related to equity issues is transactions costs in the form of investment banking 
fees that depends on both the characteristics of the issuing firms and the overall 
capital market conditions. For example, Butler et al. (2005) find that firms 
reduce the costs of equity financing by improving the market liquidity of their 
stock. In other words, more liquid stocks are associated with lower investment 
banking fees. This cost of raising equity is important because it impacts market 
timing tendencies. Stated differently, internal (related to available cash and the 
friction to obtain external cash) and external financial constraints (mostly 
related to macroeconomic conditions and the overall capital market conditions) 
play a vital role in equity issuance decisions. Hence, this study explores the 
influence of financial constraints on share issuance decisions. Financial 
constraints involve both internal cash availability and the speed at which firms 
obtain equity financing in the equity capital market. It also captures market 
liquidity and the effects of financial crisis at the time of issuing equity to 
highlight the external financial constraints associated with equity issues.  
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This chapter, therefore, extends the literature on market timing by examining 
the effects of financial constraints on share issuance decisions. If firms time 
their equity issues and also incur costs of issuing equity, then I argue that 
internally financially unconstrained firms should be more likely to issue 
overvalued equity than constrained firms. Less internally financially 
constrained firms are more likely to time their equity issues (Dong et al, 2012) 
to coincide with periods of favourable macroeconomic conditions (Korajczyk 
and Levy, 2003). Taken together, firms that are internally financially 
constrained face high finance costs when there are simultaneously 
unfavourable market conditions. During financial crisis, with low market 
liquidity, issuance costs increase. Therefore, consistent with the financial 
constraints hypothesis, prospects of equity market timing by issuing firms are 
limited. These firms generate more free cash flow that would allow them to 
take advantage of issuing overpriced equity.  
The second empirical chapter examines the different method of equity issuance 
in the UK. Firms in the UK issue equity through three dominant methods 
namely rights issues, open offers, and private placement. Since the 
deregulation in 1986, the preference for rights issue method has reduced and 
the recent evidence shows that firms use more private placements than rights 
issues (Armitage, 2007). The issuance methods are also associated with 
different stock price returns (Slovin et al. 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006). 
Therefore, theories such as the information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), window of opportunity hypothesis (Choe et al. 1993; Bayless and 
Chaplinsky, 1996), investor over-optimism (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; 
Hertzel et al. 2002) explain the choice of issuance method and the stock price 
reactions. For example, Hertzel et al. (2002) find that public firms that place 
their shares privately are associated with positive announcement returns 
suggesting that investors are over-optimistic about the future prospects of the 
issuing firms. Thus, firms deliberately choose the method based on the firm 
characteristics and the market responds according to the information that the 
issue provides to the market.  
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Furthermore, the research also explains the long-term stock returns associated 
with equity issuance methods. Prior studies attribute the different stock returns 
associated with each equity issuance method on the basis of both firm and 
issues characteristics that relate to market-to-book ratio, prior stock returns, 
firm size, and issue discount. Overall, these characteristics measure the degree 
of information asymmetry associated with the issuance method. For example, 
since rights issues are made to existing shareholders, it is less likely that firm 
will exploit any asymmetric information effects. Thus, issues involving 
external investors, such as private placement, allow the firm to exploit 
asymmetric information effects. This study asserts that operating performance 
determined by firms‟ operations have more long-term effects on long-term 
stock returns than alternative measures of information asymmetry. Therefore, 
the research explores the effects of long-term operating performance on the 
choice of issuance method and the subsequent long-term stock returns. Unlike 
Levis (2005), Abhyankar and Ho (2007), Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), who 
provide evidence about long term stock returns, this study focuses on how 
operating performance determines the choice of equity issuance method and 
explain the long term stock returns associated with equity issuance methods.  
The third empirical chapter focuses on share repurchases policies of firms. 
Share repurchase programs form an integral part of firm payout policy. US 
firms continue to repurchase their shares and actually repurchase transactions 
have increased beyond the pre-crisis levels in 2007. According to an article in 
The Economist, companies in the S&P 500 index repurchased a record $500 
billion in 2013 financed by 33 cents of every dollar of cash flow.1  Prior 
research and empirical evidence is consistent with firm cash distribution in the 
form of share repurchase or in excess of dividend payments to avoid 
investment in value-destroying projects (Jensen, 1986; Bhargava, 2010). It 
follows that share repurchase are more likely to be conducted by firms with 
substantial amount of free cash and which have limited growth opportunities. 
Moreover, the undervaluation hypothesis contends that firms repurchase in 
order to buy their own cheap shares and also signal to the market about the 
favourable future prospects (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996; Stephens and                                                         
1 Share buy-backs: The repurchase revolution, The Economist, September 13, 2014. 
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Weisbach, 1998; Dittmar, 2000). In sum, firms that are less internally 
financially constrained and have cash slack will repurchase their shares. Chen 
and Wang (2012) find evidence that financially constrained firms repurchase 
their shares due to managerial hubris. Other studies find that firms borrow at 
the time of share repurchase announcements (Minnick and Zhao, 2007; de 
Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren, 2011).  
Recent corporate financing policies reveal that it has become a commonplace 
for firms to simultaneously issue new convertible bond and repurchase their 
shares (see de Jong et al., 2011). These firms utilise the cash from debt 
issuance to finance their share repurchase transactions. During the last decades, 
share repurchases have become very popular as a means to return cash to 
shareholders. In 2007, share repurchases peaked at more than $700 billion near 
the market top.2 A large number of these repurchases were funded with debt 
issues. In 2009 alone, 37 companies announced plans to spend $39 billion on 
these levered repurchases.3 It may be understandable for internally financially 
constrained firms to repurchase their shares by borrowing due to limited 
financial resources available, but it seems puzzling for internally financially 
unconstrained firms to borrow money in order to repurchase shares. A recent 
example is Apple that announced in April 2013 that they would return $100 
billion to shareholders in the form of a repurchase by the end of 2013. 
Apple borrowed part of the money for this repurchase, despite having a 
huge cash stockpile.4 This repurchase trend evokes the following question: 
why would internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to finance share 
repurchase? This debt-financed share repurchase could be determined by the 
extent of investment undertaken by these firms. The study further explores the 
stock price implications for these debt-financed repurchase firms.  
                                                        
2See Michael Milken: “Why capital structure matters”, The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 
2009. 
3Source: research by JP Morgan cited by Herb Greenbert in: “Debt to buy back stock”, CNBC, 
November 8, 2011. See: http://www.cnbc.com/id/45209702 (retrieved on March 30, 2015). 
4See Katy Burne and Mike Cherney: “Apple‟s record plunge into debt pool”, The Wall Street 
Journal, April 30, 2013. Apple‟s case may be different from other companies, because much of 
its money is overseas; raising cash in the bond markets helps the company to reduce its large 
tax bill that would hit the company if it would bring back the cash to the U.S. 
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Unlike Chen and Wang (2012), this chapter of the thesis examines the share 
repurchase financing of unconstrained firms. For constrained firms, the 
incentive of buying back cheap or undervalued shares will motivate them to 
borrow to repurchase. However, Chen and Wang (2012) explicitly assert that 
managers of constrained firms repurchase due to overconfidence about the 
future prospects of the firms and managerial hubris. In respect of debt-financed 
repurchase, studies, such as Minnick and Zhao (2007) find that firms borrow to 
finance their share repurchase programs. Due to the effect of share repurchase 
on distress risk, these debt-financed repurchase firms report less positive 
announcement date abnormal returns. Bond returns associated with debt-
financed repurchases are also negative or less than an otherwise cash-financed 
share repurchase. Thus, share repurchase generates wealth transfer from 
bondholders to stockholders (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003). Also, another 
wealth transfer occurs between debt-financed share repurchase and cash-
financed share repurchase (Minnick and Zhao, 2007). However, de Jong et al. 
(2011) do not find that convertible debt issues are necessarily used to finance 
share repurchase. They contend that convertible arbitrage strategies explain the 
size and speed of share repurchase transactions. These previous studies 
highlight the share repurchase programs of constrained firms and the general 
evidence that firms systematically issue new debt during share repurchase 
announcements. Therefore, the present research revisits this phenomenon and 
examines the share repurchase financing of internally financially unconstrained 
firms.   
The third empirical chapter, therefore, investigates the factors that drive 
unconstrained firms to conduct levered share repurchase. The intuition for this 
phenomenon, as argued in current study, is that even though unconstrained 
firms can use internal cash flows to buy-back their shares, these firms can take 
advantage of low interest rates to raise debt financing and together with the 
internal cash flows undertake investments when they also repurchase their 
shares. Internally financially unconstrained firms are more likely to conduct 
levered share repurchase when they also invest in capital projects. In addition, 
it examines the initial stock returns subsequent to share repurchase 
announcements. It also highlights the stock returns for debt-financed and cash-
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financed share repurchase of both internally financially unconstrained and 
constrained firms.                                                      
1.3. The choice of datasets  
The thesis uses dataset from both UK and US for important reasons. The first 
empirical chapter focuses on the effects of financial constraints on share 
issuance of UK listed firms and the second chapter notes the marked stock 
returns differences associated with different equity issuance methods. There is 
a limited empirical literature on UK equity market timing and especially the 
study about the effects of financial constraints on UK equity issues is 
unexplored. Indeed, most of the internal financial constraints studies use US 
dataset (For example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Whited and Wu, 2006; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). Dong et al. 
(2012) investigate financial constraints effects on equity issues for Canadian 
listed firms. Equity mispricing studies that focus on the UK include Marsh 
(1982), and Mahajan and Tartaroglu (2008). Unlike the previous studies, I 
explore the simultaneous effects of internal financial constraints and the 
financial crisis on share issuance decisions of UK firms. Therefore, UK 
presents an ideal setting to contribute to the general empirical literature on 
equity issuance decisions and delineates how financial constraints impact such 
corporate financing policies.  
Another important reason to study UK equity issues is the presence of different 
equity issuance method as explored in the Chapter two of the thesis. UK 
deregulation of 1986 allowed firms to issue equity through means other than 
rights offerings. Since the deregulation, several changes have occurred from 
gradual recession of the rights issues dominance to near demise of rights 
issues. Armitage (2007) finds that the demise of rights issues is more 
pronounced that reflects the notion that placing better facilitates block selling 
than rights issues (Armitage, 1998; 2010).5 Again, placement saves time and 
money compared with rights issue and open offers and cost less than rights                                                         
5 Placing is an equity issuance method by which firms place new share issues by private 
negotiation or through accelerated bookbuilding in which investing institutions are publicly 
invited to bid for shares. Extensive discussion of methods of equity issuance is provided in 
Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3.  
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issues (Wu, 2004). Using UK data, the study then captures the periodic 
changes in the choice of issuance method and the implications for stock return 
reactions. Stated differently, UK provides an ideal setting to explore how 
investor, firm, and regulatory changes have altered preference for private 
placement over rights offerings. The findings shed more light on equity 
issuance methods and provide new insights into equity issuance decisions.  
Note that this unique feature of equity issues is uncommon in international 
markets.  Only one or two dominant issuance approaches exist such as firm 
commitment in the US (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992) 6 , rights issues in the 
Netherlands (Kabir and Roosenboom, 2003), rights offering by family 
controlled businesses in Sweden (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005), rights 
offerings and private placement in Australia (Brown and Chan, 2004) and 
rights issues in most European countries (Tsangarakis, 1996; Bohren, Eckbo, 
and Michalsen, 1997; Gajewski and Ginglinger, 2002; Pastor-Llorca and 
Martin-Ugedo, 2004). In an environment where choice of equity issuance 
prevails, firms are able to tailor their issues to specific motivations. For 
example, in an attempt to restrict ownership dilution, firms will prefer to issue 
shares to existing shareholders through rights offerings (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 
2005). On the other hand, private placements, while diluting ownership by 
allowing new investors to subscribe to the shares, encourage monitoring 
(Wruck, 1989) and promote credible certification of the issue (Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993). 
With regard to the third empirical chapter, the dataset on U.S. share repurchase 
is used. Despite the extensive research on share repurchase announcements in 
the US, the evolution of corporate actions and events reflects the changing 
dynamics in corporate financing policy. During the last few decades, share 
repurchases have become popular as a means to return cash to shareholders. In 
2007 alone, US share repurchases peaked at more than $700 billion near the 
market top (Milken, 2009). A large number of these repurchases were funded                                                         
6 Eckbo and Masulis (1995) report that U.S. companies have switched from uninsured rights to 
standbys and to firm commitment underwriting method. The firm commitment flotation 
method accounts for 99% of all issues. Under firm commitment, an underwriter commits to 
buy the entire equity issue and tries to resell it to investors.  
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with debt issues. In 2009 for instance, 37 US companies announced plans to 
spend $39 billion on these levered repurchases. 7  Unlike most European 
countries, share repurchase programs in the US are authorized by the board of 
directors and hence do not need shareholder approval. The apparent flexibility 
associated with share repurchase differs markedly from those of other 
jurisdictions. Until 1998, share repurchases were illegal in some European 
countries such as France and Germany (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; 
Andriosopoulos and Lasfer, 2015). Also in the UK, share repurchase programs 
are limited due to regulatory restrictions and undermine companies‟ ability to 
take advantage of undervaluation (Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; Oswald and 
Young, 2004). For example, UK companies are not allowed to buy back their 
shares in periods when managers are most likely to have superior information 
about future earnings. Whereas the regulatory limitations provide sufficient 
grounds to study UK share repurchase, the new trend of debt-financed 
repurchase motivates the use of US data. The regulatory environment in the US 
allows firms to exploit undervaluation and pursue other motivations that 
apparently benefit the firm. The study therefore uses US data to explore the 
reasons why US firms that are less financially constrained issue debt during 
share repurchase programs.  
1.4. Research questions and key findings 
The main research questions of the thesis are as follows: 
1. How do internal and external financial constraints affect equity 
issuance decisions? 
The extant literature provides evidence for equity market timing and posits that 
subsequent stock returns associated with equity issues are significantly 
negative. This study extends the market timing theory by incorporating the 
effects of both internal and external financial constraints on equity issuance 
decisions. The study uses a sample of 1257 equity issues by UK listed firms to 
test the simultaneous of effects of mispricing and internal financial constraints 
on share issuance decisions.  The total sample spans over a period of 17 years                                                         
7 see footnote 3 in Section 1.2 
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between 1994 and 2010. The study uses both univariate and multivariate 
analysis to establish the effects of financial constraints on share issuance 
decision. It uses logit regression analysis to show the probability of equity 
issuance based on both internal and external financial constraints. Moreover, it 
highlights the stock returns associated with equity issues conditional on 
financial constraints.  
Consistent with the literature (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; DeAngelo et al., 
2010; Dong et al., 2012), the results provide strong support for the market 
timing theory, showing that UK firms time their equity issues. The second 
proposition of the thesis contends that internally financially constrained firms 
could still issue overvalued equity provided the equity market and/or the 
general economic conditions are favourable. Similar to related evidence, the 
findings show that internally financially constrained firms are more likely to 
issue overvalued equity similar to unconstrained firms during non-crisis period. 
However, as costs of external financing become high during economic 
downturn, internally financially constrained firms are less likely to issue equity 
even if the equity is highly overvalued. The study further finds that during 
period of financial crisis or when there is low market liquidity, small firms are 
less likely to issue overvalued equity. It also shows that large firms with 
limited growth opportunities and substantial amount of free cash flow can 
afford transaction costs of issuing overvalued equity even during significant 
financial crisis.  
2. Does the long-term operating performance reflect the choice of equity 
issuance methods? 
The deregulation in 19868 introduced alternative issuance methods in the UK - 
rights issues, open offers and private placements – and subsequent equity 
issues reflect certain firm characteristics. Firms are expected to select issuance 
method for which they have more prospects for timing their overvalued issues. 
Rights issuing firms have less incentive to sell equity with poor prospects,                                                         
8 In October 1986, the event known as the “Big Bang” took place, marking significant changes 
to the structure of UK financial markets. Among other consequences, an electronic trading 
system was introduced.   
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since existing shareholders sell shares to themselves in comparison to 
counterpart private placements and open offers. Equity issuance methods 
account for different short-term stock returns (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and 
Walker, 2006) and long-term stock returns (Ho, 2005; Andrikopoulos, 2009; 
Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). However, most of these studies attribute the 
different stock returns to firm and issue characteristics that have short-term 
effects on stock returns. This study argues that differential information 
asymmetry allows firms to use the inside information to select the issuance 
method. 9  Since operating performance may vary after the issuance of 
alternative methods, the long-term stock returns would vary accordingly. In 
testing the hypothesis, the research uses UK equity issuance data from 1996 to 
2010 to explore stock returns and contemporaneous operating firm 
performance for each of the subsequent three years after equity issuance. 
Consistent with the developed hypothesis, the empirical results show that firms 
with better operating performance are more likely to conduct rights issues and 
are associated with the less negative long-term stock returns after rights issues 
than private placements and open offers. These results hold within a number of 
robustness tests, indicating that managers select an issuance method in line 
with their expectations of a firm‟s future operating performance. Moreover, 
firms are more likely to select private placement because less favourable 
contemporaneous operating performance information is not available to the 
market at the time of the equity issues. Stated differently, firms are less likely 
to issue overvalued equity to existing shareholders through rights issues. Long-
term stock returns associated with equity issuance method are consistent with 
the long-term operating performance. These results suggest that over the long 
term, operating performance explains long-term stock returns beyond firm and 
issue characteristics such as market-to-book ratio, firm size, issue discount, 
prior stock returns, and institutional share ownership, among others.  
3. Why do internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to 
repurchase their shares?                                                         
9  Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) theoretically and empirically support the hypothesis that 
information asymmetry influences managers‟ decisions of whether to select rights issues or 
private placements within Swedish firms.   
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Since the effects of internal financial constraints transcend all corporate 
decisions, the study also focuses on the share repurchase implications. 
Specifically, the study investigates the factors that drive unconstrained firms to 
conduct levered share repurchase. The intuition for this phenomenon is that 
unconstrained firms, which have sufficient internal cash flows, would not need 
external financing to repurchase their shares. However, these firms can take 
advantage of low interest rates to raise debt financing and together with the 
internal cash flows undertake investments when they also repurchase their 
shares. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) assert that low cash holdings of internally 
financially constrained firms does not allow them to build cash reserves when 
they spend all available cash on investments. The study, therefore, 
hypothesises that unconstrained firms with bond ratings obtain debt financing 
at relatively low transaction costs in terms of interest payments. Consequently, 
internally financially unconstrained firms are more likely to conduct levered 
share repurchase when they also invest in capital projects.  
Share repurchases are defined as levered or unlevered on whether there is an 
increase in debt capital a year prior to and after the date of repurchase. 
Unconstrained firms are defined using the KZ index.10 First analysis estimates 
logit regressions to investigate the probability of levered share repurchase 
based on internal financial constraints and the interaction between internal 
financial constraints and investments. The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to finance 
their share repurchase. But more importantly, they are more likely to conduct 
levered share repurchase when they also undertake investments. These findings 
imply that unconstrained firms even though they can repurchase with internal 
cash flows, the additional cash from the debt issuance allows the firms to 
undertake more investments. Using bond ratings as a proxy for internal 
financial constraints, the study finds that levered share repurchase is related to 
firms with bond ratings and/or investment-grade firms.    
                                                        
10  Kaplan and Zingales (1997) constructed the KZ index in their study of the financial 
constraints characteristics of 49 low-dividend paying manufacturing firms. Using observable 
characteristics, Kaplan Zingales run an ordered logit to rank the firms. A firm with high KZ 
index is considered more financially constrained.  
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Additional analysis shows that the initial stock returns associated with share 
repurchase depend on the level of internal financial constraints and the 
financing of the share repurchase. Levered repurchase firms are associated with 
less positive abnormal returns than unlevered repurchase firms. In relation to 
unconstrained firms, high investing firms are associated with more positive 
abnormal stock returns than low investing firms. The implications of these 
findings are that market reactions reflect both undervaluation and signaling 
hypotheses of positive information associated with share repurchase. As the 
firms undertake capital investments, they generate future cash flows, limit the 
effects of leverage on financial distress and ultimately reduce the risk of the 
equity capital.  
1.5. Contributions of the study 
This thesis extends and complements the extant literature on share issuance and 
share repurchase announcements.  
First, this study complements the existing literature on share issuance 
decisions. Studies such as Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Almeida et al. (2004) 
and Whited and Wu (2006) provide extensive explanations for the effects of 
financial constraints on corporate decisions, enumerating important 
characteristics that distinguish financially constrained firms from 
unconstrained ones. This study emphasises the extent to which the level of 
financial constraints affects the decision to time the issuance of shares. 
Financial constraints have significant impact on corporate decisions relating to 
employment, cuts in tech spending and capital spending (Campello, et al., 
2010) and the costs of equity issues (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Dong et al., 
2012; McLean and Zhao, 2014). This thesis argues that both internal and 
external financial constraints determine the equity market timing of firms. This 
financial constraints variable relates both to the internal cash flow limitations 
and the costs of external equity issues when there is low market liquidity 
and/or during periods of financial crisis. In other words, the issue of overvalued 
equity in the equity marketplace reflects both the degree of internal cash flows 
and external costs associated with such issues.  
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For example, during the financial crisis or periods of low market liquidity, 
financially unconstrained firms could issue overvalued equity due to both the 
ability to finance the issues and lower adverse selection costs associated with 
unconstrained firms compared to constrained firms. Given low market liquidity 
and/or during financial crisis – high costs of issuing equity – financially 
constrained firms are less likely to issue equity even if they are significantly 
overvalued (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Dong et al., 2012). Financially 
constrained firms, not only are find equity issues costly compared to 
unconstrained firms, but they also potentially are associated with higher 
adverse selection costs. Only unconstrained firms would have the financial 
resources to conduct equity issues and are therefore more likely to issue 
overvalued equity. Unlike previous studies, this thesis performs analysis of 
equity issues for simultaneous effects of internal and external financial 
constraints. Finally, stock price underperformance subsequent to equity issues 
is more severe for constrained than unconstrained firms, especially for issuance 
during financial crisis or low market liquidity. Overall, this study demonstrates 
that the effects of internal financial constraints on equity market timing is more 
pronounced when there is a concurrent external financing constraints, 
especially during periods of the financial crisis and/or low market liquidity. 
Simultaneous effects of internal and external financial constraints also 
determine subsequent stock price reactions following equity issues.  
Second, the thesis provides evidence about the effects of operating 
performance on the choice of equity issuance method and the subsequent long 
run stock returns associated with equity issues in the United Kingdom. For the 
UK in particular, several equity issuance methods are available to firms and 
each method is associated with different level of asymmetric information 
effects. Different equity issuance methods induce different types and degree of 
market reactions. Theoretical models developed in the literature attribute these 
different market reactions to quality signalling that are associated with each 
issuance method (Eckbo and Masulis, 1992; Balachandran et al., 2008). Factors 
that signal firm quality include the issue price discount, volatility of returns and 
earnings management (Dissanaike et al., 2014). The extant literature shows that 
stock returns, especially short-term returns, are a function of both firm and 
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issue characteristics (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; Armitage, 
2010). While these characteristics are transient and relate to the short term, 
operating performance will have more explanatory power in the long run than 
other firm characteristics that existing research used to explain the stock price 
performance following equity issues. Since operating performance is a long 
term performance metric it is better aligned to the changes in stock price 
performance than alternative factors that explain stock returns following equity 
issues. This thesis asserts that long run operating performance provide more 
explanatory power for the long run stock price performance following equity 
issues. Moreover, long run price performance also differs markedly among 
equity issues through rights issues, open offers and private placement. 
Operating performance explain firms inside information about their 
performance beyond the equity issuance period. 
The study departs from most previous studies that look at the choice of equity 
issuance method on the basis of the post-issue stock returns. This study asserts 
that operating performance not only determines the choice of issuance methods 
but it also explains the post-issue long run stock returns associated with each 
equity issuance method. Operating performance explains better the firm quality 
theory over the long term. Subsequent to equity issues, firms conducting rights 
issues report better operating performance than open offers and private 
placement. Thus, firms associated with better operating performance seem 
more likely to conduct rights issues rather than open offers and private 
placements. Consistent with Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), the study further 
finds that rights issuing firms outperform open offers and private placement in 
the long run. Unlike Slovin et al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006), rights 
issuing firms are associated with quality information signalling since it is 
unlikely that firms would issue overvalued equity to exploit existing 
shareholders. The study also finds that long run operating performance 
explains stock price underperformance associated with equity issues (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997; Kabir and Roosenboom, 2003). This research argues that 
operating performance better explains the choice of equity issuance than firm 
and issue characteristics such as market-to-book ratio, stock returns volatility, 
issue discount, among others. In effect, the study asserts and finds strong 
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support for the effects of long-term operating performance on both the choice 
of equity issuance and long-term stock returns associated with UK equity 
issues.  
Third, this study provides empirical evidence about levered share repurchase. 
According to conventional wisdom, firms repurchase their shares when they 
are undervalued (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996; Stephens and Weisbach, 
1998), have free cash flows (Jensen, 1986; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; 
Bozanic, 2010) and produce quality information signaling (Vermaelen, 1981, 
1984; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Baker et al. (2003)). Consistent with the 
free cash flow theory, it is less likely for internally financially constrained 
firms to conduct share repurchases unless they obtain external financing to 
support this program (Chen and Wang, 2012). It is equally puzzling for firms 
with high free cash flows or excess cash flows to borrow during share 
repurchase programs. The study provides evidence that internally financially 
unconstrained firms borrow to finance share repurchase programs. Payout 
policies make the implicit assumption that firms with significant financial 
resources do not necessarily require external financing in order to distribute 
cash to existing shareholders. Share repurchasing firms invest less in capital 
projects as more cash is distributed to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Hahn and 
Lee, 2009). However, the study argues that the additional external financing 
acts as cash buffer for investments. Given that payout limits subsequent 
investments, I explore whether unconstrained firms issue debt capital at the 
time of share repurchase announcements and find evidence that unconstrained 
firms issue debt at the time of share repurchase announcements. The findings 
also support the hypothesis that internally financially unconstrained firms 
undertake more capital investments.  
The study contributes to the share repurchase literature and in particular the 
financing of share repurchases by internally financially unconstrained firms. 
Firms do not only utilise internal cash flows to finance share repurchase but 
also a significant number of firms borrow to finance share repurchase (Chen 
and Wang, 2012; Lei and Zhang, 2015; Farre-Mensa et al., 2015). Whereas 
Chen and Wang (2012) assert that internally financially constrained firms 
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conduct share repurchases due to managerial overconfidence and hubris, this 
study highlights that internally financially unconstrained firms also borrow 
during share repurchase programs. For instance, unconstrained firms are more 
likely to be rated firms with investment grade ratings which allows them to 
obtain debt financing at low interest rates compared to an otherwise financially 
constrained firms. Stated differently, the degree of internal financial constraints 
influences the costs of debt financing and the ensuing effects of additional 
leverage on the costs of financial distress magnifies the overall costs of equity 
capital for constrained firms. Finally, Farre-Mensa et al. (2015) report that 
firms finance their payouts through debt and equity to both manage their 
capital structure and cash holdings. Their evidence shows that these firms 
could not have funded the payout without external financing. This result 
implies some of the firms are potentially financially constrained such that they 
could only finance their payouts using external financing. I find evidence 
similar to Farre-Mensa et al. (2015). Firms undertaking share repurchases 
obtain external debt-financing. In particular, I find that unconstrained firms 
borrow during share repurchase announcements and potentially utilize the 
additional cash buffers to finance investment expenditure. Overall, this study 
provides empirical evidence about levered share repurchases and show that 
investment expenditure explains levered share repurchase programs. 
1.6. Organisation of the study  
The thesis is organised into nine chapters.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature related to the effects of financial constraints on 
equity market timing. The chapter begins with the review of market timing 
theory and the other alternative theories that explain equity issuance decisions. 
It discusses the stock returns associated with equity issues and presents the 
theories that explain such stock price effects. Further, the chapter presents 
literature on internal and external financial constraints and discusses the impact 
on share issuance decisions. Finally, the chapter presents the testable 
hypotheses based on the theoretical and empirical evidence. 
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Chapter 3 provides literature review of equity issuance methods in UK. The 
chapter presents an overview of equity issuance methods in the UK and 
discusses the three main issuance methods available to UK firms. It then 
reviews the literature on short and long-term stock returns associated with 
equity issues and examines the theories that explain the returns. Finally, the 
chapter presents the testable hypotheses based on the literature. 
Chapter 4 reviews the literature on share repurchase programs in the US. The 
chapter discusses the share repurchase regulations in the US and presents the 
types of share repurchasing programs. It further reviews the factors that drive 
share repurchase and the theories that explain the stock returns associated with 
share repurchase announcements. The chapter discusses the empirical evidence 
of internal financial constraints effects on share repurchase and highlights debt-
financed share repurchase programs. Finally, the chapter presents the testable 
hypotheses based on the theoretical and empirical evidence. 
Chapter 5 discusses the data and methodology used to test the hypotheses and 
answer the research questions. It, specifically, presents the dataset and how it 
was collected, the econometric estimations and the variables for the empirical 
chapters. In addition, it discusses the justifications for the proxies used in the 
models.  
Chapter 6 investigates the simultaneous effects of market timing and financial 
constraints on share issuance decisions. The chapter presents the descriptive 
statistics of the variables and the regression analysis of the models explained in 
chapter 5. It also discusses the robustness tests conducted to corroborate the 
results of the main model.  
Chapter 7 provides the empirical testing of the asymmetric information effects 
on long-term stock returns associated with equity issuance methods. It provides 
the descriptive statistics of the variables, the univariate analysis and the 
multivariate analysis of the choice of equity issuance methods. In addition, the 
chapter presents the regression analysis of the long-run stock returns associated 
with equity issuance methods and presents the robustness tests of the main 
model.  
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Chapter 8 examines the share repurchase financing of unconstrained firms and 
explores the factors that drive unconstrained firms to borrow during the share 
repurchase announcements date. This chapter presents the descriptive statistics 
of the repurchase sample, the regression analysis of the models explained in 
chapter 5, and outlines the robustness tests for the results of the main model.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the key findings, discussing the 
limitations of the study and proposing recommendations for future research.   
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Chapter 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW: SHARE ISSUANCE DECISIONS  
2.1. Introduction  
Share issuance decisions have implications for changes in capital structure and 
firm value. These decisions also determine availability of financing for 
investment projects and can affect the overall risk exposure of the firm. 
However, the level of internal financial constraints could affect issue of 
external equity. The effect of the financial crisis in 2007/2008 highlights the 
importance of external financial constraints in equity issues. This chapter 
reviews the theories that underlie share issuance decisions. It further examines 
the literature on the effects of both internal and external financial constraints on 
shares issuance and discusses the stock returns associated with equity issues. 
The chapter also develops testable hypotheses that set out the focus of the 
empirical chapter 6 of the thesis. 
The chapter has four sections. Section 2.2 reviews theories of share issuance. It 
discusses theories such as asymmetric information/pecking order theory, 
market timing, agency theory, and trade-off theory, among others. Section 2.3 
focuses on the effects of mispricing and internal financial constraints on equity 
issues. The section examines the effects valuation and financing decisions, 
share issuance and internal as well external financial constraints. Section 2.4 
explains the empirical evidence of stock returns associated with equity issues 
and the theories that explain the stock returns‟ behaviour. Section 2.5 develops 
the testable hypotheses and section 2.6 concludes the chapter.  
2.2. Review of Theories of Share Issuance  
Through corporate financing policies, firms obtain funds in the external capital 
market for varied reasons. For example, firms need financing to undertake new 
investments, to pay dividends, to maintain capital structure, among others. The 
most popular financing sources include debt and equity, as well as convertible 
debt. Several theories have been developed to explain in part the reasoning 
behind financing decisions and the subsequent security issuance. Several 
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theories explain the motivations for share issuance decisions. The study 
provides here a brief theoretical framework of some of the theories 
documented in the finance text. In the empirical analysis, various proxies are 
used to control for the effects of these competing theories that determine the 
issuance of equity.  
2.2.1. Pecking Order and Asymmetric Information Hypotheses 
Two related theories that explain security issuance decisions are the pecking 
order and the asymmetric information hypothesis. According to the pecking 
order theory, firms follow a hierarchical order of financing preferences; 
internal financing is preferred to external financing. Myers (1984) and Myers 
and Majluf (1984) explain that high costs of adverse selection associated with 
external financing means firms will only use retained earnings unless external 
financing is needed in which case debt is preferred to equity issues (debt 
attracts low adverse selection costs than equity financing). In a rational setting, 
undertaking valuable investment opportunities requires firms to have readily 
available internal cash flows without necessarily going to the external capital 
market. It is only after exhausting internal funds firms are encouraged to obtain 
financing from outside in order of debt followed by equity (Myers and Majluf, 
1984). In an asymmetric information environment, financing choices that 
reveal positive information to the market are more likely to be preferred by 
managers. Firms that have expected high cash flows are in a better position to 
enter the capital market but high asymmetric information effects hugely affect 
such prospects. Thus, high valued firms are more likely to issue debt capital to 
signal substantially positive financial position than low valued firms, despite 
significantly high asymmetric information. The overriding intuition is that debt 
signals firm quality.  
Unlike equity issues, debt financing is associated with low asymmetric 
information effects. As debt issues are made with the supposition of providing 
positive information about the firm‟s quality, price reactions should be 
positive. Thus, leverage increasing transactions such as debt issue and equity 
repurchase are highly correlated with positive stock price returns. Equity issue 
reduces any positive impact of the positive financial and operating effects due 
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to its associated adverse selection costs. The conjecture is that at high (low) 
asymmetric information, firms issue debt (equity). While equity issue costs 
much in terms of issue costs and asymmetric information effects, debt can be 
issued cheap and with relative rapidity; despite the subsequent increase in costs 
of financial distress. Myers (2001) explains that large debt financing is a major 
support for the pecking order theory. The empirical support is mixed but 
generally pecking order has some predictive power of financing decisions.  
Studies such as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Lemmon and Zender 
(2010) test the pecking order theory. For example, Lemmon and Zender (2010) 
use dataset from 1971 to 2001 and confirm how the pecking order influences 
financing choices. Firms that enter the debt market have debt capacity to 
support additional leverage, stable cash flows with large pool of collateral. 
Information transparency enables firms to borrow at the equilibrium interest 
rate and increases their ability to access capital from the external debt market. 
With debt capacity, additional debt financing will have limited impact on costs 
of financial distress, while indirectly rebalancing the capital structure. Such 
debt-issuing firms are supported by high levels of tangible assets and relatively 
stable profitability to guarantee stable cash flows.  
However, it is possible for firms to obtain financing without necessarily going 
to the external market. Transactions such as employee options are unrelated to 
adverse selection costs; therefore, equity issues are not constrained by 
asymmetric information effects. If firms consistently pursue these issues, then 
the pecking order breaks down and is unable to determine which security-
financing firms adopt. Again, studies show that financial deficits have limited 
predictive control of financing choice. According to the pecking order theory, 
equity issues are made as last resort (due to adverse selection costs) in a state 
of significant debt capacity concerns that restricts access to the debt market. 
Thus, consequent financial distress costs discourage additional debt financing. 
This theoretical explanation has been challenged in several studies citing 
different motivations for equity issues contrary to predictions of the pecking 
order hypothesis.  
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In the spirit of asymmetric information effects, firms with substantial cash 
stockpile should avoid the external capital market and finance investment using 
internal cash flows. Helwege and Liang (1996) confirm this theory that firms 
with greater cash surpluses avoid external funding, but their results do not 
imply that cash deficit forces firms into the external finance market. 
Interestingly, asymmetric information also does little to explain the pecking 
order theory as significant asymmetric information fails to trigger equity 
finance. Equity issuers dominate external security financing that, as 
emphasised by Fama and French (2005), is not due to duress or cash deficit as 
theory posits. Again, firms that have previously obtained external financing are 
highly probable of obtaining additional funding subsequently. Again, Frank 
and Goyal (2003) use broad cross sections of 768 publicly traded American 
firms from 1971 to 1998, similar to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), and find 
that equity dominates debt issues unrelated to financial distress.11 
From the above discourse, firms willing to make equity offering should be 
prepared to manipulate the market prior to the financing decisions in order to 
reduce the information asymmetry. But Korajczyk et al. (1991) assert that 
information releases precede equity issues. Asymmetric information effects 
represent immense bane on equity offerings due to the tendency for rational 
investors to discount the stock prices as a result of a lack of symmetry in 
information between managers and investors. Arguing for dominating equity 
issues, they offer evidence that dispels the general notion of unattractive equity 
issuance decisions. They find a clustering of equity issues around information 
release dates. To obtain favourable response to security issuance, especially 
equity, firms are more inclined to, as a matter of timing philosophy, release 
„good‟ information prior to equity offerings. The effect is to discount the 
tendency for stock price depression on issuing the security. Instructively, 
equity issues preceding positive information releases are associated with 
significant price premium. However, other systematic events can trigger price 
reaction in either direction.  
                                                        
11 Also Fama and French (2005) highlight the limited impact financial distress and asymmetric 
information has on financing decisions.  
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2.2.2. Market Timing  
A relatively new theory that builds on the predictions of the information 
asymmetry hypothesis is the market timing theory. Market timing is one of the 
financing theories that have been tested to influence corporate financing 
decisions. It emphasises managers‟ efforts at issuing securities, especially 
equity, at a time in the market where they perceive benefits in the form of high 
stock prices and/or leave the market at low stock prices. Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) define market timing as the tendency for firms to issue equity at high 
prices (when stock is overvalued) and repurchase at low prices (when stock is 
undervalued). Temporary fluctuations in the cost of equity relative to other 
sources of capital guarantee the prospects of market timing. Not only does 
market timing persists in theory but it has also received much attention in 
empirical studies. Nonetheless, the evidence is mixed and fails to provide a 
convincing argument about its dominance in security issuance decisions. 
Managers are optimistic when market conditions favour their financing 
decisions and that drives the opportunistic attitudes of firms that form the 
foundation of market timing. Survey evidence provides converging position of 
CFOs across countries and different economic environments. For example, 
Graham and Harvey (2001) survey 392 US CFOs and find that securities issues 
reflect the timing potentials of firms.12 
Furthermore, the theory of market timing relates to the effects of adverse 
selection costs associated with security issues with variations across both time 
and firms.  This version of market timing reflects the asymmetric information 
theory of capital structure and explains that equity market timing depends on 
the degree of asymmetric information. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), 
the high costs of adverse selection due to information asymmetry constrain 
firms to issue equity. Several studies explore time-varying adverse selection 
costs (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk et al.1992) and adverse selection 
that varies across firms (Choe et al.1993).  Information releases prior to equity                                                         
12 Bancel and Mittoo (2004) studies 87 CFOs from 16 European countries while Brounen et al. 
(2006) provides findings on 313 CFOs from 4 European countries. Both evidence including 
Graham and Harvey (2001) suggests that managers actually time the market before security 
issues are made.  
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issues reduce the effects of information asymmetry and increase investor 
optimism (Korajczyk et al. 1991; Rajan and Servaes, 1997). By extension, the 
changing adverse selection costs should also reflect the variations in market-to-
book ratio (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Generally, firms prefer debt capital 
because it conveys information about firm quality and it avoids the asymmetric 
information effects associated with equity financing. However, beyond the tax 
advantages and the power of debt to reduce the agency costs of free cash flows, 
debt issues increase costs of financial distress and other agency costs, the 
prospects of debt overhang crowd (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, in the 
presence of asymmetric information, and given the excessive restrictions debt 
places on undertaking growth options, equity issues can only be made to 
support investment for overvalued stock.  
Another explanation to the market timing theory concerns the presence of 
irrational investors and/or managers and time-varying mispricing. An 
interpretation of mispricing is that investors are irrational and therefore make 
systematic errors in forming expectations about stock prices and hence the 
value of the firm. These perceptions mean that stocks can become significantly 
over or under-valued at particular points in time. Mispricing relates to 
overvaluation of equity and undervaluation of repurchase where overvalued 
equity are issued to profit from high stock prices and undervalued equity are 
repurchased because they are cheap. Survey evidence by Graham and Harvey 
(2001) and capital budgeting model by Stein (1996) both support managers‟ 
attempt to time their equity issues. Moreover, Baker and Wurgler (2002) assert 
that past changes in market-to-book ratio actually explain equity issues and 
subsequent changes in capital structure. The above findings suggest that firms 
systematically time their equity issues when their shares are overvalued.  
Taken together, mispricing should coincide with low asymmetric information. 
Conversely, the high mispricing can neutralise the adverse selection costs of 
asymmetric information to motivate firms to issue overvalued equity. 
Therefore, mispricing has substantial predictive power for equity market timing 
because the total gains exceed the adverse announcement effects (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2000). The empirical analysis offers new dimensions to the market 
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timing theory by looking at how internal financial constraints affect the issue of 
overvalued equity and the subsequent stock price reactions.  
2.2.3. Trade off Theory  
Since security issues can affect capital structure and firm value, theory of static 
trade off holds that there is a target leverage ratio that triggers security issuance 
decisions when there is a deviation of the current ratio. Debt and equity 
issuance are dependent on the conditions of the capital mix at a point in time 
such that debt is issued when leverage is low and equity at high leverage ratio. 
By maintaining target leverage firms balance the benefits of debt capital from 
tax advantages and control of free cash flow problems and costs emanating 
from bankruptcy costs and other agency costs. Moreover, managers with high 
levels of free cash flow under their control can engage in inefficient 
investments. Leverage restricts managerial hubris through fixed interest 
commitments and limit managerial discretion (Jung et al. 1996).  
Hovakimian et al. (2001) test the trade-off theory using debt-equity model and 
contend that results on trade off are statistically significant. Firms possess both 
assets in place evidenced by the value of tangible assets in the business and 
growth options represented by the level of intangible assets available. The 
interactions between these two alternatives inform firms about the choice of 
financing to access. Whereas tangible assets expressly provide collateral, they 
support debt financing more than equity and growth opportunities track equity 
financing. Hovakimian et al. (2001) find that more profitable firms have a 
relatively low leverage ratio that eventually triggers more debt financing to 
move the leverage ratio to target. On the other hand, since valuable growth 
opportunities reflect positively in the stock prices, firms are motivated to issue 
equity rather than debt to rebalance their leverage to target ratio. Specifically, 
they highlight the impact of repurchase on rebalancing the leverage.  
It is noteworthy to understand the short run impact of market timing in the 
context of trade off theory. Timing security issues result in temporary 
distortion of the capital structure. Equity creates under leverage while debt and 
repurchase are leverage increasing transactions. Firms that consistently adjust 
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their capital mix to reflect the target ratio rebalance their leverage subsequent 
to timing activities. Thus, leverage adjustment curtails the effects of M/B on 
capital structure. Kayhan and Titman (2007) as well as Marsh (1982) 
emphasise that when all market timing opportunities disappear financing 
choices move the leverage towards optimum level. The studies by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), using the partial adjustment technique, summarises 
the degree of explanatory power between trade-off and pecking order theories. 
Relying on the effects of tax advantages and financial deficits they find that 
pecking order can be rejected when firms follow static trade off but fail to 
reject static trade off in the event of pecking order. Despite the apparent bias in 
the sample towards larger firms, it is still intuitive to generate further 
investigation. A model which incorporates the effects of stock valuation and 
asymmetric information will be interesting to appreciate how this theory 
accommodates other factors other than tax advantages and costs of financial 
distress. 
2.2.4. Agency Theory 
The agency theory emphasises that organisations are characterised by 
principal-agency relation where shareholders (principal) entrust to managers 
(agents) the control of the business affairs. This separation of ownership from 
control creates conflict of interest due to the tendency for managers to pursue 
acts that benefit them at the expense of the shareholders. Jensen (1986) asserts 
that financing decisions only reflect the interest of the agents not the principal. 
Agency costs consideration forces firms to depart from pecking order in their 
financing decisions. High agency costs of debt reflect increased equity 
financing to support investment projects and managerial discretion forces firms 
to issue equity when there is no viable investment opportunity to pursue.  
Firms with valuable investment opportunities that seek to grow issue equity or 
those without investment opportunities but are constrained to issue debt due to 
debt capacity concerns issue equity. The agency model confirms that such 
equity financing only benefits management at the expense of shareholders. 
Excessive leverage reduces managerial discretion. Management losses control 
over free cash flows due to fixed commitments of interest payment to creditors 
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and monitoring mechanisms inserted in debt covenants to limit potential 
managerial hubris. Increasing leverage imposes financial discipline on 
management. This in part works to curtail any opportunistic activities 
management would have otherwise had the leeway to undertake at the expense 
of shareholders. The agency theory underlies both the information asymmetry 
and market timing theories in such a way as to define the issuance of equity. 
Invariably, the empirical analysis undertaken in this study captures the effects 
of agency theory on the issuance of overvalued equity.  
2.2.5. Managerial Ownership 
Security issuance decisions to a large extent depend on the level of managerial 
interest attached to the firm. The impact of asset substitution can be allayed to 
a significant extent when managers have interest in the debt structure of the 
firm. Increased leverage exposes the firm to costly financial distress but 
managers in acting in the interest of shareholders can pursue risky investments 
that can yield high returns. However, in the event of failed projects much of the 
fixed payments to debt holders could be greatly affected. Managers with 
pension benefits and compensation packages have incentive to act in ways that 
protect the business from uncertain bankruptcy. Therefore, with a meaningful 
managerial investment in the debt capital of the firm, they seek to act in the 
interest of other outside debt holders and invariably fail to advance wealth-
enhancing programmes that benefit shareholders (Cassell et al.  2012). 
Managers tend to forfeit risky investments to preserve the financial health of 
the company. This reduces the agency costs of debt between managers and 
debt holders. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasise that CEOs 
with inside debt holdings make investments and pursue financial policies that 
mitigate agency costs of debt. Since debt reveals positive information about the 
earnings of a company, it follows that CEO debt holdings should offer stock 
price premium. The above explanations indicate that managerial ownership can 
be a source of information asymmetry and hence affect the issuance of equity.  
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2.2.6. Managerial Entrenchment  
In the context of Jensen‟s (1986) free cash flow theory, debt constrains 
managers from undertaking suboptimal investment decisions with the available 
cash that fosters managerial empire building objectives. To limit these 
tendencies, Jensen advocates for high levels of debt capital to disgorge cash to 
outsiders in the form of increased fixed interest payments. The real 
disadvantage associated with the agency costs of free cash flow theory is that it 
equally works to undermine investments in good projects, as do bad ones. 
However, as a corollary to this explanation, Zwiebel (1996) offers a new 
dimension to the power of debt in restraining managerial hubris.  
While managers typically act in manner that tend to promote their personal 
interest, excessive debt levels presents a credible avenue for managers to 
restrict bad investment projects. Under managerial entrenchment theory, debt 
financing provides a moderating influence on managerial actions that 
invariably protects firm value. Takeover threats coupled with bankruptcy costs 
and loss of managerial entrenchment encourages managers to pay out 
dividends from increased debt financing. This, in effect, deactivates potential 
investments in bad projects. Thus, the power of debt in protecting against 
undertaking bad projects should be accompanied by a contemporaneous 
dividend payment of the available cash flow.  
2.2.7. Earnings Management  
As an accounting anomaly, firms manage earnings using revenues and/or 
expenses. Accounting earnings comprise both cash component that represents 
transactions for which corresponding cash payments/receipts have been made 
and accrual component where payments or receipts are deferred beyond the 
current accounting period. In order to portray a healthy earnings structure, 
firms can deliberately defer expenses and recognize immediately revenues in 
the books to shore up the earnings for the period. Thus, earnings management 
occurs when the discretionary accruals component of the earnings has been 
unjustifiably inflated. The effect is that subsequent earnings must reflect this 
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short term trend leading to further abnormal accruals in the reported financial 
statements.  
The extant empirical evidence suggests that firms engaged in earnings 
management also undertake significant corporate financing decisions. For 
example, initial public offerings (IPO) (Teoh et al., 1998) and seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al. 1998) follow periods of earnings 
management. While Teoh et al. (1998) propose that investors act naively to 
incidence of earnings management, Shivakumar (2000) emphasises the concept 
of „managerial response‟ to investors anticipation of managers earnings 
management practices. The managers in turn rationally overstate earnings prior 
to offering announcements at least to the extent anticipated by the market. This 
perceived earnings manipulation causes the share prices to rise above the 
market expected valuation; the market response by discounting the share price 
to normal levels. Jensen (2005) provides theoretical underpinnings as the 
antecedent to the earnings management phenomenon.  
As in the case of market timing, overvaluation can be linked to earnings 
management. The tendencies for information to filter through the market and 
investors opinions about the value of firms to converge over time stifle 
sustaining overvaluation in the long run. Since overvaluation is a temporary 
phenomenon, firms and managers readily attempt to benefit from this anomaly 
in the short run with dire consequences for shareholder value in the long run. 
Chi and Gupta (2009) test the hypothesis that relates overvaluation to earnings 
management previously theorised by Jensen (2005). Consistent with their 
predictions, overvalued equity engages in earnings management. The 
motivation is to justify that overvalued firms also report high operating 
performance. However, the effect of managing earnings in support of 
overvaluation excites market reactions. Chi and Gupta (2009) find negative 
stock returns and poor operating performance associated with overvalued 
firms, especially those that simultaneously manage their earnings. Information 
asymmetry relates to earnings management and the addition of appropriate 
proxy controls for the effects of earnings management on share issuance 
decisions.  
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2.3. Mispricing and the Effects of Internal Financial Constraints 
This section reviews relevant literature about market timing and share issuance 
decisions. It also discusses the effects of financial constraints and establishes 
how the level of financial constraints can potentially undermine prospects of 
equity market timing. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection 
2.2.1 discusses the effects of valuation on financing decisions. Subsection 2.2.2 
examines the influence of internal financial constraints on equity issues while 
subsection 2.2.3 reviews the effects of external financial constraints on share 
issuance decisions.  
2.3.1. Valuation and Financing Decisions  
Extant empirical evidence such as Akerlof (1970), Myers and Majluf (1984), 
Bayless and Chaplinsky (1991), (Helwege and Liang (1996), Frank and Goyal 
(2003), Baker and Wurgler (2002) DeAngelo et al. (2010) assert that capital 
structure changes have significant impact on firm value, contrary to the capital 
structure irrelevance proposition by Modigliani and Miller (1958).  This notion 
implies that it is necessary that managers take financing decisions with the 
view to improve the overall shareholder value. Thus, the degree of mispricing 
enables firms to issue securities that enhance this value. Not only does 
mispricing encourage equity offering but other evidence also suggest that 
mispricing is the result of available growth opportunities. Firms with 
substantial investment options have the edge to source financing from external 
capital market. In the spirit of market timing, firms issue equity at high 
valuation (high M/B) and repurchase equity/issue debt at low valuation (low 
M/B). With increasing levels of equity (at high M/B), the capital mix tilts more 
towards low leverage and corresponding leverage increasing transactions 
(repurchase/debt issue) result in high leverage. Conclusively, firms that time 
the market in their issues have low leverage for equity issues and improve their 
leverage levels at low valuations.  
Consequently, changes in valuation should trigger specific financing decisions 
in line with equity market timing proposition. If analysts are optimistic about 
the earnings of the company, there is the tendency for the market value to 
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deviate markedly from the fundamental value. This encourages opportunistic 
managers to issue equity to profit from the temporary price divergence. Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) emphasise that companies do not only make equity 
financing at high valuation and repurchase at low valuation but also capitalise 
on analyst favourable opinion about the company. In testing the persistence of 
market timing on capital structure, they study a sample of firms in IPO time 
and develop subsamples over a ten-year period to determine the changing 
patterns of capital structure as market valuation changes. Their results reveal 
that there is a persistent impact of market valuation changes on the capital 
structure on a long run basis. Capital structure reflects the past valuation 
movements. The net effects of high market-to-book values are to lower 
leverage independent of increased retained earnings and decreased debt.  
Moreover, the degree of responsiveness to valuation effects relates to the level 
of available cash flow to conduct the appropriate security issuance. Internally 
financially sound firm will be better able to react to mispricing than an 
otherwise internally financially constrained entity. The intuition is that high 
transaction costs can impede the ability and the speed with which firms make 
issues in accordance with equity market timing hypothesis. Dong et al. (2012) 
highlight the influence of internal financial constraints on valuation effects. 
They study securities issue on the Toronto Stock Exchange and find that 
companies that have substantial timing opportunities will be inclined to issue 
equity only when they are internally financially unconstrained. Any issue of 
additional debt increases the leverage that is associated with costly financial 
distress. Similarly, the deduction from their findings is not too remote from the 
pecking order hypothesis. However, as they emphasise, equity issue is highly 
valuation dependent even when there are internal financial constraints. 
However, other evidence suggests that M/B is related to growth opportunities 
rather than mispricing. High M/B reflects available growth options that firms 
can undertake. Investor optimism about future earnings underscores the 
potential for firms to turn the valuable investments into assets in place that is 
positive information to the market. This effect, coupled with other information 
released to the market, reinforces favourable market valuation of the company 
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stocks. Hovakimian (2006), for example, documents result consistent with the 
hypothesis that historical M/B tracks current expenditure and R&D such that 
high M/B drives higher current capital expenditure and research and 
expenditure, a proxy for growth opportunities. The effects of market timing on 
leverage disappear and growth opportunities dominate financing decisions. 
These findings cast doubt on the market timing persistent effects on leverage. 
The study explores the effects of internal financial constraints on the market 
timing of equity issues. Unlike previous studies, this study seeks to provide 
new understanding of the factors that determine the issuance of overvalued 
equity. Thus, in addition to the traditional idea of market timing dependent on 
mispricing or overvaluation, the focus of this research is an attempt to offer 
new insights into equity market timing phenomenon.  
2.3.2. Internal Financial Constraints and Corporate Financial Policy 
Firms are internally financially constrained if they face funding constraints that 
may restrict their ability to finance new or on-going projects. Internal financial 
constraints also mean the frictions or restrictions that impede access to external 
financing either through borrowings or equity issues (Fazzari et al. 1988; 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont et al. 2001; Almeida et al. 2004; Whited 
and Wu, 2006; Chen and Chen, 2012). Fazzari et al (1988) assert that in a 
perfect market where firms have unlimited access to capital market, investment 
decisions are independent of a firm‟s financial position. However, in an 
imperfect market and with limited internal financing firms that rely on external 
financing incur substantial cost to access both equity and debt capital. Low cost 
external financing implies firms are able to smooth their investments when 
there is insufficient internal financing.  Firms are classified as internally 
financially constrained using a priori conditions such as size, dividend 
payments and leverage. Investment is driven by cash flow fluctuations when 
firms face significant costs of external financing. Firms are internally 
financially constrained if they are restricted in accessing external financing 
either through borrowings or equity issues. In other words, there is a wedge 
between internal and external costs of financing. By this definition, Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) – hereafter KZ index - conclude that all firms are likely to be 
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classified as internally financially constrained when they incur transaction 
costs in securing external financing. 
Firms are internally financially constrained if they are restricted in accessing 
external financing either through borrowings or equity issues. In other words, 
there is a wedge between internal and external costs of financing. By this 
definition, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) conclude that all firms are likely to be 
classified as internally financially constrained when they incur transaction 
costs in securing external financing. The appropriate differentiation of firms in 
terms of internal financial constraints depends on the degree of the costs 
between internal and external financing. Their findings contrast that of Fazzari 
et al. (1988) and raises concern about the link between investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and financing constraints. Using sample of 49 low dividend paying 
firms (identified by Fazzari et al. (1988) as constrained firms), they find that 
less financially constrained firms exhibit greater sensitivity than more 
constrained firms. The underlying assumption of monotonicity of investment-
cash flow sensitivity with the degree of financial constraints is challenged. 
However, data snooping issues might be raised against the sample size and 
period.  
Lamont et al. (2001) define financial constraints as frictions (in an imperfect 
market) that prevent firms from obtaining external financing to undertake 
investments. Financial constraints imply credit constraints or inability to 
borrow, dependence on bank loans, inability to issue equity and illiquidity of 
assets. However, Alti (2003) argues that financing constraints is not unique to 
only markets with frictions because the information signalling effects of cash 
flows will still hold in a model without market imperfections (Fazzari et al., 
1988; Gomes, 2001). For instance, Campello et al. (2010) use survey measure 
of financial constraints where CFOs determine whether their firms are facing 
financial constraints due to unavailability and cost of credit. Consistent with 
the literature, they find that constrained firms planned cut in capital spending, 
employment and tech spending. In events where they anticipate restrictions in 
borrowings they would sell assets. Despite the apparent limitation on financial 
policy for constrained firms, Chen and Wang (2012) provide evidence to 
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suggest that a number of constrained firms repurchase equity. Firms rely on 
financial resources to undertake investment projects, make dividend payments, 
decide on security issuance or repurchase transactions, among other issues. 
Thus, the capacity to meet opportunities in terms of investments and other 
corporate financial policies is defined by whether or not the firm is financially 
unconstrained.  
Moyen (2004) offers an explanation to why some inconsistencies exist between 
the different financial constraints measures, especially between FHP index and 
KZ index. Debt financing in a frictionless market and for firms less financially 
constrained affect internal cash flow and the level of investment likely to be 
undertaken. Unconstrained firms with access to the capital market can easily 
obtain debt financing to supplement the internal cash flows and consequently 
increase their investment spending when there are more favourable investment 
opportunities. Moreover, whereas unconstrained firms with more cash flow can 
afford to increase investment and dividends simultaneously, constrained firms 
can only choose to invest or pay dividends. Thus, in support of Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997), constrained firms have lower cash flow sensitivity than 
unconstrained firms. Again, using low dividends to proxy for financial 
constraints and consistent with the predictions of Fazzari et al (1988), she 
concludes that the unconstrained firms rather pay low dividends and have 
higher cash flow sensitivity. The ability of these firms to issue more debt 
means that equity holders of unconstrained firms receive lower dividends.   
Whether or not firms anticipate and face financing constraints has implications 
for liquidity management, especially cash flow decisions. Almeida et al. (2004) 
develop a different measure of financial constraints which underlies the 
relevance of liquidity management. Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Almeida et al. 
(2004) and Chen and Chen (2012) all argue that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is flawed as a measure of financial constraints. They assert that the 
ability to predict investment demand influences the explanatory power of the 
index. Liquidity is an important factor that affects the financial policies of 
firms. Chen and Chen (2012) contend that there has been a significant decline 
in investment-cash flow sensitivity over the years, including the period of the 
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credit crunch. For example, Almeida et al (2004) predict that firms with 
uncertain cash flows will save more to avert situation of forgoing anticipated 
investment projects in future or cut dividends, among others. The cash flow 
sensitivity of cash defines the propensity for firms to save out of cash flows. 
Similar to investment sensitivity to cash flow index, they find that constrained 
firms with uncertain cash flows have positive cash flow sensitivity of cash. 
Unconstrained firms do not rely solely on savings to undertake financial 
policies; their savings are not related to cash flows. 
2.3.3. Share Issuance and Internal Financial Constraints   
This study demonstrates the effects of financial constraints on equity issues 
beyond overvaluation and mispricing. A supplementary factor to mispricing is 
how the level of financial constraints could influence firms‟ equity issuing 
decisions. It should be noted that financing decisions incur substantial costs. 
Comparatively, transactions costs incidental to equity issues are normally 
higher than that of debt capital, consistent with the adverse selection costs 
theory (Myers, 1984 and Myers and Majluf, 1984). Therefore, firms that are 
financially sound stand a better chance to issue equity when market conditions 
are favourable. Internal financial constraints determine the firm‟s demand for 
external financing (McLean and Zhao, 2014). Ceteris paribus, constrained 
firms cannot issue equity at high costs given the supply of external funding 
provided by investors. At high valuations, low asymmetric information with 
financial deficit and over leverage, firms prefer to issue equity capital than debt 
financing. Extant empirical evidence supports this trend yet most studies fail to 
account for the effect of financial constraints on the latitude of firms to pursue 
their financing objectives. Thus, financial flexibility relates to the ability to 
enter the external capital market. Firms that are substantially financially 
constrained rarely enter the capital market. However, studies show disparate 
results. 
Theoretically, security issuance decisions depend on the need to achieve target 
leverage ratio, level of debt capacity and asymmetric information effects and 
mispricing. The speed of adjusting to optimum leverage, especially using 
equity, increases with financial flexibility. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) stress 
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that financially constrained firms find it impossible and expensive to issue 
securities that quickly restore the optimum debt ratio.13 In the study of security 
issuance decisions of Canadian firms, Dong et al (2012) emphasise the 
influence of financial constraints on the choice and speed of issuance in 
relation to high valuation. They contend that less financially constrained firms 
have high probability to issue equity when they are overvalued. This is 
suggestive that market timing is enhanced with cash availability.  
However, if firms issue equity at a time when there is the need for adequate 
cash flow to support investment then this weakens equity market timing 
opportunities. DeAngelo et al. (2010) find that market timing and life cycle 
play significant roles in financing decisions. Yet, at high valuation the need for 
“near term” cash for future investments drives equity financing. That is, not all 
firms take advantage of timing opportunities. With substantial financial slack 
or high cash balance, there is limited motivation to obtain additional external 
financing regardless of the level of stock price. It is only at high financial 
constraints will firms be forced to access outside financing. They find that 
close to 62.6% and 81.1% of equity issuers would have run out of cash or 
would have had subnormal cash balances respectively in the year after the 
issue. 
Firms that are financially constrained rarely enter the external capital market. 
But these firms are more likely to absorb any cash flow shocks internally. 
Adequate internal funds provide buffer for investments expenditure with fewer 
tendencies to contact outsiders for financing. Financial deficit/surplus is the 
overriding factor in deciding to enter the external market. Firms are likely to 
relegate cost of financial distress from excessive debt capital to 
increase/decrease debt with substantial deficit/surplus. They adjust capital 
structure either in the face of above target debt or below target debt ratio. 
Byoun (2008) finds, in contrast to Kayhan and Titman (2007), that capital 
structure adjustment is more above-target ratio dependent than it is for below-
target ratio. Financial surplus is used to retire debt capital for excessive debt 
                                                        
13 Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins and Smith (2012) find that financial constraints have, in 
terms of magnitude, larger effect on leverage rebalancing than market timing considerations. 
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but the tendency to issue more debt/repurchase equity in financial deficit is less 
pronounced.  
2.3.4. Share Issuance and External Financial Constraints   
Whereas internal financial constraints occur within the firm due to policy 
changes and decisions, external financial constraints is an economy-wide effect 
on the overall capital market. This study synthesises the effects of internal and 
external financial constraints in explaining equity market timing. The financial 
crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 demonstrate how external 
financing conditions impact corporate policies. Recent studies highlight 
changes in firms‟ investment and payout decisions during the financial crisis. 
For example, Campello et al. (2010) and Campello et al. (2011) and McLean 
and Zhao (2014) document the effects of financial crisis on firm investment, 
payout polices, employment and assets sales to finance investments. Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010) also show constraints on bank lending during the crisis. 
These findings are consistent with external financing constraints effects on 
corporate decisions. The financing conditions have direct impact on the costs 
of issuing equity as reflected in investment banking fees. For example, Lee et 
al. (1996) report that investment banking fees represent about 7% of the total 
proceeds from equity financing.14 Thus, there is a direct correlation between 
low market liquidity and high investment banking fees, emanating from 
unfavourable external financing conditions (Corwin, 2003; Butler et al. 2005). 
Butler et al. (2005) show that difference in investment banking fees between 
most liquid and least liquid stock is about 21%.  
That security issuance decisions occur contemporaneously with favourable 
market conditions is fundamental underlying factor of the market timing 
theory. If firms do not issue equity to undertake investments now then it is 
expected that the firms will stockpile cash subsequent to issuance. The 
apparent demand for cash to undertake future investments impel firms to obtain 
external financing with the aim to building cash flow as precaution, especially                                                         
14 Market liquidity depends on how ease firms can sell their shares and as the liquidity becomes 
low due to unfavourable conditions, investment banking fees increase to compensate for the 
extra effort and time to sell the shares. 
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during good times. Akin to market timing, this period represents high stock 
prices when firms can cash in on mispricing. A combination of low 
transactions costs, availability of valuable future investments, cash flow 
volatility and high liquidity typifies periods of favourable market and firm 
level conditions. Bolton et al. (2013) assert that improved financing conditions 
raises stock prices. Conversely, higher probability of a crisis and the adverse 
effects on stock prices and costs of issuance motivate firms to invest 
conservatively and build cash buffers now through significant cash savings. 
Firms are also more likely to issue equity now prior to the downturn in 
financing conditions. However, firms are unable to anticipate when external 
financing conditions will deteriorate which means firms can only respond to 
the ex post financing conditions.  
Thus, equity market timing activities should be expressive during good market 
conditions compared to a recessionary period. Alti (2006) offers a new 
dimension to timing opportunities by looking at the market conditions under 
which equity issues are made, especially IPOs. He notes that since market 
conditions are orthogonal (statistically independent) of other factors affecting 
financing decisions, those conditions better isolate the timing behaviour. 
Particularly, financial distress and growth characteristics do not influence 
external financing. “Hot market” firms effectively time the market and issue 
more equity than cold market firms. The short run impact of market timing on 
capital structure explains the subsequent attempts to rebalance leverage levels 
after the equity issues. The less equity issues after IPO could be due to long run 
stock underperformance that makes equity significantly undesirable giving 
preference to debt financing.  
With limited adverse selection costs, the overall market reactions to financing 
choice should reflect moderate effects on stock prices. Alti and Sulaeman 
(2012) draw distinctive effects of both high and low institutional investor 
demand for firms‟ equity and find a strong support for the increased likelihood 
for overvalued firms to issue equity when there is perceived institutional 
demand for the stock. The need for financing is wide ranging and could enforce 
issuance decisions that are suboptimal to the purposes for which they are 
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sought in the capital market. Market conditions are subject to the vagaries in 
the general economic environment with both good times and bad times. A key 
incentive for stock market transactions is liquidity that greatly fluctuates 
overtime. The extant literature on market timing provides evidence that firms 
could time their equity issues during favourable market conditions even when 
there is no immediate need for external equity financing (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Fama and French, 2005; DeAngelo et al. 2010) 
By inference, firms that systematically time their security issues should, 
regardless of investment options, possess substantial financial slack, especially 
for equity financing. Market conditions that enhance equity offerings improve 
the cash position when there are no potentially viable investments to undertake. 
McLean (2011) studies these features as drivers of equity issuance to meet 
firm‟s precautionary motives. Discounting market timing as reflecting the cash 
savings following equity financing, he reports that issuers‟ do not record 
substantial low returns. A significant fall in cash flow over the years has made 
firms resort to equity issuance as source of cash to meet future investments 
commitments. Specifically, he finds that about 60% of recent decade share 
issuance proceeds are saved. There is increasingly less dependence on internal 
cash flow as firms have resorted to external financing as source for cash flow 
(Pontiff and Irvine, 2009; Bolton et al. 2013). As precautionary motive, firms 
maintain target cash-to-assets ratio that they adjust through share issuance 
decisions. In essence, the study focuses on how external financial constraints 
interact with internal financial constraints to determine the issuance of 
overvalued equity.  
2.4. Share Issuance and Stock Returns   
The empirical literature provides evidence of stock underperformance 
following the issue of equity (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1995). Stocks that trade in efficient markets respond instantaneously to 
new information that the market receives. Such information includes, among 
others, earnings announcements, corporate takeover and merger news, change 
in management. Security issuance likewise has signalling effects and rational 
market participants react accordingly. Post issue stock returns fall for equity 
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and rise with equity repurchase/debt issues. This section discusses the 
underreaction hypothesis of stock returns in subsection 2.3.1. Subsection 2.3.2 
explains rational discount rate theory of stock returns whereas subsection 2.3.3 
examines the investment-based explanation. Finally, subsection 2.3.4 explores 
the economic perspective underlying stock returns response to equity issues.  
2.4.1. Underreaction Hypothesis 
Equity issues convey “bad” news that triggers rational market response. 
Repurchase and debt financing signal good information about the prospects of 
the business and highlight earnings quality. Given the perceptions of the 
market concerning the financing choice, equity financing attracts low returns 
whereas repurchase/debt earns high returns. The extant empirical findings 
attribute this trend to market timing determined solely by the level of 
mispricing regardless of investment opportunities. Decisions to issue securities 
reflect managers‟ opportunistic behaviour to profit from the lack of symmetry 
between stock market value and the intrinsic or fundamental value.  
Stock market reactions to security issuance are not immediate which suggests 
that investors are irrational and are conservative in receiving new information 
in the market. Loughran and Ritter (1995) posit that long run stock 
performance is explained by the underreaction hypothesis. Other studies that 
also allude to this explanation include Bilinski and Strong (2009), Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) and Womack (1996). All of this evidence suggests that 
long run performance reflects investor partial processing of information 
signaled by managers at announcement date with partial effect on prices. The 
remaining effects of the information accounts for the long run lower returns. 
Full signaling effects take time to be totally absorbed in the security prices.15 
                                                        
15 Bilinski and Strong (2012) hold that the correction last for 17 months as opposed to 5 year 
period reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) and only 
6 months by Womack (1996). Ikenberry et al. (1995) find substantial post- repurchase 
abnormal four year buy and hold returns of 12.2% 
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2.4.2. Rational Discount Rate  
An alternative reason for the behaviour of post-issue stock performance is the 
rational discount rate. The level of investor rationality is evident in the long run 
since conservative attitude to new information preclude immediate stock price 
reaction. After the effects of underreaction are subsided the market reverts back 
to the position prior to the issue. M/B and size impact diminishes with the 
correction period so that stock returns reflect discount rate. Generally, reduced 
leverage is associated with low risk that translates into low stock returns. 
Eckbo et al (2000) find that reduced risk associated with equity issue and 
reduced leverage compared to size and valuation effects accounts for the 
underperformance.  Discount rate indicates a lower post issue risk that leads to 
adverse post issue performance.  
2.4.3. Investment-Based Explanation 
Long run returns subsequent to equity offering, as documented widely in the 
literature, exhibit price discounts. According to the market timing explanation, 
investors bid down the price in response to the issue to neutralise the initial 
missvaluation. Investment-based theory offers similar argument but presents a 
different reason to the price discount that follows equity offering. In this 
alternative orientation, the response of the stock prices relates to the change in 
risk profile that follows equity issues. As more equity financing is made to the 
investing public managers convert growth options into real assets. Butler et al. 
(2005) argue that in a time series study the amount of net financing (real 
investment-based), not the composition of the capital (market timing), has a 
more predictive power of long run abnormal stock performance. Thus, the level 
of capital inflows from both equity and debt issues decreases firm‟s required 
rate of returns due to conversion of risky growth options into less risky real 
assets. Lyandres et al. (2008) contend that equity issue converts risky growth 
options into fixed assets that reduce risks.  
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2.4.4. Economic Perspective  
The economic argument to stock returns states that in the event of increased 
equity issues or massive buybacks/debt issues, there is the interplay of demand 
and supply forces, all other things being equal. Leverage increasing 
transactions reduce the supply of equity whereas transactions that generate 
additional equity into the market increases supply. That is, post issue price is 
affected by the size of the offering at a given market. Given the demand curve, 
any equity issue at high valuations causes a downward pressure on prices 
(Scholes, 1972). This is because the increased supply creates surplus that 
forces the price down. Similarly, in a situation of constant demand for the 
shares of the firm, repurchase/debt generate shortage from the reduced supply 
that compels a consequent rise in the stock prices. However, in an efficient 
market change in the size of the offering should rule out any possibility of 
change in price in response to the financing decisions.  
Studies that propagate post-issuance underperformance ascribe the effects to 
only equity offerings. Thus, firms issue equity at high price ex ante and record 
low returns ex post. This is fundamentally the underlying phenomenon upon 
which market timing hinges. But, it is difficult to concede that only equity 
issuance takes place at a particular security issuance period. Firms that issue 
equity may as well issue other kinds of security concurrently, for example bank 
loans, private equity, and public debt among others. Billet et al. (2011) reveal a 
serious omitted variable bias that characterise prior studies. Using US data 
between 1980 and 2005 on issues of IPO, SEO, public debt, public equity and 
bank loans, they highlight the potential impact of multiple issues on stock price 
performance. The abnormal returns from Fama-Macbeth, Fama and French 
with augmented Carhart as well as BHAR all yield similar results.  
Consistent with prior studies such as Baker and Wurgler (2002), stock price 
returns fall subsequent to equity issuance. Specifically, they find that firms 
perform worse when they engage in multiple security issues. Issue of three 
securities earns -4.9% annual returns compared with issuance of four security 
types return of -16.9% per year. However, the reason for this trend is not well 
articulated. Whether that is a new dimension to market timing, pecking order as 
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well as the impact of specific characteristics is not clear. In effect, multiple 
security type issues are rife and this study provides a new insight into the stock 
price performance following financing decisions.  
2.5. Testable Hypotheses  
This section develops the testable hypotheses from the literature reviewed in 
the preceding sections. This section consists of four subsections related to each 
developed hypothesis that are tested in Chapter 6 of the thesis. Subsection 2.5.1 
discusses the hypothesis about share issuance and internal financial constraints 
while subsection 2.5.2 explains the hypothesis about share issuance and 
external financial constraints. In subsection 2.5.3, the hypothesis that share 
issuance and financial constraints depends on firm size is developed. Finally, 
subsection 2.5.4 explains the hypothesis that share issuance decisions affect 
stock returns.  
2.5.1. Share Issuance and Internal Financial Constraints  
The extant literature provides strong support for equity issues that precede 
periods of stock overvaluation or prior stock price run-ups (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Baker and Wurgler, 2002). As explained in Section 2.2, equity 
issues depend on factors such as costs of adverse selection associated with 
equity issues (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk 
et al., 1992). Again, the empirical evidence reveals that equity issues are 
associated with negative asymmetric information effects when they need 
external equity financing. Therefore, consistent with a pecking order theory, 
firms avoid this cost by utilising internal cash or issue debt when they require 
additional financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 
1999; Lemmon and Zender, 2010). Baker and Wurgler (2002) explain that the 
effects of asymmetric information correlate with overvalued equity or 
mispricing. Thus, the issue of overvalued equity coincides with high 
asymmetric information effects. This implies even when firms face 
significantly high asymmetric information effects associated with equity issues, 
the motivation to issue overvalued equity for market price exploitation 
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overrules the convention that firms issue equity during periods of low 
information asymmetry.  
According to the trade-off theory, firms attempt to maintain a balanced capital 
structure based on a target debt-equity ratio (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; 
Hovakimian et al., 2001). Financial deficit is crucial in determining when firms 
issue securities. Given the high costs of adverse selection equity issues only 
enable firms to balance its excessive leverage position. Thus, at high leverage 
any additional debt issues will potentially drag the firm into costly financial 
distress and bankruptcy, even though debt issues produce tax advantage. This 
means the combination of potential discounting of the stock price and 
relatively high transaction costs does not encourage firms to undertake equity 
offerings. At high stock prices, firms are motivated to make equity offerings, 
but they must also possess the financial capacity to pay the high ancillary costs 
of issue. Opportunistic managers that issue/repurchase securities on the basis of 
the stock price must have the financial strength to also deal with costs 
(especially for equity issues) incidental to accessing the external capital 
market.  
The direct costs such as gross fees paid to investment banks in conducting 
seasoned equity offering could be considerably high (Butler, Grullon, and 
Weston, 2005). For example, Lee et al. (1996) find that the average firm pays 
around 7% of the total proceeds to raise capital through an SEO. If firms only 
time their issues, then it is expected that they have substantial financial slack, 
especially for equity issuers. Without adequate investment opportunities cash-
strapped entities are less inclined to access equity financing. Growth options 
dominate the demand for cash, and hence the need to obtain external financing 
when there is internal deficit. DeAngelo et al. (2010) stress that it is only the 
need for “near term” cash for future investments that motivates equity issue at 
high valuations. Firms that require cash for identified projects contact the 
outside investing public for financing without regard for market timing 
activities. It presupposes that rate of investment should increase with equity 
issues.  
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Moreover, Fama and French (2005) and Dong et al. (2012) contend that equity 
issuing firms are actually cash-rich. These firms do not necessarily require 
external financing. So following the argument by Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
and the evidence from Fama and French (2005) and Dong et al. (2012) and the 
high costs of equity issuance, one can conclude that timing the issue of 
overvalued equity should be more pronounced for cash-rich firms than it would 
be for cash-poor ones. Thus, for market timing to hold, equity issues must track 
financial surplus. This means managers that time the market should not be 
financially constrained. The only motivation for any equity offering should be 
occasioned by high stock prices with substantial financial slack such that high 
transaction costs do not impair the ability to conduct the issue. Firms are 
typically opportunistic and will issue equity/repurchase at high/low valuations. 
Fama and French (2005) highlight this proposition and find that equity issuers 
are not constrained with cash rather these entities hold significant cash 
balances prior to the issue. While this lends credence to market timing theory, 
it weakens the position of the pecking order phenomenon. Issue of overvalued 
equity under the market timing theory undermines the effects of pecking order 
theory. Stated differently, financial constraints do not curtail equity issue when 
firms with timing prospects issue equity. Therefore, equity issuers are less 
financially constrained and M/B suppresses factors that support pecking order 
(Dong et al, 2012).  
The hypothesis following the above discussions is stated as follows: 
H1: There is high probability for less internally financially 
constrained firms to issue overvalued equity  
2.5.2. Share Issuance and External Financial Constraints  
According to McLean and Zhao (2014), internal financing constraints affect 
the demand for external financing. However, the supply of the funding will 
depend on the overall external financing conditions. Investors buy shares when 
they are more liquid such that they can freely trade them on the secondary 
market. Thus, market liquidity influences the supply or the availability of 
external funding, regardless of whether firms are internally financially 
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unconstrained to pay the transaction costs. External financing constraints – the 
degree of market liquidity or economic conditions (e.g. financial crisis) - not 
only affect the supply of funding but it also increases the transactions costs 
associated with equity issuance. Speculative securities such as equity attract 
significant sentiments that affect the supply and costs of equity issuance (Stein, 
1996; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Baker, 2009). Therefore, firms‟ market 
timing of equity issues is dependent on the external financing constraints as 
well. The degree of internal financial constraints should also affect the 
likelihood that firm issues overvalued equity during periods of high external 
financial constraints.  
The financial crisis of 2008 and the European debt crisis of 2011 have both 
emphasised the effects of external financing constraints on corporate decisions. 
During crisis periods, market liquidity dampens and increases the costs of 
raising external equity financing (Corwin, 2003; Butler et al., 2005; McLean 
and Zhao, 2014). For instance, Naes et al. (2011) show that U.S. stock market 
liquidity is countercyclical, and argues that during recessions there is a “flight 
to quality” in equities. This is because during recessions investors sell stocks, 
especially riskier stocks, in favour of safer securities. Therefore, external 
financial constraints should limit equity market timing. Studies such as 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Alti (2006) find equity-issuing effects of 
market conditions. Specifically, firms find it cheap to issue equity when there 
are favourable overall market conditions. Favourable market conditions 
enhance supply of funding and also reduce the costs of obtaining the external 
financing. Thus, firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity during 
periods of favourable market conditions. Less external financial constraints and 
high market liquidity should increase the probability of issuing overvalued 
equity. The likelihood of a firm issuing overvalued equity during periods 
financial crisis should be higher for firms with low internal financial 
constraints than for those with high internal financial constraints.  
H2: Firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity when external 
financial constraints are low (non-financial crisis period or periods of 
high market liquidity) 
  
 
49 
H3: The probability of issuing overvalued equity during periods of 
high external financial constraints increases for firms with low 
internal financially constraints than those with high internal 
financial constraints  
2.5.3. Share Issuance and Stock Returns  
In markets where security issues depend on prevailing conditions, investors are 
expected to act in response to issuers‟ decisions. Generally, capital market 
transactions reflect favourable information either to the seller or the buyer. 
There is always the lack of symmetry between the two parties in terms of the 
information that encourage the party to act in the market. Therefore, rational 
investors discount stock prices to indicate situations of asymmetric 
information. Market timing theory asserts that managers issue equity at high 
stock prices and repurchase at low valuations. If investors are rational, then the 
immediate response following announcement of equity (at high prices) and 
repurchase/debt issue (at low prices) is to bid down prices or up respectively. 
Equity issues are associated with significant stock underperformance (Fama 
and French, 1993; Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Dong et al. 2012).  
Several theories underlie the gradual stock price reaction to security issuance 
decisions. Loughran and Ritter (1995) propose that investors‟ reaction take 
time to reflect in the stock price. Largely, irrational attitude of investors ensure 
that stock prices do not immediately fall following equity and rise with 
repurchase/debt issues. Opportunistic managers, therefore, take advantage of 
high and low valuations to make equity offering and repurchase/debt issues 
respectively. The combination of high adverse selection costs and transaction 
costs suggest that managers only exploit investors when they issue equity. 
According to the underreaction theory, overvalued/undervalued firms that issue 
equity/repurchase record low/high long run returns. The degree of financial 
constraints has significant impact on the level of stock returns. Lamont et al. 
(2001) find evidence that the stock returns of financially constrained firms 
move together because they are subject to common shocks. But more 
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importantly, their findings are consistent with low stock returns associated with 
constrained firms.  
Financial constraints and the consequence on investment decisions and other 
signalling financial policies such as dividend payments should reflect in the 
stock returns. Firms that are limited in their ability to undertake investment 
opportunities and pay dividends will have negative stock market reactions 
compared to those that undertake investments and pay dividends. Using KZ 
index as internal financial constraints proxy, Lamont et al (2001) and Chan et 
al (2010) find that stock returns of internally financially constrained firms 
move together indicating that they have common shocks. On the other hand, 
they find that unconstrained firms earn significantly higher stock returns than 
constrained firms. The degree to which issuing firms underperform depends on 
the level of internal financial constraints. Consistent with Lamont et al. (2001), 
internally financially unconstrained firms should report less negative stock 
returns than more constrained firms. Also, faced with high external financial 
constraints and high costs of issuing equity, the level of stock price 
underperformance should also be less negative for unconstrained firms than 
constrained firms. The hypotheses are stated as follows:” 
H4: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative 
short-term abnormal returns, especially for firms with high internal 
financial constraints 
H5: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative 
short-term abnormal returns, especially for firms with high internal 
financial constraints and during periods of high external financial 
constraints  
2.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has reviewed the theoretical as well as the empirical evidence of 
share issuance decisions. The aim of the chapter was to establish that not only 
mispricing but also the level of both internal and external financial constraints 
affects the share issuance decisions of firms. The chapter also discussed the 
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theories that explain stock returns associated with equity issues. Empirical 
evidence suggests that equity issues are associated with negative 
announcement date abnormal returns. This finding fails to account for the level 
of financial constraints. Hence, firms‟ decisions relating to equity issuance are 
likely to be influenced by mispricing as well as the level of financial 
constraints.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
52 
Chapter 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW: SHARE ISSUANCE METHODS  
3.1. Introduction  
Firms in the UK are allowed to issue equity through rights issues, open offers, 
and private placement. This apparent choice of issuance method was affected 
by the deregulation in 1986. In deciding on the method, firms take into account 
several factors including the level of information asymmetry, the ownership 
structure of the firm, and whether equity issue can be timed. In view of that, the 
market also responds differently to the issuance methods. This chapter provides 
overview of the equity issuance method in the UK. It also reviews the theories 
that underlie the choice of each method and provides empirical evidence of the 
stock returns associated with each method. The chapter also develops testable 
hypotheses that set out the focus of the empirical chapter 7 of the thesis. 
The chapter has five sections. Section 3.2 presents the general overview of 
share issuance methods in the UK. It discusses the flotation methods, UK 
issues, the costs and demise of rights issues. Section 3.3 explains the theories 
that underlie the choice of issuance method. This section examines firm 
characteristics that determine whether a firm selects rights issues, open offers, 
or private placement in issuing equity. Section 3.4 provides empirical evidence 
of stock returns as well as the operating performance associated with each 
equity issuance method. Section 3.5 develops the testable hypotheses and 
section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
3.2. Overview of Share Issuance Methods   
Equity issues can be undertaken through a number of methods. The application 
of a particular method is influenced by a number of firm factors and 
managerial motivations for the transaction. For instance, a small firm that 
prefers a more concentrated ownership structure would opt for rights issues 
approach to avoid ownership dilution. Without issuing shares to new investors, 
the existing shareholders are able to control the affairs of the company without 
much external influence and monitoring. Similarly, the cost of conducting 
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equity issues affects the choice, all other things being equal. Thus, shareholder 
characteristics, direct cost of flotation and asymmetric information, among 
other factors, determine the equity issuance approach adopted by firms. This 
section discusses the flotation methods in subsection 3.2.1, UK issues in 3.2.2, 
the cost of rights issues in 3.2.3, and the demise of rights issues in 3.2.4.  
3.2.1. Flotation Methods 
Rights issues: Issues through rights issues, otherwise known as uninsured 
rights issues, ensure that new shares are offered to existing shareholders for 
subscription on pro rata basis. Shares offered to current shareholders attract 
price discount to the market price to encourage take-up. This implies that the 
shareholders to whom the shares are offered have the right to forfeit or sell 
their rights subsequent to taking up the offer. Rights issues are organised on 
pro rata basis to assure that all shareholders retain the degree of control they 
enjoyed prior to the offer. Therefore, shareholders who opt to reject the offer 
tend to be worse off after the transaction because they lose percentage of 
control and subsequent dividends payments. Again, any forfeited shares cannot 
be issued to external investors with firm losing on the amount that would 
accrue had they been issued to outsiders. Given that firms act in the interest of 
current shareholders, rights issues are more likely offered when the shares are 
undervalued (Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011).  
Open offers: Open offers: Open offer is an offer of new shares usually at a 
discount to existing shareholders on a pre-emptive basis. The usual practice is 
to invite shareholders to apply for any number of shares. The terms of an open 
offer are similar to rights issues except that offers that are not taken up cannot 
be sold by the shareholders (Armitage, 2000). Unlike a rights issue, application 
forms are used (instead of provisional allotment letters) which cannot be traded 
nil paid and no arrangements are made for the sale of shares not taken up by 
shareholders. Thus, entitlements from an open offer are not tradable and 
therefore an open offer is only available to existing shareholders. The principle 
of pre-emption is usually achieved by providing for a guaranteed "minimum 
entitlement". If any shareholder declines his minimal entitlement, the excess 
shares are allocated to those applying for shares in excess of their minimum 
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entitlements. If excess applications cannot be met in full, applications are 
scaled down. 
Private Placement (Placings): An issue where the entire offer is placed with 
one or more investors without issuing pro rata to existing shareholders is 
private placement. Firms normally target these few investors. The only 
distinguishing feature of private placement from both rights issues and open 
offers is that private placement is not made on pro rata basis. However, it is 
made under similar terms and conditions as the rights issues.  
3.2.2. UK issues  
Factors that motivate a choice of flotation method are varied and wide. Rights 
issues, until deregulation in 1986, were the only method used in the UK. 
Subsequent to the deregulation, firms had the option to issue using rights 
issues, placement, and open offers among others. Korteweg and Renneboog 
(2002) and Barnes and Walker (2006) both find open offer and placing firms 
are smaller with higher asymmetric information than rights issuers. The high 
asymmetric information is attributed to the high proportion of director 
ownership in such firms. However, placings that involve new and external 
investors allow the firm to divulge information to the market. Thus, placings 
are associated with information releases that reduce information asymmetry. 
This information release improves liquidity of the shares and reduces issue 
costs for the shares. Quality firms would also choose placement over rights 
issues to attract new investors and explore other financing avenues. The above 
features, coupled with the certification credibility, contribute to a positive price 
reaction to placement with negative price effects to rights issues (Slovin et al, 
2000; Armitage and Snell, 2004; and Barnes and Walker, 2006; Levis, 1995).  
3.2.3. Costs of Issue Approach 
An important element in the choice of issuance method is the cost associated 
with each method. Earlier empirical evidence in the US documents that 
uninsured right issues are the cheapest flotation method. Smith (1977) finds 
that the average cost of conducting rights issues is 1.8% and 0.5% of gross 
  
 
55 
proceeds for industrial and utilities, respectively. Firm commitment costs 6.1% 
and 4.2% of gross proceeds respectively. These costs comprise underwriting 
fees and other direct expenses. The discount provided on the offer encourages 
subscription and the amount earmarked to raise from the issue. Firms that 
choose rights offerings maintain the number of shareholders and consequently 
the dividend. For anti-dilution reasons, rights offerings do not diminish 
earnings per share. Rights issues are much cheaper than placement in the UK 
yet firms prefer private placement to rights issues. Recent equity issues show 
that a surge in private placement and open offers at the expense of rights 
issues. Factors that account for this changing trend are unrelated to the costs of 
issuance.  
3.2.4. Demise of Rights Issues 
The demise of rights issues relates to the changing preference for placings and 
open offers since early 1990s following the deregulation of 1986. Changing 
firm characteristics explain in part the apparent lack of preference for rights 
issues. For instance, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) attribute the demise of rights 
issues in the US during 1980 to increased use of dividend reinvestment plans 
(DRIPs). DRIPs allow shareholders could choose to receive common stock in 
lieu of cash dividends. However, the introduction of DRIPs does not necessary 
explain the disappearance of rights issues for firm commitment.  A number of 
factors explain the demise of rights issues or the increased preference for 
private placement in the UK.  
Firstly, capital gains taxes affect the choice of rights issues (Smith, 1977). 
Since rights issues are conducted to benefit equally all the existing 
shareholders, those who do not subscribe to their rights become worse off. To 
forestall this anomaly, shareholders can elect to sell their rights or subscribe 
and sell them subsequently. This ensures that the value of the shareholding is 
not reduced and also takes advantage of the price discount. Smith finds that the 
incidence of capital gains tax on the discount discourages substantial discounts 
making rights offerings unpopular. Further, he asserts that investment banks 
effectively influence firms to adopt firm commitment regardless of the higher 
fees. Secondly, rights issues are made to only existing shareholders unless the 
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rights are subsequently sold to outside investors. Given this phenomenon, price 
effects and trading in shares are limited. The lack of external or new investors‟ 
involvement in the rights issues lowers the liquidity of the shares (Kothare, 
1997). 
 Another reason for the demise is that shareholders that opt to sell their rights 
bear the responsibility and the cost of selling them. Unlike underwriting where 
the sale of shares rests with underwriters, shareholders can only sell on 
organised exchanges that require dealers and brokers.  Hansen (1989) finds a 
high dealer and brokerage fees associated with the sale. Lastly, rights issues 
that are unsubscribed attract negative market reactions. Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) find that low participation in the issue increases asymmetric information 
about the firm.  Thus, market response to rights issues is more negative than 
firm commitment. It implies announcement price run-up is low for rights issues 
and high for firm commitment issues. Barnes and Walker (2006) assert that 
placements are preferred for firms with high asymmetric information.  
Other empirical evidence attributes the demise of rights issues to the need for 
block selling of shares. Armitage (2007) finds that the price discount of 
between 15% and 20% of the market price is least attractive to maintain the 
preference for rights issues. Nevertheless, the demise of rights issues reflects 
the notion that placings better facilitate block selling than rights issues 
(Armitage, 1998; 2010). Again, placement saves time and money compared 
with rights issue and open offers. Placement also invites new investors and 
provides insurance as to the certainty of the offer taken up. Substantial 
resources are committed to placement to assure the right value of the firm that 
reduces adverse selection effects. Therefore, high quality firms prefer 
placement to rights issues.  
Again, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) further describe adverse selection costs as a 
function of current shareholder take-up of rights issues. By inference, high 
adverse selection costs are associated with rights issues with low take-up 
whereas high take-up effectively offset any asymmetric information effects. 
Thus, in the definition of market reaction to rights issues, Eckbo and Masulis 
(1992) rely on the degree of current shareholder take-up of the offering. 
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Absolute take-up of the issue signifies quality information that eventually 
translates into positive market reaction. This intuition reflects the tendency for 
firms to advance shareholder value by not inviting new investors to participate 
in the distribution of the wealth. 
However, the incidental low take-up by current shareholders could force 
managers to issue to new shareholders. Undervalued firms are successful with 
rights issues whereas firms that are relatively overvalued prefer firm 
commitment. The above suggests a more negative market reaction with firm 
commitment and a near zero stock returns associated with rights issues. On the 
average current shareholders are more informed about the firm than the 
outside/prospective investors thus by participating in new shares convey 
quality information to the market. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) assert that 
subscription pre-commitments reveal the success of the issues and the 
perception of the existing shareholders about the quality of the firm. This effect 
potentially attenuates negative reaction occasioned by stock issues.  
3.3. Theories of Share Issuance Choice  
In addition to the theories that affect equity issues as discussed in Chapter 2, 
this section discusses specific theories that explain the choice of issuance 
method. The section is made up of four subsections discussing different 
theories. Subsection 3.2.1 explains the quality signalling theory, 3.2.2 the 
monitoring and certification hypothesis, 3.2.3 he managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis, and 3.2.4 the investor relationship phenomenon.  
3.3.1. Quality Signalling  
In line with the asymmetric information hypothesis16, firms attempt to signal 
their quality through equity issuing transactions. Factors which define quality 
include, among others, lower discount, low information asymmetry, higher 
liquidity, undervaluation. In particular, the extant evidence suggests that price 
discount is an important gauge of firm quality (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Slovin 
et al, 2000; Barclay et al, 2007; Balachandran et al. 2008). Quality firms are                                                         
16 Refer to Chapter 2 for discussion on information asymmetry hypothesis  
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more likely to preserve ownership control by issuing equity to existing 
shareholders (Balachandran et al. 2013). On the one hand, quality firms will 
issue equity to existing shareholders because they have no motivation to reduce 
shareholder wealth. It also suggests that it allows firms to retain control of the 
quality firm and not dilute ownership concentration. However, firms use 
private placement to signal undervaluation through investor certification of the 
issue (Hertzel and Smith, 1993). This evidence indicates that for low quality 
firms, private placement allows them to obtain approval for the issue in 
exchange for significantly large price discounts.  
In the study of equity offering methods using a sample of 967 UK equity issues 
from1996 to 2005, Balachandran et al. (2013) assert that quality firms are more 
likely to issue equity to existing shareholders. These firms have lower 
idiosyncratic risk, higher liquidity, and lower information asymmetry. Since 
private placements constitute few investors who can be targeted, low quality 
firms choose private placement. Larger price discount compensates for the 
costs of obtaining information about the firms and the issue. Moreover, the 
firms in turn obtain credible certification for the issue that in turn dampens 
adverse effects of perceived adverse selection associated with issuance to 
external investors. The above differences have significant implications for 
subsequent stock price reactions. Their study emphasises that, all else equal, 
firms will more likely signal their quality through private placement than rights 
issues when the price discount is low. However, for larger discount, 
shareholder wealth is more protected using rights issues.  
3.3.2. Monitoring and Certification Hypothesis  
Two related theories that underlie share issuance choice are monitoring and 
certification hypothesis. Monitoring means the ability and capacity with which 
investors assert their authority and control over corporate strategies and 
preserve firm resources. A well monitored firm pressures management to act in 
the overall interest of the shareholders. It ultimately reduces the agency costs 
associated with management of corporate entities. Wruck (1989) contends that 
active investors purchase private placements to increase managerial monitoring 
which ensures that corporate resources are utilised more efficiently and also 
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increase the probability of value-increasing takeovers. Wruck (1989) further 
asserts that the monitoring effects is different between private and public 
equity issues because public issues are made to the general public with 
purchasers not necessarily willing to actively involve themselves in the 
management of the firm. On the other hand, private placement mitigates the 
asymmetric information problem because private placement allows managers 
to negotiate with the purchasers to address any concerns about the firm.   
Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, private placement 
promotes credible investor certification of the equity issue. Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) contend that informed investors who purchase the equity in private 
placement certify the credibility of the market value of the issue.  The 
implication of the certification is that it dispels market suspicion about firms‟ 
attempts to issue overvalued equity and also decreases the adverse selection 
associated with information asymmetry. Hertzel and Smith (1993) study the 
certification hypothesis using a sample of 106 private placement 
announcements from January 1, 1980 through May 31, 1987. The substantial 
discounts associated with private placement compensates for the costs incurred 
by investors in obtaining information about the equity issue and the firm. Thus, 
the discounts represent the price paid by the firm in exchange for the value 
certification. By certification, information asymmetry problem is resolved and 
it also highlights the equity undervaluation.  
3.3.3. Managerial Entrenchment  
The activities and interests of corporate managers could also influence the 
choice of issuance. Corporate managers are under huge pressure to meet 
shareholder objectives of maintaining shareholder wealth and creating value 
through investments. These managers are expected to manage the financial 
resources in a way consistent with the objectives of the firm. Through 
monitoring, labour market pressures, among other factors, managers are 
constrained from making value-destroying activities and paying substantial 
perquisites at the expense of the firm. Managerial entrenchment is the attempt 
by managers to make themselves valuable to shareholders and costly to replace 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). Entrenched managers have control over corporate 
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resources and strategy. All else equal, entrenched managers are more likely to 
act in a way that is inconsistent with shareholder value creation. This effect 
manifests through excessive perquisite payments and the investments in value-
destroying projects that undermines the long-term growth potential of the firm.   
In the context of share issuance, private placement attracts new investors to 
encourage monitoring (Wruck, 1989). However, Barclay et al. (2007) assert 
that private placements are often made to passive investors. By placing equity 
with passive investors, managers undermine the effects of monitoring. Rather, 
the managers are able to strengthen their control over the firm. Barclay et al 
(2007) also stress that initial positive stock returns may suggest evidence of 
monitoring and certification.  Over the long term, these purchasers of private 
placement do not actively involve themselves in the management of the firm. 
Thus, the passive investors do not become directors, CEOs, and do not acquire 
the firms or act in any capacity that demonstrates their active involvement in 
the management of the firm. The inactivity of the investors in the management 
of the firm solidifies managers‟ control of the firm. Managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis is consistent with managerial behaviour and the post-placement 
activities of the firm.  
Barclay et al find significant price discount for private placements. Of the total 
594 issues between 1979 and 1997, only 12% were active placements. The 
criterion for designating as active and passive is crude with serious limitations. 
For instance, the kind of interaction that would qualify placement as active is 
arbitrary. They further assert that the discount compensates for the subsequent 
stock price decline. Passive placements means management chooses 
uninformed investors who do not provide the monitoring (Wruck, 1989) and 
certification (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) for the issue. Thus, the lack of 
monitoring and active involvement of the new investors in the activities of the 
firm allows management to entrench itself. Therefore, management 
entrenchment motivation influences the choice of passive investors, accounts 
for the price discount and the long-term negative post-issue stock returns 
associated with private placement.  
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3.3.4. Private Placement and Investor Relationship  
Another feature of private placement is the tendency to target few investors 
without selling the shares to the wider investor public. The absence of a wide 
public demand is beneficial to existing shareholders in a sense as to preserve 
their ownership interest without significant dilution. It is also consistent with 
targeting investors who provide certification (Hertzel and Smith, 1993) and 
adequate monitoring (Wruck, 1989) to justify the value of the share issues 
transaction. The effects of both certification and monitoring constitute positive 
information about the firm that enhance the credibility of the issue and increase 
firm value. However, a large number of private placements are associated with 
significant issue discount and negative post-issue stock returns (Armitage, 
2007; Wruck and Wu, 2009; Armitage et al. 2014). In effect, this brings into 
focus the ability of the active investors that participate in the issue to determine 
the true value of the firm at the time of the issuance decision.  
Wruck and Wu (2009) note that in the process of the private placements, 
issuing firms form relationships with investors.  When new relationships are 
created it evokes positive signal to assure the market of adequate monitoring 
and credible certification that accompany the transaction. The positive 
announcement stock returns support this hypothesis. They study a total of 1976 
private placements spanning years 1980 to 1999 of US public companies. 
Placements where new relationships are formed generate significant CAR (-3, 
0) of 3.15% compared to insignificant returns of 0.63% for no relationships. 
They argue that subsequent improvement in operating performance and long 
run stock returns are the result of strong governance and increased monitoring 
occasioned by the new relationships. By extension, the subsequent 
performance of the firm depends on the degree and effectiveness of the 
governance invoked by the private placement transaction. Thus, private 
placement accompanied by good governance is anticipated to generate 
improved performance than an otherwise private placement that fails to 
generate improved governance. Also, governance should also address the 
extent of the new investors‟ involvement in the corporate affairs of the firm.  
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3.4. Stock Price Reactions to Share Issuance Choice  
The stock price and operating performance associated with equity issues are 
discussed in this section. Subsection 3.4.1 provides evidence of short-run stock 
returns associated with each equity issuance method whereas 3.4.2 offers 
insights into the long-run stock performance of the different equity issuance 
methods. Finally, 3.4.3 focuses on the level of operating performance to each 
method.  
3.4.1. Initial Abnormal Stock Returns   
Consistent with theories of share issuance (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and 
Walker, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Armitage, 2010; Dong et al. 2012), 
firms choose equity issuance to exploit either overvaluation or in response to 
low information asymmetry.17 For example, market timing of equity issues is 
associated with overvaluation. If different valuation can be attributed to each 
equity issuance method, then firms can time their issuance choice on the basis 
of the overvaluation. Stated differently, different level of information 
asymmetry should also explain the choice of issuance method. This approach 
follows that initial stock returns associated with equity issues should be 
different for each issuance method. Empirical literature provides significant 
evidence of the differential stock price reactions dependent on the equity 
issuance method. Thus, if firms choose issuance method on the basis of 
overvaluation, market reactions should be negative for the issuance method 
that is associated with overvaluation. Moreover, for method with significant 
information asymmetry, market reactions would be negative.  
Seasoned equity offerings generally attract negative market reactions due to the 
inherent asymmetric information costs associated with them. Empirical 
evidence in the US is unanimous. For instance, Hansen (1988) finds AAR 
underwritten rights -2.61% for industrials and -1.21% for utilities whereas 
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report AAR -1.39% for industrials and 0.23% for 
utilities. Similarly, for UK Armitage (2007) find that renounced rights issues 
are sold at significant discounts of about 8% but they argue this is more to do                                                         
17 See chapter 2 for overview of theories that explain share issuance decisions.  
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with issuer value uncertainty than overvaluation concerns. The extant literature 
asserts that rights issues attract low costs. However, as Armitage reports, when 
the rights issues are subsequently renounced and sold at discount to new 
investors the cost could potentially exceed that which would otherwise be 
incurred for open offers and private placement. On this evidence, take up of 
rights issues define the success of such transactions.  
Firms wishing to signal quality, disperse ownership and reduce asymmetric 
information between insiders and outsiders adopted Placings. Moreover, 
placings effectively enhance ownership dispersion, enhance external 
monitoring and promote corporate control. Again, given that an underwriter 
buys the entire offerings and makes gains from bid-ask spread, thorough 
investigation about the value of the firm would be conducted before an 
underwriter accepts the placings. Slovin et al (2000) and Barnes and Walker 
(2006) contend, in consonance with Myers and Majluf‟s (1984) information 
asymmetry theory, that underwriting certification, ownership dispersion, 
increased external monitoring, and corporate control embodied in placings 
eliminate/reduce asymmetric information effects associated with equity 
financing.  
Another explanation to the stock price reactions to equity issuance method is 
mispricing. Stock price underperformance associated with SEO in the US and 
UK has been attributed to the effects of market timing. All else equal, 
regardless of equity issuance method, post-issue abnormal stock returns is 
likely to be negative due to possible overvaluation; but the more firms are able 
to exploit the overvaluation through a specific issue approach, the more 
negative the market reactions to stock returns. The argument that managers aim 
to improve shareholder value supports the idea that they will be unwilling to 
issue overvalued equity to existing shareholders. Following this reasoning, 
firms would be more likely to issue overvalued stock to new investors due to 
information asymmetry and these investors can only obtain information by 
incurring substantial costs. This is similar to a case where ownership is 
concentrated at family level. With aversion to control dilution and increased 
monitoring following private placement, such firms would prefer rights 
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offerings (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2005). Burch et al (2004) and Capstaff and 
Fletcher (2011) assert that firms are less likely to time their equity through 
rights issues than placings. Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) and Balachandran et al 
(2013) assert that rights issues firms are not of lower quality compared to 
placings and open offer firms.  
3.4.2. Long Run Stock Returns  
Theories such as asymmetric information, monitoring and certification, 
managerial entrenchment and mispricing underlie the long run price reactions 
associated with the choice of equity issuance methods. Following the 
asymmetric information hypothesis, long run performance of rights offerings 
and placings are akin to SEO. Several empirical studies confirm that firms that 
conduct both rights issues and placings record substantial negative abnormal 
returns. This evidence is consistent with findings in the US about market 
reactions subsequent to seasoned equity offerings. Prior to the deregulation, 
firms could exploit overvaluation, as they deemed profitable using rights 
offerings. With the introduction of different approaches to issuing equity, firms 
can distinguish themselves from others and communicate information to 
investors using a more appropriate technique.  Ngatuni et al. (2007) review the 
differential long run performance of equity offering for rights issues and open 
offers at different time periods.  
In the period between 1986 and 1995, rights issues were the dominant issue 
approach. Open offers and placings had been introduced but were yet to be 
more pronounced in the UK. Using a sample of 818 rights issues spanning a 
period from 1986 to 1995, Ngatuni, et al (2007) report a 5-year average BHAR 
of -41.80%. It is both statistically and economically significant. When 
disintegrated between different time periods, rights issues made between 1991 
and 1995 recorded a reduction in the abnormal returns. Generally, the intuition 
is consistent with evidence from the US (e.g. Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995) that find negative abnormal returns following SEO. 
As open offers increases with rights issues gradually less preferred, the 
negative reaction to rights issues diminishes and open offers earn positive 
abnormal returns.  
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Also, using a sample of 670 UK rights issues and 391 placings from 1989 to 
1997, Ho (2005) and Abhyankar and Ho (2007) conduct event study that 
focuses on the relative long run performance of equal and value-weighted 
portfolios. It would have been interesting to note the performance of both 
rights issues and placings given that prior studies have enumerated many 
different features that potentially yield different market reactions. They find 
significant negative abnormal returns over a three-year period. Specifically, 
rights issues earn equal-weighted BHAR and value-weighted BHAR which are 
respectively -19.50% and -8.53%. While consistent with other UK evidence, 
there is stark difference in terms of magnitude of the returns. For example, 
Levis (2005) find three year BHAR of -30.20% in UK.  
The equity issuance decisions of public firms also determine the long-term 
stock performance. Public firms can issue equity securities to the public for 
subscription through firm commitment method of flotation. While this 
approach is commonly adopted in the US, a number of public firms also place 
equity private with investors. These issues are limited to specific investor or 
investor group without public involvement. If equity market timing hypothesis 
causes the market to penalize firms that conduct public issues due to perceived 
exploitation of overvaluation, then private placings of equity should at least 
cause limited negative market reactions. Hertzel et al. (2002) study 619 private 
placements over the period 1980 to 1996 for firms listed on the 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq exchanges. They estimate both the stock returns and 
operating performance after the private placement to check for a consistent 
behavior of stock returns and firm operating performance.  
Hertzel et al. (2002) generate positive stock price reactions to announcement of 
private equity of 2.4% in variant to the negative returns associated with public 
issues. The long run returns, however, compares with the negative returns 
recorded for public issues. For example, they find mean there-year buy-and-
hold abnormal return for size-and-industry matched control firms of -38.18%. 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) report abnormal returns relative to size-and-
industry-matched benchmark of about -22.84% for public issues of equity. This 
evidence contradicts the underreaction hypothesis that has been advanced in 
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explaining the stock market reactions following the announcement of equity 
issues. In effect, the long run returns lend support to investor over-optimism 
associated with „windows of opportunity‟ at the announcement of both private 
and public equity issues. Again, and more strikingly, they find that private 
issues follow period of relatively poor operating performance that divorces the 
predictions of investor over-extrapolation of firm performance to the 
announcement of the issuance decisions.  
According to the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, the long run stock 
returns associated with private placement differs from the initial stock returns. 
Barclay et al. (2007) emphasise that whereas the initial positive abnormal 
returns reflects the effects of monitoring and certification, over the long term 
the effects of managerial entrenchment become apparent. Firms make private 
placement to passive investors who do not intend to engage in the management 
of the firm. The inactivity of the new investors enhances the managerial control 
of the existing management on corporate resources, increases perquisite 
payments and ultimately decreases shareholder wealth. Thus, private placement 
promotes managerial entrenchment and hence results in unfavourable long-
term stock price reactions.  
Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) also contend that UK managers are less motivated 
to use rights offerings to exploit equity overvaluation. Rights issues of equity 
made to existing shareholders present limited scope for information asymmetry 
and mispricing and the potential for exploitation. Consistent with the quality-
signalling hypothesis, rights issues are less overvalued and the market least 
anticipates firms to time their issues through rights offerings. This incidence of 
mispricing explains the long-term stock performance. Capstaff and Fletcher 
(2011) assert that rights offering firms perform better in the long run than other 
alternative issuance methods. The study of 772 equity issues from January 
1996 to December 2007 computes cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) as well as calendar time portfolio returns 
for equity. 
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Rights issuing firms perform significantly better over the long term than 
placings. With similarly positive prior issuance performance for all methods, 
the subsequent underperformance is an indication of an attempt by firms to 
time their issues. The firm quality argument is consistent with rights issues 
because firms are less likely to time issues to existing shareholders with low 
information asymmetry. In line with the asymmetric information hypothesis, 
and consistent with equity market timing, placings are more likely to be timed 
even though recent evidence by Dionysiou (2015) suggests otherwise. In fact, 
she finds that placings are associated with high earnings quality and growth 
opportunities at the announcements. The effects of mispricing and information 
asymmetry manifests in the long term and define the stock price 
underperformance. This evidence supports the managerial entrenchment 
phenomenon (Barclay et al. 2007) and cast doubts on the findings by Slovin et 
al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006). Again, these findings suggest that 
any positive stock returns associated with placings can only be transient; the 
monitoring and certification hypotheses explain these short-term returns 
(Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993).  Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarise the 
empirical evidence of long run stock returns associated with equity issues. 
Table 3.1: Summary of Empirical Evidence of US Long Run Abnormal Returns Post 
Equity Issues 
Authors  Period Size Post-issue Period  Returns   
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) 
Loghran and Ritter (1995) 
Brav et al. (2000) 
Eckbo et al. (2000) 
1975-1989 
1970-1990 
1975-1992 
1964-1995 
1116 
3702 
3775 
3315 
3-Year CAR 
3-Year BHAR 
5-Year BHAR 
5-Year BHAR 
-18.67% 
-33.0% 
-24.0% 
-23.20% 
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Table 3.2: Summary of Empirical Evidence of UK Long Run Abnormal Returns Post Equity Issues 
Authors  Period Equity Method Sample Size Event Window  Returns   
Levis (1995)  
Ho (2005) 
 
Abhyankar and Ho (2007) 
Ngatuni et al. (2007) 
 
 
Iqbal et al. (2009) 
Andrikopoulos   (2009) 
Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) 
 
 
 
 
Iqbal et al. (2013) 
1980-1988 
1989-1997 
 
1989-1997 
1990-1995 
1991-1995 
1986-1990 
1991-1995 
1988-1998 
1996-2007 
 
 
 
 
1988-2008 
Rights Issues 
Rights Issues 
Placings  
Rights Issues  
Open Offers  
Rights Issues 
Rights Issues 
Open Offers 
Rights Issues 
Rights Offerings 
Placings  
Open Offers 
Placings plus 
Open Offers 
Rights Issues 
158 
562 
252 
670 
132 
421 
397 
181 
1542 
168 
185 
95 
76 
 
1146 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
36-month BHAR 
30.20% 
-19.92% 
-25.38% 
-19.92% 
15.60% 
-25.75% 
-34.45% 
-21.65% 
-24.39% 
-7.1%a 
-15.21% 
-2.62%a 
-25.50% 
 
 
-30.67% 
a means the value is statistically insignificant  
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3.4.3. Operating Performance  
Theoretically, the stock returns should correlate positively with operating 
performance. Poor performing firms are expected to have depressed stock 
prices. Thus, operating performance explains the stock performance of the 
firm. A number of studies have shown the stock market response to the issue of 
seasoned equity. The evidence is unanimous across several economic 
environments that there is a negative stock returns following equity issuance 
transactions. However, our understanding of the level of operating performance 
at the time and subsequent to equity issues is limited. Anecdotally, negative 
stock returns are expected to reflect deteriorating operating performance of the 
firms. Thus, from market timing standpoint, high operating performance should 
reflect the stock price run-up and high market-to-book ratio of equity issuing 
firms. Similarly, as stock price declines after the equity issuance transactions, 
operating performance is expected to equally deteriorate to give support to the 
underlying reasons for the adverse market reactions. In the context of issuance 
method, it can be argued that issuance method that mimics the market timing or 
information asymmetry theory should demonstrate similar reactions and effects 
as the equity offerings. Thus, high market-to-book ratio, stock price run-up and 
high operating performance should precede the announcement of the equity 
issues. 
Empirical research covering this thesis include but not limited to Healy and 
Palepu (1990) who find no earnings effects following equity issues. They 
contend that SEO do not convey new information about earnings. However, 
Loughran and Ritter (1997) demonstrate that operating performance of equity 
issuing firms is significantly high prior to the issuance date. These firms 
subsequently report deteriorating performance that reflects the decline in stock 
returns. Teoh et al. (1998) as well as Rangan (1998) also assert that the 
activities of firms „managing their earnings‟ in the lead up to the issuance 
decision underperform. Similar effects can be investigated when equity issues 
are disintegrated into the different issuance methods available to firms, 
especially in the UK. Kabir and Roosenboom (2003) study rights issues in the 
Netherlands and find that firms experience significant stock price decline at the 
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announcement of rights offerings. Rights offerings are the dominant flotation 
method in the Netherlands unlike UK where firms have choice among rights 
issues, open offers and private placement including variants of these methods. 
This compares well with the US where firm commitment is the only method 
adopted for equity issuing transactions. This study differs markedly from Kabir 
and Roosenboom (2003) since it considers three equity issuance methods that 
are available to UK firms. I explore the effects of differential operating 
performance on the choice of equity issuance methods among UK firms.  
Their study covers the period from 1984 to 1995 for a total 67 rights issues 
(final sample of 58 issues) conducted by 62 different companies listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Rights issuing firms record announcement date 
abnormal return of -2.0% which decreases further to -2.8% in the next two 
days. Consistent with the stock price decline, operating performance 
subsequently deteriorates. This shows that negative stock return is not an 
anomaly but indicate market perception of the adverse operating performance 
after the issuance activity. Using return on assets measures such as net income 
to total assets, EBITDA to total assets as well as return on sales metrics like net 
income to sales and EBITDA to sales, they find consistent negative operating 
performance over 5-years after the equity issues. Information asymmetry 
between firms and shareholders explain this trend but they find no evidence of 
rights issues in response to favourable market conditions.  
Also, differences in type of firms can account for the post-issue performance of 
firms conducting private placement. The equity issuance literature is replete 
with evidence that overvalued firms underperform the market subsequent to the 
issuance decisions. The work by Baker and Wurgler (2002) highlights the long 
run effects of mispricing on capital structure. Other studies such as Dong et al 
(2012), also find evidence in support of the overvaluation-performance 
relationship. As noted earlier Hertzel et al (2002), provide consistent 
relationship between stock returns and operating performance following equity 
issues. Chi and Gupta (2009) also assert that overvalued firms are more likely 
to engage in earnings management that explains the subsequent 
underperformance. However, differences such as the degree of overvaluation 
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and/or the level of growth opportunities can distinguish firms in terms of the 
level of underperformance.  
Using a sample of 371 private placements between the period 1980 and 2000, 
Chou et al. (2009) explain the post-issue performance of private placements in 
relation to growth opportunities. High growth firms are more likely to manage 
earnings (Skinner and Sloan, 2002; McNichols, 2002). Thus, the perception for 
firms to engage in earnings management stimulates the adverse effects of 
private placements on stock returns. Market reactions reflect the notion that 
firms cannot maintain the high reported earnings prior to the equity issues. 
High growth opportunities evoke both management and investor optimism 
about the prospects of the firm (Hertzel et al, 2002; Marciukaityte et al, 2005). 
Overall, they find that high growth firms record negative 3-year abnormal 
stock returns between -15% and -37% that is consistent with the poor operating 
performance within the same time period. However, the cross-sectional 
regression of the abnormal returns is too simplistic since it does not capture the 
effects of factors such as issue discount, the level of demand and the other 
corporate governance factors.  
Moreover, firms that manage earnings always struggle to maintain the same 
level of performance. Earnings that are backed by actual revenue generating 
activities are likely to be repeated in subsequent years. However, managed 
earnings are not consistent with the underlying business prospects. Chen et al. 
(2010) find evidence that firms that conduct private placement overstate their 
earnings prior to the announcement. Investors are unable to detect the 
excessive accruals in the earnings but subsequent earnings reversal causes the 
stock price to decline. These earnings reversals imply the firm is unable to 
sustain or justify the prior period earnings because the core business and 
revenue generating activities deviate from the reported figures. This 
phenomenon is consistent with the poor operating performance that occurs in 
the long run after the announcement of the private placement.  
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3.5. Testable Hypotheses  
The evidence on financing decisions in the literature is varied and wide. 
Evidence in support of market timing asserts the overriding effects of valuation 
in determining the decision to issue equity or repurchase at specific times.  For 
instance, Baker and Wurgler (2002) affirm that market timing enables 
companies to issue equity at high prices and repurchase at low prices. Hence, a 
coherent understanding of market timing prospects should occur at the point 
where at high (low) stock prices firms are also significantly overvalued 
(undervalued) to force equity issue (repurchase). Consequently, in a perfect and 
rational economic environment, market timing should generate immediate 
negative (positive) market reactions for equity issues (repurchase). Differences 
in the level of anticipated operating performance should explain the choice of 
equity issuance method.  
3.5.1. Equity Issues and Operating Performance  
As explained in Section 3.3, theories such as monitoring hypothesis (Wruck, 
1989), certification hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), and managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis (Barclay et al., 2007)) define the decision to conduct 
private placements. For instance, the monitoring hypothesis emphasise that 
private placements enhance firm value because active investors that purchase 
the shares monitor and ensure efficient use of corporate resources. Under the 
certification hypothesis (Hertzel and Smith, 1993), private placements create 
value since the shares are purchased by informed investors with considerable 
credibility for the market value. Finally, managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
assert that management places stock with friendly or passive investors who do 
not play active role in the managing the company thereby strengthening the 
position of existing management.  
A number of characteristics define firms that choose rights issues compared 
with firms that conduct open offers and placings. Korteweg and Renneboog 
(2002) and Barnes and Walker (2006) find evidence smaller firms whose 
shares are less liquid and have a higher degree of information asymmetry are 
more likely to choose open offers and placings. A higher proportion of the 
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equity of these firms is also owned by directors. Given that placings are made 
to external investors it has the tendency to improve external monitoring of the 
firm and the liquidity of its shares (Slovin et al., 2000). Cronqvist and Nilsson 
(2005) explain that rights issues are used to retain family control (prevents 
dilution of ownership), whereas placements are used to issue shares to a 
strategic partner whose interests are aligned to that of the issuer. Placing 
process via negotiation with investors facilitates the purchase of large blocks 
better than the alternative method of selling rights on the market (Armitage, 
2010). Unlike Slovin et al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006), Capstaff and 
Fletcher (2011) argue that quality firms prefer rights issues to open offers and 
private placements.   
The effect of operating performance subsequent to equity issues has been 
documented in the literature. Loughran and Ritter (1997) assert that firms that 
issue equity normally report substantial deterioration of operating performance. 
This means that the negative post-issue stock returns only reflects the poor 
operating outlook of the firm. Firms timing their equity issues when there is a 
priori improvement in operating performance are more likely to generate 
negative market reactions when the operating performance is not sustained. In 
studying private placements, Hertzel et al (2002) find that private issues of 
equity follow periods of poor operating performance. Kabir and Roosenboom 
(2003) also establish that Dutch rights issues also exhibit decline in operating 
performance. In the context of issuance choice, negative stock returns should 
correlate with operating performance. If overvaluation drives the issuance of 
equity using private placement and generates negative stock returns, one would 
expect deteriorating operating performance for private placement than rights 
issues and open offers. Factors that signal firm quality include the issue price 
discount, volatility of returns and earnings management (Dissanaike et al., 
2014). However, operating performance should determine the choice of equity 
issuance method beyond these factors that have relatively short-term impact on 
subsequent stock performance of equity issuing firms. 
H6: Firms that anticipate positive operating performance are more 
likely to conduct rights issues than open offers or private placement  
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3.5.2. Long-run Stock Returns and Equity Issuance Methods 
Market reactions to equity issues on the average are negative following market 
timing-informed issuance. Empirical evidence in the literature in relation to 
equity issues in the UK contends that different issuance methods attract 
different market effects. Slovin et al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006) 
both find that rights issues attract more negative reactions that open offers and 
placement. This is the result of less asymmetric information effects associated 
with placement where firms increase external monitoring and dilute ownership. 
However, Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) in a recent study find, similar to Burch 
et al. (2004), that firms are less likely to time their equity through rights issues 
than placings. Thus, firms that conduct rights offerings do not potentially 
exploit overvaluation as do those that conduct equity issues through placings. If 
quality firms choose rights issues, then it follows that these firms are also more 
likely to outperform counterpart firms that choose open offers and private 
placement. In other words, the level of operating performance at the time of 
equity issuance has explanatory power for the subsequent stock returns 
associated with the equity issues. Firms that choose rights issues should report 
less negative stock returns than those that choose open offers and private 
placement.” 
H7: Equity issues through private placement generate more negative 
abnormal returns than rights issues 
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter provided a comprehensive review of equity issuance methods in 
the UK. It has also discussed the historical background to the equity issues and 
the changing trends in the choice of equity methods. The chapter also discussed 
the specific theories that explain the choice of each method and the stock 
returns associated with each issuance method. The discourse about the stock 
returns included both the short-run and the long-run price reactions to equity 
issues and also the level of operating performance associated with each 
issuance method. It appears the contemporaneous level of operating 
performance subsequent to the issuance decisions could influence the choice of 
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method. Based on the reviewed literature, the chapter also discussed the 
testable hypotheses that are analysed in Chapter 7 of the thesis.  
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Chapter 4  
LITERATURE REVIEW: SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAMS  
4.1. Introduction  
Share repurchase programs remain one of the main avenue by which firms 
distribute cash flows to existing shareholders. Corporate payout policies have 
changed over the world and in particular the US where different tax codes have 
shifted preference for dividend payments to share repurchase. In addition to 
tax, the incidence of stock options as part of corporate compensation programs 
as well as the prevalence of takeovers, has further allowed firms more 
preference for share repurchase. Moreover, the recent financial crisis and the 
debt financing of unconstrained firms present a new dimension to the share 
repurchase policy. The present study, therefore, explores the share repurchase 
behaviour of financially unconstrained firms. Apart from the general overview 
of share repurchase programs and the theories that underlie repurchase 
transactions, the focus of this chapter is to establish the empirical 
underpinnings of debt-financed repurchase of firms. In this light, the chapter 
develops testable hypotheses that set out the focus of the empirical chapter 8 of 
the thesis.  
The chapter has four sections. Section 4.2 presents overview of share 
repurchase programs. It discusses the methods of and the regulations of share 
repurchase programs in the US. Section 4.3 focuses on the theories that explain 
repurchase transactions. Section 4.4 explains the empirical evidence of share 
repurchase. Section 4.5 discusses the testable hypotheses and section 4.5 
concludes the chapter.  
4.2. Overview of share repurchase  
This chapter briefly lays out the general overview of share repurchase 
programs. The section consists of two subsections. Subsection 4.2.1 presents 
the different methods of conducting share repurchase as explained in the 
literature and adopted by firms, while 4.2.2 the share repurchases regulations in 
the US.  
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4.2.1. Methods of Share Repurchase  
Open market share repurchase (OMR): OMR is the mode of share repurchase 
in which a company enters the open market, usually through a broker, to 
purchase its own shares. The average percentage of shares sought is 
approximately 7%.18 OMR remains the most common method by which firms 
acquire their own shares. OMR accounts for a total of about 90% of total share 
repurchase transactions in the US (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). In fact, 
between 1994-1999, OMRs accounted for between 95% and 98% of 
repurchase activity (Grullon and Ikenberry, 2000). Open market repurchases 
represent an option rather than an obligation for the firm to acquire shares 
announced.  Thus, firms are flexible to decide when and how much to 
repurchase. This flexibility implies announced shares can remain unpurchased 
over a period of time. In fact, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that 
between 74 and 82% of announced repurchases are completed whereas Kahle 
et al. 2005) show a completion rate of 90% among repurchase conducted by 
Fortune 500 firms. Also, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004) contend that open 
market repurchases afford managers the opportunity to engage in cheap talk. 
Thus, the mere announcement of a repurchase does not constitute the intention 
to actually repurchase the shares. This thesis analyses only OMRs given the 
high percentage of repurchase activity that constitute OMRs.  
Tender offer: This method of repurchase involves the purchase of specified 
amount of shares at fixed price, normally above the market price. This 
transaction occurs until the expiration date of the offer. In a tender offer, the 
firm can set limit in terms of both the maximum or minimum amount that 
intends to buy from the shareholders. The premium associated with tender offer 
motivates shareholders to tender their shares and conveys quality information 
about the prospects of the firms. If a small number of shares is tendered the 
firm can withdraw the offer. However, for an excessively large tender, the firm 
can choose to buy pro rata or buy greater than the anticipated number of shares 
                                                        
18 Ikenberry et al. (1995) report that the average percentage of outstanding shares sought in all 
of the OMRs announced between January 1980 and December 1990 by firms listed on the 
American Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ was 6.6%. 
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initially specified. One peculiar feature of tender offer is that the shareholders 
know about the intentions of the firm to buy back the shares.  
Dutch-auction tender offers: These repurchases are similar to fixed price tender 
offers in the way they are organised. Like fixed price tender offers, they also 
constitute management‟s attempt to buy back specified number of shares and 
with a real commitment to purchase such shares. However, firms set price 
range at which it is willing to purchase the shares from the shareholders. 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) report abnormal returns for fixed price tender 
offers, dutch-auction tender offers and open market repurchase of 11%, 8% and 
2.3% respectively. The intuition is that whereas tender offers represent 
commitment to repurchase, OMR affords management flexibility without 
actual commitment to follow through with the announced repurchase.  
Accelerated share repurchase or synthetic repurchases: These repurchases are 
combined with derivative securities such as put options, collars and forward 
contracts. The repurchase transaction is only consummated when the 
underlying derivative instrument is exercised. For example, the sale of a put 
option enables a firm to buy the underlying stock at a specified exercise price. 
The put option allows the firm to exercise the option and buy the share at or 
below the exercise price. Thus, the firm commits to buy specific number of 
shares on expiration of the put option. Firms with undervalued shares but have 
large growth opportunities and face high costs of financial distress prefer these 
contracts (Vermaelen, 2005). For example, in a forward contract, the company 
will receive cash when the stock price ends up above the forward price on 
maturity. In the event that stock price is below the forward price, the company 
has the option to issue shares to settle the price difference.  
Privately negotiated or targeted share repurchase: Share repurchase organised 
through direct or private negotiations constitute efforts to buy back specified 
amount of shares from specific shareholders. This normally entails buying 
block of shares from a large holder. Either the shareholder(s) or the 
management of the firm can initiate the agreement for the transfer of shares. 
Sellers proactively make contacts with firms of their intentions to sell their 
shares back to the firms. This mode of repurchase is normally prevalent where 
  
 
79 
stocks are thinly traded such that sellers do not favour open market repurchase 
transactions (Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005). Large investors involved in target 
repurchase are well informed about the prospects of the firms. By initiating the 
sale of their shares to the company, it is unlikely that such repurchase will be 
motivated by undervaluation or signal private information about the firm. 
Moreover, reductions in cash flow might not reflect decrease in agency costs.  
4.2.2. US Share Repurchases Regulations  
This section discusses the US regulations as they apply to share repurchase. It 
lays out this regulatory framework to provide perspective since the thesis uses 
US data on share repurchase. A number of rules are instituted in the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations to control the share 
repurchase transactions of corporations. The initial motivation for the 
regulation of share repurchase is to ensure that corporations do not engage in 
excessive repurchase that will deplete the assets of the company. For instance, 
assets depletion affects debt repayment and accrued interests. Unlike open 
market repurchase, stringent reporting and disclosure requirements must be 
adhered to in respect of tender offer repurchases, insider trading and equity 
offerings.  
Prior to 1982, open market repurchase in the US were regulated under the 
provisions of Sections 9(a) (2) and 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934. However, firms were liable to a charge for illegal price 
manipulation as result of the uncertainties inherent in the provisions. Price 
manipulation determines the price of future acquisitions and new issue of 
shares. However, firms can also have genuine business reasons for engaging in 
open market repurchase other than simply repurchasing shares to inflate the 
share prices. The SEC Rule 10(b)-18 of 1982 addresses this concern by giving 
firms safe harbour in respect of open market repurchase programs. A 
significant component of this rule is that compliance with the conditions of the 
rule and the disclosures are voluntary. The safe harbour rule explains the surge 
in US share repurchase transactions (Grullon and Michaely, 2002).  
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SEC Rule 10(b)-18 provides immunity from the anti-manipulation provisions 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. However, firms must meet four 
conditions to enjoy the immunity. First, repurchases are made through only one 
broker or dealer on a given day (Manner of purchase). Second, no repurchase is 
made as an opening transaction or during the last half hour of trading day 
(Timing condition). Third, no repurchase is made at a price exceeding the 
highest current independent bid price or the last independent sale price, 
whichever is higher (Price condition). Finally, non-block repurchase volume 
does not exceed the higher of (A) one round lot or (B) the number of round lots 
closest to 25% of the average daily trading volume of the preceding four 
calendar weeks. 
Under the SEC Rule 10(b)-18 paragraph (d), a firm is not subject to legal 
liability for non-compliance if it does not abide by the conditions. The 
implication for non-compliance is that the firm ceases to enjoy protection or 
immunity under the safe harbour rule. Kim and Varaiya (2004) posit that there 
is likely conflict of interests between inside and outside shareholders due to the 
non-mandatory reporting and disclosure issues that characterise open market 
repurchases in the US. In the same way that firms are buying back shares 
insiders can also be selling their holdings to profit from the increased in the 
share price caused by the buyback activities. Amendments to the Rule 10(b)-18 
were proposed on 26th January 2010 due to improved trading strategies and the 
automation of trading systems and technology that have contributed to trading 
speed. In the event of market-wide trading suspension, the issuer is allowed to 
purchase up to 100% of the average daily trading volume. Also, the time of 
purchase condition is relaxed at the reopening of trading on the day of the 
market-wide trading suspension or on the opening of trading on the day 
preceding the day of the market-wide trading suspension. The amendments 
also challenge the safe harbour rule in the event that issuers‟ insiders are 
involved in the sale of issuers‟ shares concurrent with the issuer buyback 
activity.  
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4.3. Theories of Share Repurchase 
As with various corporate policies, several theories have been developed in the 
literature to explain the motivations for share repurchase programs. Firms 
conduct repurchase based on some firm characteristics that underlie various 
theories and hypotheses with empirical evidence. This section provides 
description of the theories that explain share repurchase programs. This section 
is divided into four subsections. Subsection 4.2.1 discusses the undervaluation 
hypothesis, 4.2.2 the information signalling theory, 4.2.3 the free cash flow 
hypothesis, and 4.2.4 the market timing theory.  
4.3.1. Undervaluation Hypothesis  
A firm is undervalued if the intrinsic or the fundamental value is higher than 
the market price. In other words, undervalued shares are cheaper in the market 
than their worth. The undervaluation hypothesis therefore posits that firms are 
more likely to repurchase their own shares in the market when they are cheap 
in comparison to their fundamental values. This phenomenon of share 
undervaluation stems from the information asymmetry between managers-
insiders- and the external investors. Firms that are undervalued can inform the 
market about it through corporate transactions such as repurchase, acquisitions 
and dividend payments. Thus, firms or managers attempt to profit from the 
private information about the true value of the firm by buying back shares that 
are cheaper. Since this undervaluation contains information relevant for stock 
prices, investors are inclined to revise upwards their valuation upon the release 
of the private information. Moreover, in a share repurchase, managerial 
behavioural changes in terms to purchase or sale of ownership rights indicate 
the extent of the quality of the private information (Lee et al. 1992). This 
hypothesis underlines the financial management goal of maximising 
shareholder value; any attempt to buy back shares at a price higher than the 
undervalued price will destroy shareholder value. With significant manager 
share ownership in the firm, such repurchase transactions align the interests of 
managers with that of the shareholders.  
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Repurchase of undervalued shares at low stock prices stimulate high or 
improved stock price. This is because buyback of shares represents favourable 
information signal to the market about the future prospects of the firm.  
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) assert that repurchase is negatively related to 
the prior stock price performance. In other words, undervalued shares perform 
better subsequent to a share repurchase announcements. In a study of 450 open 
market repurchases from 1981 to 1990, Stephens and Weisbach find significant 
effects of low stock price on increasing the number of shares repurchased. 
Consistent with free cash flow hypothesis and liquidity argument, they further 
find evidence of levels of cash flows driving the repurchases (Jensen, 1986; 
Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon and Michaely, 2004). The 
timing of repurchase of undervalued shares is more effective in relation to open 
market operations that contain significant flexibility. Managers determine the 
when and how much of announced shares to repurchase which allows them to 
make actual repurchase when there is significant undervaluation (Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen, 1996; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). According to Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen (1996), the flexibility feature allows managers to expand their 
investment opportunity set. This flexibility constitutes exchange option that 
affects the stock prices at the announcement date. In the long term, the option 
value increases the stock value of the long-term shareholders. In the empirical 
analysis discussed in Chapter 8, I control for prior stock stock returns.  
Undervaluation can also be inferred from the level of analysts‟ forecasts of 
earnings that are related to the information asymmetry. However, since 
consensus analysts‟ estimate of earnings is public information, a more refined 
way of looking at undervaluation from information asymmetry perspective is to 
consider the anticipated future earnings prospects of firms rather than analyst 
estimates. D‟Mello and Shroff (2000) compute an ex ante economic value from 
the manager‟s perspective. The difference between the estimated economic 
value and the market value constitutes undervaluation. However, the caveat is 
that the estimate of the economic value will be impacted by the assumptions 
about the future earnings and the cost of equity. They report that 74% of firms 
that repurchase via tender offers are undervalued. The positive information 
signal associated with share repurchase and managerial opportunism means 
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that managers/insiders are likely to buy more of the undervalued shares and 
profit from the subsequent price appreciation (Lee et al. 1992; D‟Mello and 
Shroff, 2000). This affirms the expectations of private information associated 
with share repurchase.  
4.3.2. Information Signalling Theory  
A related theory to the undervaluation hypothesis is the information signalling 
that posits that share repurchase is a mechanism for information releases. The 
information-signalling hypothesis assumes asymmetric information between 
managers/insiders and investors. Therefore, share repurchase is one tool by 
which companies convey quality and credible information about the prospects 
of the firm to the market. Baker et al. (2003) survey managers and find that 
signalling is the most cited reason for share repurchase. Managers as insiders 
within the firm are likely to possess information that is yet to be released to the 
market. In a market where investors do not have complete information about a 
company, actions and decisions of managers have greater impact on the 
economic decisions of investors. Market reactions reflect the nature of the 
information and the magnitude of the „positiveness‟ or the „negativeness‟ of 
such information. Information that can be divulged to the market through 
corporate actions include among other things, the value of the firm, the future 
cash flow prospects of the firm including the earnings potentials from available 
growth opportunities. Undervalued shares reflect these positive characteristics 
such that the market attaches positive information to share repurchase 
announcements.   
Several factors about the firm indicate information signalling associated with 
share repurchase. These conditions are likely to achieve the signalling effects 
that accompany repurchase and other forms of cash distributions. Firstly, since 
repurchase involve cash distribution, only cash-rich firms are more likely to 
conduct share repurchase programs. Repurchase allows the firm to disgorge 
excess cash flows to the shareholders in a way consistent with reducing the 
agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, undervalued shares 
signify highly probability that firms anticipate improved earnings in the long-
run. Thus, the predictions of the signalling hypothesis resonate with perceived 
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improved earnings and cash flows subsequent to repurchase transactions. The 
firms, through repurchase releases information about both the current and 
future cash flows. This should be associated with improved operating 
performance and positive stock returns (Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Grullon and 
Michaely; 2004).  Firms signal quality information to the market and the 
outside investors through repurchase. If firms distribute free cash flows to 
reduce agency costs, that should be preclude the availability of growth 
opportunities.  
Secondly, the decision of firms to acquire part of its outstanding shares by 
paying premium for them indicates anticipated future prospects in terms of 
enhanced operating performance. Investor positive reactions to repurchase are 
consistent with this anticipated improved performance. Vermaelen (1981; 
1984) formalises the signalling theory of share repurchase to explain the stock 
price reactions associated with share repurchase. In this model, the effects of 
information hypothesis depend on the premium paid for the shares, the target 
fraction of shares acquired and the fraction of insider holdings in the company. 
The information signalling theory has more predictive explanation for the post-
repurchase abnormal returns. Repurchase at a premium using tender offers 
signifies that the future prospects of the future are more likely to improve. This 
is because insiders will lose much of their stakes in the event of failure. 
Vermaelen (1981) finds that insiders do not tender their shares but rather 
increase the target fraction to signal to the market of quality information. The 
stock price reactions reflect the premium paid, the increase target fraction, and 
the high amount of insider shareholding in the firm (Vermaelen, 1984). He 
finds this to be true for also open market repurchase where signalling is the 
most plausible explanation for the abnormal returns. 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) extend the information-signalling hypothesis of 
Vermaelen (1981; 1984) using three repurchase methods. They emphasise that, 
even though repurchase is associated with positive abnormal returns, the level 
of stock impact depends on how much information signals the repurchase 
sends to the market. Relative signalling effects of fixed price tender offers, 
dutch-auction tender offer and open market repurchase yield different stock 
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price reactions. The level of premium determines the risk of loss of managerial 
wealth; quality of signals increases with insider loss of false signals. Comment 
and Jarrell (1991) study the stock price effects of three repurchase methods 
using over the period between 1984 and 1988. They find that firms pay 
premium of 20.6% and 12.8% for fixed price tender offers and dutch auction 
respectively.  Open market repurchase does not normally involve premium and 
as such have a limited information signal effects than the tender offers. 
However, open market repurchase constitute high volume of share repurchase 
to signal undervaluation. The average stock returns at announcement are 11% 
for fixed price tender offer and 8% for dutch-auction tender offer. Open market 
repurchase is associated with average stock returns of about 2%.  
A third factor that explains the information signalling effects of share 
repurchase is the volume of repurchased shares. The level of information 
signalling is positively correlated with the volume of open market share 
repurchase. The number of shares bought in an open market repurchase 
determines the risk exposure of the insiders. Market interprets that as 
information signal that motivates insiders to assume the high risk of ownership. 
By using internal cash flow in a leverage increasing repurchase transaction, the 
riskiness of the firm increases due to reduced cash holdings and increased 
leverage. Also, the exposure to earnings volatility and other macroeconomic 
dynamics impact on the value of ownership. For an insider-owner, transactions 
that increase utility is preferred and pursued. Open market repurchase has 
signalling effects unrelated to premium payment such that stock price increases 
are related to the number of shares bought in open market repurchase 
(Comment and Jarrel, 1991; Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). McNally (1999) 
posits that higher expected earnings compensates for the risk exposure 
associated with increased insider shareholdings. Insiders generate utility from 
open market repurchase due to signals of greater expected earnings. Like 
previous findings, the model predicts high market value (high stock prices) in 
relation to quantity of shares repurchased the number of insider holdings and 
the riskiness of the expected earnings.   
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All the above discussion assumes high costs for low value firms which signal 
false information about the quality of the firm. This high cost discourages 
mimicking of share repurchase programs (Massa et al, 2007). The inherent 
flexibility and lack of commitment in open market repurchase has the tendency 
for managers intending to shore up low stock prices to announce repurchase 
without significantly making actual purchase of the shares (Vermaelen, 1984; 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). If repurchase is inspired by the objective to 
send „false‟ signals-where earnings improvement are not actually expected in 
the long run-the long run stock performance should reflect this anomaly. Thus, 
the market reactions after the initial announcement period are expected to 
reverse once investors process the actions of managers to mislead them. Once 
the repurchase is announcement more information is released to the market in a 
way as to reduce the level of asymmetric information. At this point the market 
gathers more information and obtains the actual value of the firm. Studies such 
as Fried (2004) and Chan et al. (2010) report that some managers announce 
open market repurchase with the view to mislead investors just to increase 
stock prices. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback 
announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However, over 
longer horizons, suspect firms do not experience improvement in their 
economic performance. 
4.3.3. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Another factor that may define the share repurchase behaviour of firms is the 
free cash flow hypothesis. According to the free cash flow hypothesis, firms 
with excess cash flows distribute it to shareholders rather than investing in 
value-destroying projects. In other words, share repurchases preserve 
shareholder value more than sub-optimal investments for firms with excess 
cash flows. The separation of ownership creates two kinds of conflict: conflicts 
between management and shareholders on one hand, and conflicts between 
shareholders and bondholders on the other hand (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The conflict between managers and owners creates agency problem because 
managers are more likely to pursue their interests at the expense of the owners. 
Therefore, managers may commit firm‟s resources into activities that benefit 
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such as extensive perquisites, empire building, and investment in value-
destroying activities. Repurchase limits available cash and restricts the 
overinvestment projects (Jensen, 1986).  
Unlike the undervaluation and the information signalling models, the positive 
investor reactions to repurchase are unrelated to perceived improved 
performance that is associated with payout policies. Repurchase under free 
cash flow hypothesis does not predict improved operating performance but lead 
to reduced agency costs of free cash flow. Under the free cash flow model, 
repurchase and other corporate payouts should increase with low growth 
opportunities or negative NPV projects. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) support 
this conjecture and report that high positive market reactions are associated 
with low-q firms than high-q firms subsequent to dividends payments. The 
source of the cash flow expended in the payout could be generated from 
sources other than cash reserves. Firms can undertake asset sales and/or issue 
debt financing prior to the corporate payout decisions. For example, as part of 
restructuring, loss-making assets could be sold and cash proceeds spent in more 
efficient projects or paid out to shareholders.  
Nohel and Tarhan (1998) also argue that asset sales-performance improvement 
is related to free cash flow hypothesis. Significant asset sales prior to 
repurchase transactions generate increase in operating performance. 
Performance increase reflects the deployment of proceeds from sales of poorly 
performing assets as part of restructuring programme. Again, the performance 
effects resonate with low-growth firms without any increases in investment 
opportunities. Market reactions occur at the announcement date and do not 
extend over the long run. These firms also record significant reduction in 
systematic risk. Thus, the positive stock returns associated with repurchase are 
explained by the downward revision of firm risk perception and corresponding 
rise in investor expectations about the prospects of the firms.  
The predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis also assert that managers forgo 
capital expenditures and disgorge excess cash flows to shareholders. This 
effect discounts the conflicts of interest that persist between managers and 
shareholders. The agency theory demonstrates an inherent motivation for 
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managers to seek to enhance their benefits at the expense of shareholders. 
Firms with limited growth opportunities should reduce agency costs of free 
cash flows by paying out excess cash flows to shareholders (Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004; Bozanic, 2010). In this spirit, share repurchase should 
correlate negatively with capital expenditure and research and development 
expenditure. The reduction in capital expenditure, R&D expenses, and 
subsequent decline in cash reserves is a feature of mature firms. Growth firms 
on the hand, have unlimited growth opportunities and are more likely to 
conduct repurchase in line with the signalling model (Liang et al. 2013). 
Repurchasing firms record reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital 
(Nohel and Tarhan, 1998) and inform market about reduction in both the 
agency costs and risks that stimulates positive market reactions. 
4.3.4. Market Timing  
According to Baker and Wurgler (2002), firms issue overvalued equity and 
repurchase undervalued equity in keeping with market timing phenomenon. 
This theory suggests that managerial behaviour also sheds lights on the stock 
market performance of share repurchase. Consistent with the undervaluation 
hypothesis, managers with timing ability should only repurchase when the 
share price is lower. Empirical evidence suggests that few or no shares are 
actually bought following repurchase announcements (Ikenberry and 
Vermaelen, 1996; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). If managers truly have 
timing ability they will increase actual purchase of shares already announced 
when the prices are low. Thus, Chan et al. (2007) relate mispricing with the 
actual buyback activity and long run stock performance. There is only pseudo-
market timing if stock performance depends on repurchase announcement 
behaviour (Schultz, 2003). Chan et al. (2007) find that different portfolio 
technique yields similar returns and that past stock performance do not have a 
negative relationship with repurchase announcements. However, they find 
significant evidence for the increased actual buy back activity when the past 
stock prices fall. This is consistent with the managerial timing ability that open 
market repurchases are actually bought when managers perceive stocks are 
undervalued.  
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4.4. Empirical Evidence of Share Repurchases  
Recent corporate decisions concerning share repurchase provides evidence 
about alternative financing for share repurchase programs. Firms do not 
necessarily utilise internal cash flows to buy back their shares. In fact, both 
constrained and unconstrained firms borrow to finance share repurchase. This 
section, therefore, provides insights into levered share repurchase. Subsection 
4.4.1 discusses levered share repurchase whereas 4.4.2 examines repurchase 
and investment expenditure. Subsection 4.4.3 provides empirical evidence of 
stock returns associated with repurchase announcements.   
4.4.1. Levered Share Repurchase  
The argument from the free cash flow hypothesis is consistent with share 
repurchase financing through excess cash flows. In order to restrict investment 
in value-destroying projects and the payment of excessive perquisites, firms 
with free cash flows are expected to distribute same to the existing 
shareholders. Thus, cash-rich firms utilise their internal cash to pay for the 
purchase of their own shares. Stated differently, cash-rich firms are unlikely to 
borrow to finance their share repurchase transactions. The potential reduction 
in agency costs as result of distributing excess cash flow to shareholders 
through share repurchase transactions is positive news to the shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). Following from the above, cash-poor firms with excess debt 
capacity will tend to use debt financed repurchases (Minnick and Zhao, 2007). 
However, cash-poor firms incur huge costs of financial distress from 
simultaneous debt issues and share repurchase, especially if they do not have 
excess debt capacity. Thus, the effects of increasing debt through borrowings 
might limit cash-poor firms from conducting debt-financed share repurchase.  
Debt issues during periods of share repurchase has become commonplace in 
recent corporate events. In fact, significant amount of levered share 
repurchases occurred in the period prior to the financial crisis in 2008. The 
amount of such debt-financed repurchases peaked at more than $700 billion in 
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2007 (Milken, 2009).19 This trend has continued during and after the financial 
crisis. The incidence of debt-financed repurchase of unconstrained firms during 
the crisis period has been attributed to tax costs. For instance, Foley et al. 
(2007) assert that the consequence of tax costs associated with repatriation of 
foreign income to the US has resulted in huge amount of cash holdings by 
firms. This evidence suggests that cash-rich firms are multinationals with 
significant oversees presence. A significant amount of these cash holdings are 
domiciled in these oversees operations. Accordingly, it is unlikely that these 
firms will distribute excess cash flows to finance share repurchase. However, 
few large firms account for a significant amount of this foreign cash. 
Therefore, the incidence of levered share repurchase is not defined by only the 
cash-rich multinationals that do not want to repatriate their foreign earnings for 
tax purposes.  
According to the precautionary motive for holding cash, future uncertainties in 
the capital market motivates firms to build cash buffers which will allow them 
to undertake future investments (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2006). This 
motive also holds for debt issues when interest rates are at a record low. More 
significant, it also relates to the asymmetric information effects of external 
financing. High information asymmetry causes an increase in the costs of 
external financing. Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that firms should obtain 
external financing during periods of low information asymmetry. It also 
predicts that debt issues are less information sensitive and as such involves low 
costs of issuing them. Moreover, the level of information asymmetry reflects 
the degree of firm internal financial constraints. All else equal, unconstrained 
firms are likely to have low information asymmetry compared to an otherwise 
constrained firm. Therefore, the costs of debt financing should be low for 
unconstrained firms.  
                                                        
19 See Michael Milken, “Why Capital Structure Matters: Companies that repurchased stock two 
years ago are in a world of hurt, “The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2009. He states that 
companies such as General Electric, AIG, Motorola, and Home Depot all used new debt to 
finance stock buybacks prior to the year 2007.  
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The agency cost of debt20 is an important factor that affects debt financing by 
firms. Due to agency costs of debt firms are unable to issue significant amount 
of debt capital. Highly leveraged firms face default and bankruptcy risks that 
prevent them from obtaining debt financing that will allow them to undertake 
investment projects. Thus, agency costs of debt results in underinvestment 
(Myers, 1977) and asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The 
prospect of agency costs of debt implies the degree of internal financial 
constraints will determine the financing of share repurchase. Constrained firms 
are more likely to face high agency costs of debt because of limited cash flow 
and the associated high costs of external financing. Conversely, internally 
financially unconstrained firms with excess debt capacity are able to increase 
their debt ratios without significant agency costs. Therefore, one would expect 
unconstrained firms with valuable investments opportunities to engage in debt-
financed share repurchase.  
4.4.2. Share Repurchase and Investment Expenditure  
The predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis suggest that repurchase 
significantly reduces cash, cash flows and investment. It also assumes that 
firms with limited growth opportunities undertake repurchase in order to 
distribute excess cash flow to shareholders instead of spending on value-
destroying activities. In that sense firms are able to reduce risk and costs of 
capital because repurchase is less risky than the assets in place (Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004). Conversely, the undervaluation and signalling hypotheses do 
not necessarily imply limited growth options for firms, even though under-
valued firms are more likely to have low growth options. What these theories 
suggest is that repurchase signals quality information about the future prospects 
about the firm. By inference, therefore, undervaluation and signalling do not 
anticipate significant reduction in investment.  
From the foregoing, it can be stated that firm lifecycle determines whether free 
cash flow or the information signalling motivates repurchase announcements.                                                         
20 Agency costs of debt arise when the interests of shareholders differ from that of debtholders, 
and also among different classes of debtholders.  
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Hence, it is anticipated that growth firms would repurchase based on 
information signalling and mature firms would be motivated by the free cash 
flow hypothesis (Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Liang et al., 2013). Generally, 
repurchase reduce cash flow and liquidity in a way that would limit investment 
expenditure. Thus, share repurchasing firms should invest less in capital 
projects as more cash are distributed to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Hahn and 
Lee, 2009). But, firms could still invest insofar as cash flow is not significantly 
depleted subsequent to the repurchase announcements. Moreover, through 
levered repurchase firms would be able to maintain sufficient cash flows to 
allow for investment activities. Stated differently, the benefits of investing in 
capital projects could explain the levered share repurchase transactions of 
unconstrained firms. Market to book ratio is a control variable in the empirical 
analysis since it captures the effects of growth opportunities.  
The financial crisis of 2008 showed dramatic changes in firm‟s financing and 
investment behaviours. Internally financially constrained firms are more likely 
to be hugely affected by financial crisis in terms of investment activities. 
Campello et al. (2010) and Campello et al. (2011) show that constrained firms 
planned deeper cuts in investments during the financial crisis. Chen and Wang 
(2012) provide evidence about share repurchase effects on cash, cash flow, 
leverage, and investments. They find that constrained firms generally 
experience significant declines in cash, cash flow, investments, and significant 
increases in leverage after repurchase activity. Likewise, unconstrained firms 
also experience declines in cash and increases in leverage but no changes in 
cash flow and investment. This evidence suggests that leverage is more likely 
undertaken to finance repurchase program by constrained firms. Conversely, 
for unconstrained firms the additional leverage provides cash buffer to 
maintain investment expenditure. Overall, investment has significant influence 
on repurchase programs, especially for unconstrained. Given the effects of the 
financial crisis, I control for crisis in the empirical analysis as discussed in 
Chapter 8.  
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4.4.3. Share Repurchase and Stock Returns 
Share repurchase, according to the undervaluation, free cash flow and 
information signalling theories, provides positive information to the market. 
This information includes favourable future financial prospects and growth 
about the firm, the reduction of the costs of free cash flows not invested in 
value-destroying activities. In response to the positive information, stock prices 
increase over the pre-announcement levels. Thus, share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive initial abnormal returns. This 
returns characteristics indicate that repurchasing firms outperform non-
repurchasing firms. Prior research attributes the positive returns to the 
undervaluation hypothesis (Stephens and Weisbach (1998); D‟Mello and 
Shroff (2000); Comment and Jarrell (1991)), the free cash flow theory (Grullon 
et al., 2002; Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Bozanic, 2010), and the information-
signalling hypothesis (Vermaelen, 1981, 1984; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996).  
The overall evidence find average 3-day abnormal returns of about 3% for US 
repurchase announcements. Table 4.1 summarises the evidence of abnormal 
stock returns associated with repurchase announcements. This figure compares 
well with returns for repurchase in Canada However, the returns are lower for 
countries with regulatory restrictions to repurchase announcements (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 2002; Andriosopoulos and Lasfer, 2011). For example, Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) find 11-day average abnormal returns of 1.14% and Oswald 
and Young (2004) 3-day abnormal returns of 1.24%; Andriosopoulos and 
Lasfer (2015) find 1.68% all in UK, 2.32% in Germany, and 0.80% in France.  
Moreover, the long run returns similarly reflect the positive information that 
accompany repurchase announcements. Market reactions seem to follow the 
initial returns. Table 4.2 presents empirical evidence of long run returns 
associated with repurchase announcements which shows that over the period 
between 2 to 4 years after repurchase, stock returns are significantly positive. 
This return pattern implies the market initial underreact to the repurchase 
announcements until sufficient information is released to the market. Grullon 
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and Michaely (2004) explain market underreacts to repurchase because they 
underestimate the decline in the cost of capital.  
Three hypotheses provide reasons for the market underreaction to repurchase 
announcements and hence the positive returns associated with share 
repurchase.  First, risk-change hypothesis emphasise that repurchase results in 
decline in firm risk. According to Grullon and Michaely (2004), firms with 
limited growth opportunities are more likely to conduct share repurchase. As 
these firms buyback their shares, they return cash which otherwise would have 
been wasted on value-destroying investments to reduce the costs of free cash 
flows. Thus, the repurchase is less risky than assets in place. Grullon and 
Michaely further explain that repurchasing firms experience significant 
reduction in systematic risk and cost of capital compared to non-repurchasing 
firms.   
Second, the liquidity hypothesis asserts that the abnormal returns could be 
caused by an omitted priced factor. The evidence on the liquidity hypothesis is 
mixed. For example, Barclay and Smith (1988), Brockman and Chung (2001), 
and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) find that repurchase reduces liquidity and the 
abnormal returns reflect price for the reduced liquidity. However, repurchase 
could increase depth of the sell side market by supporting market makes and 
adding downside liquidity to falling stock markets (Grullon and Michaely, 
2002). These effects of repurchase improve liquidity.  
Finally, the long run returns could be explained by the overreaction hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, management belief about market overreaction to 
recent publicly available information influences repurchases decisions. Thus, 
prior events determine the long run returns such that management buys back to 
correct market reaction to bad news. What this hypothesis predicts is consistent 
with the undervaluation hypothesis because under-valued stocks are priced 
cheap in the market. All three hypotheses provide better understanding to the 
positive stock returns associated with repurchase announcements.  
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Table 4.1: Summary of Empirical Evidence of US Announcement Date Abnormal 
Returns following Share Repurchase 
Authors  Sample Period Sample Size Event Window  Abnormal Returns   
Comment and Jarrell (1991) 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) 
Grullon and Micahely (2002) 
Grullon and Micahely (2004) 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
Vermaelen (1981) 
Chen and Wang (2012) 
Chan et al. (2004) 
Chan et al. (2010) 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) 
1984-1989 
1984-2001 
1991-2001 
1972-2000 
1980-1997 
1981-1992 
1970-1978 
1990-2007 
1980-1996 
1980-2000 
1980-1990 
1980-1997 
1,197 
6,470 
3,481 
15,843 
4,443 
450 
243 
4,710 
5508 
7628 
1239 
6541 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR (-1,1) 
CAR(-1,0) 
BHAR(-2,0) 
AR(-2,2) 
AR(-2,2) 
CAR(-2,2) 
CAR(-1,1) 
2.3% 
2.39% 
2.39% 
2.57% 
2.71% 
2.69% 
3.37% 
1.17% 
2.18% 
1.80% 
3.54% 
1.49% 
 
Table 4.2: Summary of Empirical Evidence of Long Run Abnormal Returns following 
Share Repurchases 
Authors  Sample Period Sample Size Holding 
Period  
Abnormal Returns   
Chan et al. (2010) 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
Ikenberry et al. (2000) 
Chan et al. (2004)  
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) 
1980-2000 
1980-1990 
1989-1997 
1980-1996 
1991-2001 
7628 
1239 
1060 
5508 
3481 
2-year BHAR 
4-year HPR 
3-year CAR 
4-year BHAR 
4-year F&F 
CAR 
8.6% 
12.14% 
21.40% 
23.56% 
24.25% 
 
4.5. Testable Hypotheses  
This section discusses the testable hypotheses. 
4.5.1. Internal Financial Constraints and Levered Share Repurchase 
In the information signalling framework, firms repurchase to convey quality 
and credible information about the prospects of the firm to the market in terms 
of both the current and future cash flows (Baker et al., 2003; Grullon and 
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Michaely, 2004). The undervaluation hypothesis posits that firms repurchase 
when their stock prices are undervalued or cheap (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 
1996; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). The free cash flow hypothesis asserts 
that firms repurchase in order to disgorge excess cash flows to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998). Therefore, firms with limited 
growth opportunities would rather distribute cash instead of investing in value-
destroying projects. This evidence is in the spirit of maximising shareholder 
value even though it undermines the pursuit of personal interests of the 
managers. Stock returns response reflects the decrease in agency costs 
associated with free cash flow, when managers engage in cash distribution, 
including share repurchase. Nohel and Tarhan (1998), Dittmar (2000), and 
Grullon and Michaely (2004), all find support for the free cash flow 
hypothesis. This theory assumes that share repurchase transactions reflect cash 
distribution of firms with considerable excess cash reserves. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that internally financially unconstrained firms are more 
likely to repurchase their shares than firms with significant cash constraints.  
This chapter addresses two broad arguments related to share repurchase 
transactions. Firstly, the study asserts that firms borrow to finance their share 
repurchase transactions. Secondly, Chen and Wang (2012) emphasise that 
internally financially constrained firms also conduct share repurchases. Grullon 
and Michaely (2004) as well as Denis and Sibilkov (2009) show that a firm 
may reduce their investments after share repurchase activities due to limited 
available cash flows. Moreover, Campello et al. (2010) and Campello et al. 
(2011) show that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in investments during 
the financial crisis. Thus, share repurchasing firms should invest less in capital 
projects as more cash is distributed to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Hahn and 
Lee, 2009). However, borrowings should allow firms to build cash balances 
that support both investment expenditure and share repurchase. Firms that hold 
high cash balances are likely to preserve their cash balances and conduct debt 
issuance and use the proceeds to support investment expenditure and 
repurchase shares.   
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Therefore, the research further argues that unconstrained firms borrow to 
finance share repurchases insofar as they engage in more capital investments. 
The motivation for this conjecture is that unconstrained firms with debt rating 
and/or investment grade ratings are able to obtain cheap and available debt 
financing than constrained firms (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Almeida and 
Campello, 2007). This idea follows that while constrained firms need debt 
financing to repurchase their shares, the high costs of external debt limit the 
amount they can obtain to finance both the repurchase and investments. 
Consequently, unconstrained firms are likely to build cash reserves sufficient 
to undertake both share repurchase and investments. Again, the above 
discourse is consistent with the conjecture that the level of internal financial 
constraints determines the probability of levered share repurchase. More 
significantly, the financing of the repurchase transaction differs according to 
the level of cash flow available to the firm. Thus, the need for cash to finance 
investment expenditure at the time of repurchasing shares motivates firms to 
borrow in order to have sufficient cash reserves to invest while at the same 
returning cash to shareholders. The following hypotheses are thus tested:  
H8: Internally financially constrained firms are more likely to 
conduct debt-financed repurchase than unconstrained firms 
H9: Internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to repurchase 
especially when they also undertake investments  
4.5.2. Internal Financial Constraints, Levered Share Repurchase and 
Stock Returns  
In terms of stock returns, the study tests the hypothesis that the announcement 
date abnormal returns associated with share repurchase reflect the level of firm 
internal financial constraints and financing of the share repurchase programme. 
The extant literature find support for stock price outperformance following 
share repurchase programs both announcement date (Vermaelen, 1981; 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Grullon and Micahely, 2004; Peyer and 
Vermaelen, 2009) and long run (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Chan et al., 2010). 
However, whether internal cash flow or borrowings are used to finance the 
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share repurchase program should produce different stock price reactions, both 
at the announcement date and over the long run. Cash-financed repurchase 
indicates a more likely positive outlook for the firm; this evidence is 
highlighted in the information-signalling model. Moreover, the free cash flow 
hypothesis shows that share repurchase using cash reserves decreases agency 
costs of free cash flow. Debt-financed repurchase increases leverage and 
financial distress more than cash-financed repurchase (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Myers, 1977; Chen and Wang, 2012). The leverage increases cause a fall 
in the value of the equity capital.  
Stated differently, unconstrained firms that borrow to finance share repurchase 
should have less increases in leverage and hence financial distress costs than 
constrained firms. To the extent that unconstrained firms borrow to both 
conduct share repurchase and invest more in capital projects (given that 
projects are value-increasing), these firms should be associated with more 
positive abnormal returns than low investing firms and /or constrained levered 
repurchase firms. In addition to the announcement date abnormal returns, the 
risk hypothesis and liquidity hypothesis explanations to the long run stock 
returns suggest that unconstrained firms which invest should be associated with 
more positive long run returns, especially for the levered repurchase firms.” 
H10: Cash-financed repurchase is associated with more positive 
abnormal returns than debt-financed repurchase, especially when the 
firm is internally financially unconstrained.  
H11: All else equal, internally financially unconstrained firms which 
conduct levered share repurchase should be associated with more 
positive returns for high investing firms than low investing firms.   
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the overview of share repurchase and provided 
empirical support for share repurchases announcements. The aim of the chapter 
was to establish that repurchase financing is changing with firms using 
borrowings to finance share repurchase. However, for internally financially 
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unconstrained firms, which do not necessarily need external financing to 
conduct repurchase, the additional borrowings allow them to invest more. The 
chapter also discussed the stock returns associated with repurchase 
announcements. Empirical evidence suggests that share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive announcement date abnormal 
returns. This finding fails to account for the level of financial constraints and 
the source of financing of the repurchase program that can affect the stock 
returns. Therefore, firms are likely to take into account these factors and the 
stock price implications when undertaking share repurchase programs.  The 
study examines the repurchase behaviour of unconstrained firms, especially 
when they borrow to finance their repurchase transactions.  
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Chapter 5  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter discusses the data and methodology applied to carry out the 
empirical analysis. The objective of this chapter is to explain the data selection 
procedure and criteria and also to present the empirical models used in testing 
the hypotheses. The rationale for the research design is discussed in this 
chapter. The chapter consists of three sections: Section 5.2 examines the 
sample selection criteria and the design of the study, Section 5.3 the empirical 
models and estimation techniques including the measurements of the variables 
used. Section 5.4 concludes.  
5.2. Data  
This section discusses the sample period, sources of the data used and how the 
final sample is derived. The section is divided into four sections. Section 5.2.1 
presents the criteria for the sample period selection. Section 5.2.2 focuses on 
the data for the equity issues, whereas Section 5.2.3 the data for the equity 
issuance methods. Finally, Section 5.2.4 examines the data for share repurchase 
programs.  
5.2.1. Sample Period  
The thesis uses two datasets for the entire analysis and the testing of the 
hypotheses. Data on UK equity issues are collected from Securities Data 
Company (SDC) and accounting data from Datastream over the period 1st 
January 1994 to 31st December 2010. These equity issues are then divided into 
the type of equity issuance method that is the focus of the second empirical 
chapter (Chapter 7). Since the deregulation of 1986, UK listed firms are 
allowed to issue equity through rights issues, open offers, and private 
placement. Hence, the initial year of the sample period is chosen due to the 
preference for open offers and private placement. The final data comprise 1257 
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equity issuance announcements. This represents a comprehensive dataset 
compared to previous studies.21  
The second dataset comprises open market share repurchases of US firms 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012 and is collected from the 
(SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. Financial statement data are 
extracted from the Compustat database while market and stock returns data are 
collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
Share repurchases announcements data from SDC is relatively more complete 
after 1985 and from the 1990 it became readily available and more 
comprehensive. The final data consists of 5874 share repurchase 
announcements over the 23-year period. The choice of US data is important 
since US firms make significant debt-financed repurchase. 22  This dataset 
compares favourably with data used in prior studies both in terms of length of 
time period and the sample size. For example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
used a sample of 450 repurchase announcements from 1981 to 1990, Grullon 
and Michaely (2004) used data of 4443 repurchase announcements from 1980 
to 1997, and Chen and Wang (2012) used a sample of 4710 repurchase 
announcements between 1990 to 2007.  
The study uses datasets for equity issues (including the equity issuance 
methods) and share repurchase programs. While the equity issues are for UK 
listed firms, the share repurchase sample is derived from US listed firms. The 
aim of the UK equity issues is to explore the effects of market timing and 
financial constraints on equity issuance decisions (H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5) as 
discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2. Moreover, the UK equity issues are split 
into the issuance methods - rights issues, open offers, and private placement - 
to investigate the long run operating and stock performance associated with 
each issuance method (H7 and H8) as discussed in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3. For 
the purpose of examining why unconstrained firms conduct levered share                                                         
21 Prior studies such as Slovin et al., (2000) used 296 equity issues (made up of 220 rights 
offerings and 76 open offers), Armitage (2000) used a sample of 928 rights issues and 450 
open offers from 1985 to 1996, Barnes and Walker (2006) used 868 equity issues consisting of 
600 rights offers and 268 placings from 1989 to 1998, and Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) used a 
sample of 772 equity issues made up of 229 rights issues, 129 open offers, 299 placings, and 
115 placings with open offers from January, 1996 to December, 2007.  
22 The choice of datasets is discussed in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.  
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repurchase (H9, H10, H11, H12, and H13), a total of 5874 share repurchase 
announcements are used as discussed in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4. In the 
subsections that follow, the sample procedure for the equity issues and 
repurchase announcements as well as the sample statistics are discussed.  
5.2.2. Data for Equity Issues  
The data on the security issues obtained from the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) are matched using datastream codes (see subsection 5.2.3 below), with 
the corresponding accounting, stock market prices and valuation data from 
Datastream. Data on analyst forecast earnings are obtained from the 
Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). Financial firms are excluded 
from the sample in line with most research due to volatility of data variables 
and in regard to regulatory factors that affect financial firms. Examples of 
studies that exclude financial firms include; Hovakimian, Opler and Titman 
(2001); Dittmar and Thakor (2007); Oswald and Young (2008); Cook and 
Tang (2010); DeAngelo et al. (2010). In addition to regulatory differences, 
financial firms also have a different capital structure from non-financial firms. 
For example, banks equity issuance decisions may be affected by the minimum 
capital requirements.   
Data are sorted first using sedol number since that represents the code for listed 
companies on the London Stock Exchange. After applying this initial screening 
criterion, about 88% of the companies with sedol numbers are found which are 
then used together with the company ticker symbols to identify the 
corresponding datastream codes. In cases where a firm has both sedol and 
ticker symbols further check that the datastream codes provided by sedol and 
ticker are the same. Where sedol numbers are missing (about 12%), both the 
ticker and the company names are used to find the datastream codes. Also, 
further checks with the proceeds resulted in the exclusion of companies 
without figures for proceeds. This also resulted in the deletion of a further 
0.18% of the data to arrive at the final sample for the equity issues. 
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Data restrictions are as follows: 
i. Issues from SDC must have corresponding accounting data from 
datastream  
ii. Issues must have relevant sedol codes, datastream codes and ticker 
symbols  
iii. Firms without any of the codes are deleted  
iv. If the codes do not match with the appropriate corresponding codes in 
datastream, the firm is eliminated. Thus, both the sedol and datastream 
codes must match with the codes extracted from datastream 
v. Where feasible, ticker and company names are used to reconcile the 
disparities. These are just few instances where three of the four criteria 
are inconsistent.  
vi. Only firms that made any security issues are considered. Therefore, 
firms without any issues are ignored.  
vii. Following Byoun (2011), only firms with positive market-to-book 
ratios are included in the final sample. Negative market to book ratios is 
difficult to interpret since they imply a sustained level of negative 
earnings by the firm.  
Final sample comprises 1257 equity issues over the sample period 1994 to 
2010 as reported in Table 5.1.  
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5.2.4. Selection of matching firms/control firms  
The procedure for selecting matching firms is similar to Capstaff and Fletcher 
(2011), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1997) and 
Hertzel et al (2002). A control firm for each sampled firm is extracted from the 
listed firms on the London Stock Exchange. At any year-end, firms that 
previously issued equity are excluded from the list of potential control firms to 
avoid confounding results. In each of the year-end prior to the security issuance 
date, one control firm for each sample firm that satisfies certain conditions is 
identified. A control firm must belong to the same industry group as the sample 
firm and must be of comparable size in terms of specified range of market 
value compared to the sample firm.  
Once selected, a two-year time lag is imposed before a previously selected 
control firm is allowed to re-enter the pool of potential control firms. This 
allows to measure operating performance for the three years to compare with 
the performance of the sampled firms. Furthermore, a three-year stock return is 
Table 5.1: Annual Equit Issues 
Year  No. of issues 
1994 63 
1995 63 
1996 83 
1997 51 
1998 49 
1999 58 
2000 126 
2001 104 
2002 51 
2003 77 
2004 65 
2005 44 
2006 47 
2007 83 
2008 54 
2009 159 
2010 80 
Total 1257 
Notes: This table shows the annual equity 
issues across the sample period. 
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estimated to reflect the level of operating performance following the decision 
to issue equity through three issuance methods. In addition to the cumulative 
abnormal returns, buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for sampled firms 
and control firms over three years post-issue are estimated. Following Hertzel 
et al (2002), the size-matched benchmark ensures that the control firm has 
market value larger than, but closest to, the sample firm. The matching is done 
12 months prior to the announcement date of the issuing firms to better 
compare the prior issue abnormal returns.  
5.2.3. Data for Share Issuance Methods  
The final data collected for equity issues as described above are split into the 
equity issuance methods. Annual operating and monthly stock market returns 
are collected from Datastream. Since stock returns are estimated for each firm 
up to three years after the issuance of equity; therefore, stock returns are 
collected until December 2013. Again, the data is restricted to non-financial 
firms with at least one-year return data available after the issuance.23 Panel A 
of Table 5.2 outlines the procedure for constructing the final sample; Panel B 
shows the annual number of equity issuances during the sample period. The 
final sample consists of 328 rights issues, 321 open offers, and 608 private 
placements. The number of issues over the sample period shows the high 
frequency use of rights issues during the 1990s, and a significant increase in 
usage for alternative private placements and open offers within recent years. 
This decline in usage of rights issues and the increase in private placements 
and open offers have been reported in prior UK studies (Barnes and Walker, 
2006; Armitage, 2010).   
 
 
 
                                                         
23 The TIME datatype is used to explore whether a firm is delisted after the issuance (zero 
returns in the month of delisting), and firms are not required to have all three-year returns after 
issuance to avoid look-ahead biased.  
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Table 5.2: Construction of Equity Issues by Method and the Distribution across 
the Sample Period 
Panel A: Construction of Final Sample of Equity Issues  
Initial Thomson One Banker sample (follow-on equity issues of UK listed 
firms from 1994 to 2010) 
Exclude issues not on London Main Market 
Exclude issues which are not either ordinary and/or common shares 
Exclude VCTs and investment trusts 
Final sample  
Made up of:  
Rights issues  
Open offers  
Placings  
Total  
5986 
 
(3785) 
(53) 
(891) 
1257 
 
328 
321 
608 
1257 
 
 
Panel B: Annual Equity Issues by Issuance Method  
Year  Rights Issues (RI) 
Open Offers  
(OO) 
Private 
Placement 
PP 
Total 
1994 42 0 21 63 
1995 39 0 24 63 
1996 48 0 35 83 
1997 29 10 12 51 
1998 17 27 5 49 
1999 16 26 16 58 
2000 18 47 61 126 
2001 19 44 41 104 
2002 13 29 9 51 
2003 11 41 25 77 
2004 11 29 25 65 
2005 19 4 21 44 
2006 11 4 32 47 
2007 2 10 71 83 
2008 7 8 39 54 
2009 24 29 106 159 
2010 2 13 65 80 
Total 328 321 608 1257 
Notes: Panel A shows the procedure for the construction of the equity issues by method 
whereas Panel B gives the annual equity issues by issuance method.  
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5.2.4. Data Share Repurchase 
The second dataset consist of 5874 share repurchase announcements of US 
firms. Following Maxwell and Stephens (2003) and Minnick and Zhao (2007), 
this study identifies the announcements of open market repurchases program 
from the Securities Data Company (SDC). Fama and French (2001) and 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) calculate repurchase using the balance sheet 
which give similar results.24 According to Grullon and Michaely (2002) the 
correlation between the two measures is 0.97 and the dollar amounts are also 
similar. However, the announced repurchase from SDC gives the specific dates 
to help compute the returns prior to the announcement. Using Compustat 
measure of repurchase is also problematic. For example, Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998) indicate that since Compustat reports repurchase in value 
terms and the price at which shares are repurchased is assumed. Moreover, 
Compustat measure is likely to overstate repurchase since it is an aggregation 
of all security repurchases and retirements during the quarter or year.  
Hence, data on open market share repurchases are collected of US firms 
between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012 from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. Financial statement 
data are extracted from the Compustat database while market and stock returns 
data are collected from the CRSP database. Financial firms (SIC codes between 
6000 and 6999) are excluded due to the stringent regulatory oversight under 
which they operate and their different capital structure (e.g. Denis and 
Sibilkov, 2010; Chen and Wang, 2012). Finally, following Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), repurchase made by the same firm within three years of the 
previous announcements are excluded to eliminate repeated repurchase 
announcements (in line with Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996; and Lie, 2005). 
The final sample is made up of 5874 repurchase announcements as reported in 
Table 5.3.  
                                                         
24 Jagannathan et al (2000); Fama and French (2001) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) define 
repurchase as the total expenditure on common and preferred stocks (Compustat #115) minus 
reduction in the number of preferred stocks outstanding (Compustat #56).  
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Table 5.3: Construction of Final Sample of Share Repurchase Announcements 
Initial Thomson One Banker sample  
Exclude issues without corresponding Compustat code for matching  
(permno, gvkey or 6cusip codes) 
Exclude announcements without share repurchase value/amount 
Exclude sample with negative MB or no stock returns data 
Final Sample  
12296 
(5191) 
 
(959) 
(272) 
5874 
Notes: This table shows construction of the final sample of share repurchase. It indicates the initial 
sample and the restrictions and exclusions that resulted in the final sample. 
 
Consistent with the research the third objective the sample is defined as levered 
or unlevered depending on the source of financing. The idea is to test the 
hypothesis that drives firms to either commit internally generated funds to 
conduct repurchases or borrow with the goal of using the proceeds to finance 
equity repurchase. Levered share repurchase occurs when debt issues finance 
the repurchase. Following Minnick and Zhao (2007), share repurchase is 
levered if there is a positive change in the debt capital either one year prior to 
or within two years after the repurchase announcement. The sample is further 
classified according to the level of internal financial constraints.25 Table 5.4 
Panel A reports the number of share repurchase for unconstrained firms during 
the sample period. Out of 5874 share repurchase announcements, a total of 
4700 repurchases are made by unconstrained firms of which 3359 unlevered 
and 1341 levered repurchases. There seems no particular pattern at the total 
share repurchases and the distribution between unlevered and levered 
repurchases during the sample period. A significant number of share 
repurchases is therefore financed through borrowings, even though the 
particular firms are unconstrained.   
 
 
                                                         
25 The measure of financial constraints is discussed in section 5.2.1.2 
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Table 5.4: Number of Annual Share Repurchase Announcements 
 Panel A: Full sample   Panel B: 
Unconstrained  
 Panel C: 
Constrained  
Year  0 1 Total  0 1 Total  0 1 Total 
1990 195 38 233  159 32 191  36 6 42 
1991 94 19 113  86 18 104  8 1 9 
1992 162 32 194  150 24 174  12 8 20 
1993 124 46 170  114 39 153  10 7 17 
1994 179 74 253  147 57 204  32 17 49 
1995 222 86 308  181 65 246  41 21 62 
1996 289 153 442  253 113 366  36 40 76 
1997 271 145 416  230 103 333  41 42 83 
1998 453 189 642  346 123 469  107 66 173 
1999 341 127 468  254 76 330  87 51 138 
2000 164 92 256  126 60 186  38 32 70 
2001 126 29 155  111 19 130  15 10 25 
2002 90 33 123  80 21 101  10 12 22 
2003 73 27 100  61 18 79  12 9 21 
2004 107 46 153  89 31 120  18 15 33 
2005 130 99 229  112 77 189  18 22 40 
2006 92 101 193  80 86 166  12 15 27 
2007 157 141 298  132 100 232  25 41 66 
2008 302 92 394  258 62 320  44 30 74 
2009 95 40 135  82 27 109  13 13 26 
2010 116 72 188  99 58 157  17 14 31 
2011 135 129 264  117 103 220  18 26 44 
2012 103 44 147  92 29 121  11 15 26 
Total 4020 1854 5874  3359 1341 4700  661 513 1174 
Notes: This table shows the annual share repurchase announcements. Panel A provides the annual 
share repurchase announcements for the full sample; Panel B gives the annual repurchase 
announcements for unconstrained firms and Panel C shows the annual repurchase announcements for 
the constrained firms subsample.  
 
.3. Variable Definitions and Model Specification  
This section justifies the research approach used in the study. Variables used 
are defined including how they are measured. The model used is also specified. 
The section is further divided into three subsections. Subsection 5.3.1 defines 
the dependent, explanatory, and control variables for exploring the effects of 
mispricing and financial constraints on equity issues. It also discusses the 
model used to test the hypotheses related to equity issues. Subsection 5.3.2 
presents the dependent, explanatory, and control variables used to examine the 
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long run operating and stock performance associated with equity issuance 
methods. Again, model for the analysis is explained in this subsection. Finally, 
subsection 5.3.3 explains the variables and models used to examine the levered 
share repurchase behaviour of internally financially unconstrained firms. The 
variables used are consistent with prior literature (see for example Grullon and 
Michaely, 2002; Chen and Wang, 2012) which has shown that these variables 
theoretically and empirically have significant effects on share issuance and 
repurchase decisions of firms as discussed further in the subsections that 
follow.  
5.3.1. The Effects of Mispricing and Financial Constraints on Equity 
Issuance Decisions  
The first part of the thesis examines the equity issuance decisions of firms 
given the degree of financial constraints. This section discusses the dependent 
variables, the explanatory, and control variables. It also specifies the model for 
the empirical testing of the hypotheses.  
5.3.1.1. Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are discussed in the sections below.  
i. Indicator Variable: Equity Issuance  
The study explores the propensity for firms to issue equity given the degree of 
financial constraints. It also controls for other firm characteristics that have 
been explored in the empirical literature to determine equity issuance 
decisions. Given that the research examines probability of equity issues, the 
dependent variable therefore is a dummy variable; 1 for equity issues and 0 for 
non-equity issuance.  
ii. Abnormal Stock Returns  
The second dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns associated with 
equity issues, Event studies methodology is used to measure the stock price 
impact of corporate events. The early work by Fama et al. (1969) laid the 
foundation for other intriguing event studies in respect of corporate events. 
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Their study focused on stock split and market reactions but since then other 
corporate events such as seasoned equity offerings (SEO), initial public 
offerings (IPO), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), repurchase, among others 
have received considerable attention in event studies in the empirical corporate 
finance literature. Brown and Warner (1980) explore event studies using 
monthly data and subsequently use daily data when they became available 
(Brown and Warner, 1985).  
Abnormal stock returns are estimated using the market model where daily 
return of a particular security is compared with the daily return of the 
benchmark to compute daily excess or abnormal returns.26 For UK data, the 
benchmark is the FTSE ALL SHARE INDEX. The market model calculates 
abnormal returns as the difference between the actual returns and the OLS 
fitted returns. Thus, the residuals or regression errors represent the abnormal 
returns of the market model. The market model therefore adjusts for both 
market-wide factors and systematic risk of each security.  
Abnormal returns are computed using the market model as follows:  
 
Where:  
 is the abnormal returns  
is the actual stock returns  
 is the fitted or predicted returns from the OLS regressions with  
and as regression coefficients  
 is the market index returns.  
Cumulative abnormal returns,  is estimated from the abnormal returns 
using the market model.  
                                                        
26 Studies which have used the market model to estimate abnormal returns include Dong et al. 
(2012),  
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5.3.1.2. Explanatory Variables 
The proxies used to measure the effects of mispricing and financial constraints 
on equity issuance decisions are discussed in the following subsections. In 
addition to their definitions, limitations of each proxy are also explained.  
i. Mispricing: Market-to-book ratio (MB) 
According to proponents of market timing theory, misvaluation of firm value 
represents mispricing that motivates managers to issue overvalued equity and 
repurchase undervalued. Market-to-book ratio (MB) by definition encompasses 
firm value from market perspective as well as the fundamental or intrinsic 
value as determined by the companies‟ fundamentals. Given this background, 
any difference between what the market perceives as firm value and the firm‟s 
valuation results in mispricing. Summarily, higher market value than the book 
value generates high MB whereas lower market value than the book value 
generates lower MB. Thus, MB defines stock mispricing (Fama and French, 
1992; Rhodes-Kropf et al., 2005; Elliot et al., 2008). Consistent with the 
literature on equity issues, overvalued firms are more likely to issue equity 
whereas undervalued firms prefer to buy back their shares (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002; Dong et al., 2012). The degree of mispricing defined as the ratio of 
market price to fundamental value also explains firm stock returns (Fama and 
French, 1992; Daniel et al. 2001; Barberis and Huang, 2001).27  
Consistent with prior studies, MB is the proxy for mispricing. Accordingly, 
high MB is expected to have a positive relationship with share issuance 
decisions. The effects of mispricing also indicate that MB has an ex post 
negative relationship with stock returns. Mispricing or misvaluation is defined 
as MB and computed as follows:  
 
Where: 
BVAit is the book value of total assets                                                          
27 Further evidence of the effects of mispricing on share issuance decisions and subsequent 
stock returns is discussed in chapter 2.  
it
ititit
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BVEit is the book value of equity  
MVEit is the market value of equity  
 
ii. Internal Financial Constraints (KZ index) 
The main proxy for internal financial constraints is the Kaplan and Zingales‟ 
(1997) index (hereafter KZ index).28 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) constructed 
this index in their study of the financial constraints characteristics of 49 low-
dividend paying manufacturing firms. The sample of 49 firms over 15-year 
period (from 1970-1984) replicates that of Fazzari et al. (1988). Low-dividend 
paying firms exhibit strong relation between investment and cash flow. Using 
observable firm characteristics, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) rank these firms 
on ordinal scale form least to most constrained and run ordered logit model. 
This is an objective measure that has gained substantial currency in the 
empirical literature as an indicator of financial constraints (Baker et al. 2003). 
It is hypothesised that internally financially constrained firms will be impeded 
in responding to high valuations to issue equity. This implies less internally 
financially constrained firms quickly take advantage of mispricing; therefore, 
there is a negative correlation between valuation and degree of internal 
financial constraints.  
Following studies such as Baker et al., (2003) and Dong et al., (2012), the 
proxy for internal financial constraints used in this study is computed below.  
KZ index is defined as follows: 
 
Where: 
CF is the cash flow measured as net income plus depreciation  
                                                        
28 Lemmon and Zender (2010); Almeida et al. (2004) use dividend payment and debt capacity 
as proxy for financial constraints which the KZ-index captures in addition to other factors that 
affect the level of financial flexibility. Again, Helwege and Liang (1996); Lemmon and Zender 
(2010); DeAngelo et al (2010) adopt Altman‟s Z-score which define financial distress as 
evidenced by excessive leverage rather than the lack of financial surplus.  
 KZ =  1.002 CF TA( ) + 3.139LEV  39.368 DIV TA( )  1.315 CASH TA( )
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TA is total assets LEV is leverage defined as the long term debt over lagged 
total assets 
CASH is defined as cash and cash equivalents  
A higher KZ-index represents highly constrained firms that have debt capacity 
concerns, have low cash balance (limited financial slack) and pay no dividends. 
According to the pecking order theory, firms with high KZ-index issue equity. 
Similarly, less financially constrained are better placed to respond to both 
valuation effects and the need to adjust the leverage to achieve target debt ratio.  
iii. Internal Financial Constraints (WW index) 
For robustness of results, an alternative proxy for financial constraints is used 
to analyse the effects of internal financial constraints on share issuance 
decisions. This proxy for financial constraints is the Whited and Wu (2006) 
index hereafter the WW index calculated as follows: 
 
Where: 
CF is cash flow; TA is total assets; LTD is long-term debt; INDSG is the firm‟s 
three-digit industry sales growth; SG is the firm‟s sales growth; and DIVDUM 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays cash dividends and 0 
otherwise. A high WW-index denotes that the firm is more internally 
financially constrained. In line with the KZ-measure, firms in the 5th quintile 
are classified as internally financially constrained and unconstrained otherwise.  
iv. Financial Distress (Taffler’s Z score) 
Financial distress (used for UK data) measure is used as alternative proxy for 
financial constraints measure. The degree of financial distress supports the 
pecking order theory. In the context of this hypothesis, firms that are 
potentially liable to financial distress prefer equity financing to debt. Financial 
distress, as explained in theoretical finance, is the inability of company to meet 
its financial obligations, especially to creditors. Factors such as excessive debt 
giving rise to fixed interest payments, lack of profitability particularly in 
WW = -0.091 CF TA( ) - 0.062 DIVDUM( ) + 0.021 LTD TA( )
-0.044logTA + 0.102INDSG - 0.035SG
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situations where sales levels slump in response to economic downturns and the 
lack of liquid assets that could be sold to defray the obligations. Firms plagued 
with costly financial distress correlate with severe debt capacity concerns 
which limit external debt financing. Again, there is a lack of financial slack 
such that inadequate internal funds result in financial deficit.  
For example, Helwege and Liang (1996), Lemmon and Zender (2010), 
DeAngelo et al. (2010) state that Z-score correlates with excessive leverage 
rather than the lack of financial surplus. Thus, financial distress explains 
financial constraints due to the high leverage associated with distressed firms. 
The effects of debt capacity concerns, lack of internal funds and profitability 
restrict any attempts to access the external debt market. Effectively, financially 
distressed firms are more likely to enter the external equity market for 
financing in order to undertake investments projects. The correlation with 
internal financial constraints also suggests that financially distressed firms are 
less likely to issue equity due to high costs of equity issuance.  
Financial distress, though correlates with internal financial constraints, also 
have partial effects of financing decisions and in particular determining the 
leverage levels. The trade-off theory emphasises the costs associated with 
excessive leverage. Here financial distress, rather than internal financial 
constraints, is used to account for the effects of potential bankruptcy costs on 
equity financing. Therefore, Taffler‟s Z-score (a measure of business failure for 
UK firms) is used as a measure of financial distress. By using multiple 
discriminant analysis, Taffler‟s (1983) provides a Z-score measure that is 
computed as four weighted ratios. He used stepwise linear discriminant 
analysis to develop a model that was able to discriminate effectively between 
failed and healthy companies between the beginning of 1969 and the end of 
1976. The model is described as follows: 
 
Where: 
PROF is the ratio of profit before tax to average current liabilities WCAP is 
ratio of current assets to total liabilities  
LIQDFRISKWCAPPROFZ  0289.068.1050.218.1220.3
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FRISK is current liabilities divided by total assets LIQD refers to number of 
credit interval that is defined as [(Current assets-Inventory-Current liabilities) / 
(Sales-Profit before tax +Depreciation)] 
Negative Z score represents financially distressed companies that are in danger 
of failure; whereas those with positive Z score are solvent companies.  
v. Financial Crisis (CRISIS) and Market Liquidity (LIQD) 
The extant literature offers evidence of the effects of financial crisis and market 
liquidity on corporate decisions. 29  Campello et al. (2010), Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2010), Campello et al. (2011), and McLean and Zhao (2014) 
indicate that external financial constraints, evidenced by the financial crisis, 
affect investment, employment, and cash holdings of firms. Financial crisis 
(CRISIS) is a dummy variable that is 1 for the period after 2007 and 0 
otherwise. Market Liquidity (LIQD), on the other hand, measures the ease of 
raising capital that is related to the costs of external financing. Internally 
financially constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity when 
market liquidity is low.  Market liquidity is computed as the difference 
between 12-month London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the Bank of 
England Base Rate (BOEBR). This is as similar measure of market liquidity 
used by Harford (2005) for US equity market.  
 
Where:  
LIBORt is the 12-month London Interbank Offer Rate 
BOEBRt is the Bank of England Base Rate 
5.3.1.3. Control Variables  
In addition to the key parameters that have been defined as affecting financing 
decisions, the study incorporates a number of additional variables that have 
partial effects on security issuance decisions. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
identify four firm characteristics that have significant impact on financing                                                         
29 See Chapter 2 for discussion of the effects of external financial constraints on corporate 
financing policies.  
LIQDt = LIBORt  BOEBRt
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decisions. Particularly, leverage levels correlate with each of these variables 
that in turn determine financing decisions as a result of the leverage levels. The 
four Rajan and Zingales (1995) leverage determining factors include firm size, 
profitability, and asset tangibility and growth opportunities. However, growth 
opportunities are already captured in the measure of mispricing given as MB. 
The following control variables are included.  
i. Profitability (PROF) 
Profitability is defined in the model as the earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation (EBITDA) divided by total assets and expressed as a percentage 
(in other words as the return on assets). Jensen (1986) asserts that free cash 
flow problems associated with profitable firms force them to issue debt capital. 
Again, evidence attests that profitable firms have high levels of internal funds 
and as such are unlikely to be financially distressed. Moreover, profitability 
translates into growth opportunities in subsequent periods. That is, profitable 
firms are more likely to investment in research and development that produces 
opportunities for growth. Thus, with growth options firms issue equity more 
than debt financing and hence record low leverage levels. Following from that, 
and according to the pecking order theory, these firms are unlikely to access 
the capital debt market for financing. Therefore, profitable firms have a low 
leverage. It is defined accordingly as:  
 
Where:  
INCit is net income before extraordinary items  
CE is common equity of the firm i at time t  
ii. Firm size (SIZE) 
Firm size is measured as the log of net sales/market capitalisation has a 
positive relationship with leverage. This is due to the ability of large firms to 
shield against financial distress and access capital debt market. Empirical 
it
it
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INCPROF  
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evidence asserts that small firms possess considerable growth opportunities, 
low leverage yet greater uncertainty due to information asymmetry. Large 
firms, on the other hand, are mostly matured entities that have exhausted 
growth options but are highly followed by analysts. The effects of analysts‟ 
coverage limit asymmetric information effects. Again, large firms have 
substantial tangible assets which provide collateral facilities to access debt 
financing. Intuitively, small firms are less likely to follow the pecking order, 
even though this argument is sternly challenged in the literature (Lemmon and 
Zender, 2010). In terms of leverage levels, the collateral facility from the high 
degree of asset tangibility ensures that large firms have high leverage than 
small entities. The conclusion from this analysis reflects the positive 
relationship between firm size and leverage.  
Using Rajan and Zingales‟ (1995) definition, firm size is calculated as the 
natural logarithm of book value of total assets (also Barclay and Smith, 1995; 
Dong et al., 2012). Other studies such as Antoniou et al. (2006) use log of 
sales. The reasoning for scaling with natural logarithm is to curtail the bias 
associated with outliers and errors. Residuals get bigger with bigger values for 
the dependent variable. This apparent anomaly is inevitable because error or 
change in the value of an outcome variable is often a percent of the value rather 
than an absolute value. The natural logarithm of a variable neutralises the 
residuals for the bigger value. Moreover, the difference in size among small 
and large firms is controlled using logarithm rather than the “raw” values. This 
eliminates potential skewness associated with large values. There is neutrality 
with firm size and the effects on financing choice or leverage removes any 
bias.  
 
Where:  
LogMVit is the natural logarithm of book value of total assets   
 
 
 
 
SIZEit = LogTAit
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iii. Earnings Deviation (ED) 
Earnings deviation and accrual quality demonstrate information gap between 
managers and investors. This measure captures the effects of information 
asymmetry associated with equity issues as discussed in Chapter 2. Dittmar and 
Thakor (2007) use earnings deviation as an agreement parameter where high 
value represents higher agreement between managers and investors. Dong et al 
(2012), however, argue that absolute value of earnings deviation better defines 
the degree of disagreement between managers and investors. Lee and Masulis 
(2009) and Billet et al. (2013) assert that accrual quality is an alternative proxy 
for asymmetric information that is more related to earnings management. 
Whereas investors rely on financial statements to take economic decisions, 
insiders own the source of such information reported on the financial 
statements. A lower quality of such information therefore represents a source 
of asymmetric information.  
To proxy for asymmetric information, in line with the pecking order theory, an 
estimate of the earnings deviation, showing the absolute deviation of actual 
earnings from analysts‟ consensus forecast is given as: 
. 
Where:  
EPSactual is the earnings per share reported by the firm i at time t EPSforecast is 
the consensus analysts’ average forecast of earnings per share for the firm i at 
time t  
iv. Capital Expenditure (CAPX) 
Investment is used to represent capital expenditure. Firms with valuable 
investments are more likely to obtain external financing. For example, firms 
issue additional debt to undertake investment (DeAngelo et al. 2011; Dudley, 
2012). Also given debt capacity concerns, firms would obtain equity financing 
to provide cash flow for investment. Thus, mispricing drives investment. Firms 
actual
forecastactual
it EPS
EPSEPSED  
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undertake investment when the stock is overpriced through the issuance of 
equity financing to support the capital or cash required for the investment 
project. This view relates closely with the market timing phenomenon. Polk 
and Sapienza (2009) assert that mispriced firms undertake abnormal 
investment and are associated with post-investment adverse returns. This 
implies mispriced firms are more likely to issue equity because of investment 
opportunities. Investment tracks mispricing more when the firms are dominated 
with high R&D and also possess short-term horizon investors.  
It is defined by the capital expenditure over the prior period divided by total 
assets and is given as:  
 
Where:   
 is capital expenditure for the prior period  is total assets   
5.3.1.4. Model Specification and Estimation Technique 
This section discusses the econometric model for testing the effects of 
mispricing and financial constraints on equity issues and the associated stock 
returns. The first part tests the following hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) as 
discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2: 
H1: There is high probability for less internally financially 
constrained firms to issue overvalued equity  
H2: Firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity when external 
financial constraints are low (non-financial crisis period or periods of 
high market liquidity) 
H3: The probability of issuing overvalued equity during periods of 
high external financial constraints increases for firms with low 
internal financially constraints than those with high internal 
financial constraints  
 CAPXit = CAPXit  1TAit
1itCAPEX itTA
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The hypotheses specifications are related to a binary dependent variable. This 
is because the study tests the probability or the likelihood of equity issues in 
the presence of a set of firm characteristics. For the binary dependent variable, 
OLS estimation technique is not an appropriate model. For example, OLS 
estimation of the linear probability model (LPM) violates certain assumptions. 
LPM has the defect that the conditional probability is not constrained to lie 
between zero and one (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; 
Wooldridge, 2010).  Thus, the predictions of the conditional probability can be 
greater than one or less than zero. Moreover, the errors are inherently 
heteroscedastic. Unlike LPM, logistic regression estimated under maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) restricts the predicted probability within the range 
1 and 0 and also corrects for heteroscedastic errors. Studies such as Cox, 
(1970) Tennant (1977), Silvapulle (1981), Scott and Wild (1986 and 1991) are 
apply the MLE to various research. Therefore, logistic regression model is an 
appropriate model for binary dependent variable.  
The logistic regression model is stated as follows:  
 
 
Where: 
  is the constant term 
  is the indicator variable for levered repurchase 
  is the market-to-book ratio for mispricing  
 is the interaction term between market-to-book ratio and 
internal financial constraints  
  is the set of control variables: pre-announcement abnormal 
returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS) and market liquidity (LIQ), 
firm size (LMV), capital expenditure (CAPX), earnings deviation (ED), 
profitability (PROFIT), time dummies, and industry dummies   
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Logistic regression models have been applied extensively in the empirical 
finance and corporate finance literature. Martin (1977) explores early warning 
of bank failure, Martin (1996) the method of payment in corporate acquisitions, 
Fama and French (2001) firm characteristics and the propensity to pay 
dividends, Goyal and Park (2002) the board leadership structure and CEO 
turnover, Baker and Wurgler (2004) link the propensity to pay dividends to 
catering incentives, and Denis and Osobov (2008) he reasons for dividend 
payments.  This study adopts a similar estimation model to study the 
propensity for equity issues given the level of internal financial constraints and 
a set of firm characteristics.  
The following pooled OLS regression model is used to test the above 
hypothesis about the post-issue stock returns.  
H4: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative 
abnormal returns, especially for firms with high internal financially 
constraints 
H5: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative 
abnormal returns, especially for firms with high internal financially 
constraints and during periods of high external financial constraints  
 
Where: 
  is the constant term 
  is the indicator variable for internal financial constraints which 
is 1 for constrained and 0 for unconstrained  
  is the market-to-book ratio for mispricing   
 is the interaction term between market-to-book ratio and 
internal financial constraint  
  is the set of control variables: pre-announcement abnormal 
returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS) and market liquidity (LIQ), 
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firm size (LMV), capital expenditure (CAPX), earnings deviation (ED), 
profitability (PROFIT), time dummies, and industry dummies   
All regression estimations throughout the thesis are carried out using the 
STATA software.  
 
5.3.2. Share Issuance Methods: Operating Performance and Stock Returns  
The second research objective of the study is to explore the effects of operating 
performance on the choice of equity issuance methods. It also uses the 
operating performance to examine the different long run stock performance 
associated with rights issues, open offers, and private placement. This section 
discusses the dependent variables, the explanatory, and control variables. It 
also specifies the model for the empirical testing of the hypotheses.  
5.3.2.1. Dependent Variable: 
The following sections explain the dependent variables used to carry out the 
empirical analysis.  
i. Indicator Variable for Rights Issues, Open Offers, and Private Placement  
The study compares rights issues with open offers on one hand, and rights 
issues and private placement on the other. Thus, for the first part the dependent 
variable is 1 for rights issues and 0 for open offers. In the second part, the 
dependent variable is 1 for rights issues and 0 for private placement.  
ii. Long term abnormal returns  
Long-term returns estimation presents important statistical issues that need to 
be considered in order to avoid biased estimates. Unlike short-run abnormal 
returns with limited stock price volatility over short estimation window, long 
run abnormal returns can be affected by the estimation method used and 
produces biased estimates and misspecified test statistics. Kothari and Warner 
(1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) both analyse extensively the properties of 
long-run abnormal returns. Both studies find significant statistical problems 
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with long-run abnormal returns depending on the method of estimation. 
Cumulative abnormal returns, buy-and-hold abnormal returns and Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor models have been employed to estimate long-run 
abnormal returns in the empirical literature. Ritter (1991), for example, note 
that the use of CAR and BHAR depends on the specific question to be 
answered. Thus, it is more likely that CAR and BHAR will produce different 
estimates.  
Moreover, Barber and Lyon (1997) assert that empirical power and 
specification of test statistics are affected by the method of estimation and the 
approach for developing benchmark. Long-run abnormal returns benchmarks 
used in the literature include reference portfolio (market index or size decile 
portfolios), control firms approach and the three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993). Fama (1998) states that long-term return anomalies are 
sensitive to methodology. Further, Lyon et al. (1999) recognise the problems 
associated with analysis of long-run abnormal returns. Bias estimates and test 
statistics misspecification stem from new listing bias, rebalancing bias and 
skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997). They argue that new listing bias 
occurs because new firms are allowed to the market index that is benchmark 
for the sample firms‟ long-run abnormal returns. Again, compound returns of 
market index are computed with implicit periodic rebalancing whereas returns 
of sample firms do not involve rebalancing. Finally, long-run abnormal returns 
are positively skewed.  
Control firm approach to calculating abnormal returns is able to offset the 
sources of bias and misspecification depending on whether CAR or BHAR is 
the estimation method. Without the reference portfolio benchmark such as the 
market index, the bias from new listing, rebalancing and skewness are 
eliminated. Control firm and sample firm are identical in several respects and 
experience comparable effects when measured against the market index. CAR 
is also associated with measurement bias. Barber and Lyon (1997) contend that 
BHAR using the control firm approach produces unbiased and well-specified 
test statistics since it eliminates the bias from new listing, rebalancing, 
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skewness and measurement. The current study follows this approach that has 
been applied in a number of studies in the literature.30  
a. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)  
To estimate cumulative abnormal returns for each cross section firm, the 
expected returns, using market model that regresses stock returns on market 
return, is computed. Market returns are defined as the total return on the FTSE 
ALL SHARE index. The relationship of the market model is thus stated as 
follows:  
         
 (1) 
         
 (2) 
Where: 
                   
(3) 
The parameters in equation (1) are the stock returns for each firm, ; the 
market return defined as , and  is the idiosyncratic risk associated with 
the stock returns.   and  are the alpha and beta coefficients of the 
regression model to be estimated. Both stock returns and market returns are the 
daily returns associated with the stock and market index respectively. The 
estimation window of 250 days prior to the announcement date is used. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are estimated as the sum of the 
abnormal returns (AR) within a specified event window. This is stated as 
follows: 
                                                        
30 Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Veld and Veld-Merkoulova 
(2004), Hertzel et al (2002) and Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) all use the control firm approach 
in calculating long-run abnormal returns.  
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Following Barber and Lyon (1997), the t-test is defined as the ratio of the 
cumulative abnormal returns to the standard deviation of the CAR of the firms 
divided by the root of number of firms.  
 
b. Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
Buy and hold abnormal returns  measure the difference between 
compounded actual return and the compounded predicted return. The 
compounding feature associated with  better simulates the effect of an 
event on an investor‟s portfolio. Again,  provides a good measure of the 
long run investor experience under the long run event studies (Loughran and 
Ritter, 1995).  and both complement each other due to their 
peculiar limitations. Whereas  fails to capture the compounding effects, 
can also yield incorrect statistically significant abnormal performance 
due to short-term return fluctuations. Therefore, the problems of extreme 
skewness occasioned by  are curtailed when double-checked with .  
Similarly, the BHAR is computed after estimating the expected or predicted 
returns from the regression of stock returns and market returns. Buy and hold 
return is the daily compounded return on the equity security for each firm over 
a specified time period in days.  
The buy and hold return (BHR) of each firm is given as  
. 
In same fashion, the expected or predicted buy and hold return is calculated as  
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Finally, BHAR, the difference between the buy and hold returns  and 
the expected buy and hold returns , is computed using the equation 
below.  
 
Test of statistical significance of the mean returns is computed using the 
standard t-test as follows:  
 
5.3.2.2. Explanatory Variable  
This section discusses the proxies that are used to measure the effects of 
operating performance on share issuance method and stock returns. In addition 
to their definitions, limitations of each proxy are also explained.  
i. Operating Performance (ROA) 
The extant literature reports strong empirical evidence of stock 
underperformance following SEOs (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1995) that is related to the poor operating performance 
(McLaughlin et al. 1996; Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Levis, 1995).31 The study 
predicts that the level of operating performance influences equity issuance 
method and hence explains the long run stock performance differences among 
issuance methods. If high profitability is favourable market information, then 
rights issuing firms are more likely to be profitable than open offers and private 
placement (Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). This should also explain long run 
stock outperformance for rights issues than open offers and private placement.  
Profitability is defined using returns on assets (ROA) and their abnormal 
components over matched firms. The following relations explain each measure. 
                                                         
31  Chapter 3 provides comprehensive discussions of stock and operating performance 
associated with equity issuance methods 
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Where:  
ROA is the return on assets. It can also be calculated as the ratio of EBIT, 
earnings before interest and taxes to TA,  
 
 
5.3.2.3. Control variables  
The control variables are used in previous studies to explain the stock price 
effects associated with equity issues and equity issuance methods. Most of 
these variables are based on theories that have been explored extensively in the 
literature. In addition to variables that explain equity issues in general as 
discussed in preceding sections, other variables specifically determine the 
choice among the equity issuance methods. Following the extant literature, the 
variables are defined in the same manner to reflect the same effects as 
indicated in the literature. The proxy for each variable is discussed as follows:  
i. Mispricing (MB) 
Mispricing affects the choice of equity issuance method due to its relation to 
high information asymmetry (Livingston et al., 2005). Moreover, Slovin et al. 
(2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006) find that overvalued equity are issued to 
existing shareholders rather than privately placed with external investors. 
However, Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) assert that rights issuing to existing 
shareholder are less likely to be overvalued. Thus, all else equal, high MB is 
negatively related to the probability of rights issues and positively related to 
private placement and open offers. MB is defined in the Section 5.3.1.2.  
ii. Pre-issue Abnormal Returns (Prior AR) 
AR is the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) estimated using the market 
model over estimation window (-255,-21) relative to the announcement date. 
The pre-issue AR is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -30 through day 
-2.  Thus, the AR is defined as CAR (-30,-2). It is expected that AR should have 
a positive relationship with mispricing and thus increase the probability of 
equity issues through private placement. 
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iii. Firm Size (SIZE) 
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets and 
has a positive relationship with equity issues. This is because large firms to 
have low information asymmetry and are less likely to be mispriced. Large 
firms are mostly matured entities that have exhausted growth options but are 
highly followed by analysts. Small firms possess considerable growth 
opportunities, low leverage yet greater uncertainty due to information 
asymmetry.  
iv. Discount (DISC) 
Empirical evidence suggests that equity issues are associated with significant 
discounts between the offer price and the market price at the announcement 
date. Armitage et al. (2012) find that about 90% of UK open offers and 
placings are at a discount of about 26%. However, for large discounts existing 
shareholder value is more protected if rights offering are used to issue equity. 
This is because discount transfers wealth to the new investors that will 
subscribe to the equity issues, when the discounted equity is issued to external 
investors through private placement. While this constitutes costs to existing 
shareholders who do not participate the new shares, due to lack of pre-emptive 
rights, the discount could compensate placees for the cost of investigating the 
issuer (Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Balachandran et al., 2013). However, Barclay 
et al (2007) contend that the large size of the discount undermines such 
conjecture.  
Following the information asymmetry hypothesis, overvalued firms should 
attract high discounts (Hertzel et al, 2002). Armitage et al. (2014) establish that 
discounts are related to illiquidity of issuers‟ shares, financial distress and 
inelastic demand for the shares. Slovin et al. (2000), Armitage (2002), and 
Balachandran et al. (2008) report that rights issue price reaction is significantly 
and negatively related to the issue discount. However, Barnes and Walker 
(2006) assert that high discounts are more likely to be associated with placings 
than rights issues. This is consistent with overvaluation effects that evoke 
equity issues through placings. High discount (more negative value) is more 
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likely to be associated with issues that reflect overvaluation. Thus, equity 
issues are timed should attract deep discount to compensate investors. 
Issue price discount is calculated using the Barnes and walker (2006) and 
Armitage et al. (2014) formula that compares the pre-announcement date 
market price and the offer price. Thus, discount is given as follows:  
, 
Where:  
is the offer price stated in SDC at the announcement date of the equity 
issues   
 is the prior announcement date market price reported  
 
v. Accruals Quality (AQ) 
Consistent with the information asymmetry and earnings management 
hypotheses, firms with better accrual quality are more likely to issue equity to 
existing shareholders. Hertzel and Smith (1993), Wu (2004), Balachandran et 
al. (2013) argue that firms since private placement investors can obtain the true 
value of the firm at a cost; firms with high information asymmetry are more 
likely to issue equity through private placements. Accruals quality is the 
modified Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure of earnings quality defined in 
the preceding sections. This is consistent with studies such as Lee and Masulis 
(2009), Balachandran et al. (2013), and Armitage et al. (2014),   
 
Where:  
=total current accruals= current assets- current liabilities- cash+
debt in current liabilities; =changes from year  to year   
= cash flow from operations= net income before extraordinary items-
total accruals and total accruals=current accruals-depreciation and 
amortization;  
=total sales revenue  
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= property, plant and equipment. Each of the variables is scaled by the 
average of total assets between year  and year .  
Accruals quality ( ) is computed as the standard deviation of the regression 
residuals from through where larger standard deviation at year  reflects 
a poor earnings quality and hence high asymmetric information. All variables 
are scaled by average total assets over year t-1 and t. Overall, four regressions 
using a total of four lagged values and one lead value of data over the sample 
period 1989-2011 is estimated. The firm-specific measure of earnings 
management is the standard deviation of the four regression residual values. 
Larger standard deviations suggest poor accruals quality and greater 
information asymmetry. This variable is denoted as ACC_QUAL.  
vi. Idiosyncratic Risk (IDYRISK) 
Idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the excess 
market return relative to the date of equity issue announcements (Dierkens, 
1991; Krishnaswami and Subramanian, 1999). Balachandran et al. (2013) find 
lower idiosyncratic risk for rights offerings than open offers and placement. 
This indicates that issue to existing shareholders do not produce adverse 
selection costs that are associated with external shareholders. Hence, firms with 
lower asymmetric information are more likely to conduct rights offerings. 
Therefore, lower idiosyncratic risk indicates that the firm is higher quality firm 
(Balachandran et al., 2008).  
vii. Financial Crisis (CRISIS 
Financial crisis is an indicator variable of 1 for the period 2008-2010 and 0 
otherwise.  
5.3.2.4. Model Specifications 
This section discusses the econometric model for testing the effects of 
operating performance on the choice of equity issuance method and the long 
run stock performance as discussed in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3. The first part 
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tests the following hypotheses (H6) using the multinomial logit regression 
model.  
H6: Firms that anticipate positive operating performance are more 
likely to conduct rights issues than open offers or private placement  
The multinomial logit regression model is stated as follows:  
 
Where: 
  is the constant term 
  is the returns on assets for long run operating performance  
  is the set of control variables: market-to-book ratio (MB), ratio 
of issue proceeds over market value (P/MV), pre-announcement abnormal 
returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS),, firm size (LMV), economic 
growth rate (GDP), accruals quality (ACC_QUAL), idiosyncratic risk 
(IDY_RISK), issue price discount (DISC), time dummies, and industry dummies   
Long run stock returns are estimated using the OLS estimation to test the 
following hypothesis.  
H7: Equity issues through private placement generate more negative 
abnormal returns than rights issues 
The OLS model is stated as below:  
 
Where:  
  is the constant term 
  is the returns on assets for long run operating performance  
 is the dummy variable for equity issuance method which is 1 for 
rights issues and 0 otherwise  
 is the interaction between operating performance and equity 
issuance method 
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  is the set of control variables: market-to-book ratio (MB), ratio 
of issue proceeds over market value (P/MV), pre-announcement abnormal 
returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS),, firm size (LMV), economic 
growth rate (GDP), accruals quality (ACC_QUAL), idiosyncratic risk 
(IDY_RISK), issue price discount (DISC), time dummies, and industry dummies   
5.3.3. Share Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints  
The third research objective of the study is to examine the share repurchase 
behaviour of internally financially unconstrained firms. In other words, the 
study explores the effects of internal financial constraints on the financing of 
share repurchase programs through either internal cash flows or external 
borrowings. This section discusses the dependent variables, the explanatory, 
and control variables. It also specifies the model for the empirical testing of the 
hypotheses.  
5.3.3.1. Dependent Variable  
According to the developed hypotheses (H8), internally financially constrained 
firms are more likely to borrow to finance repurchase programs. However, for 
unconstrained firms, the need to undertake investments are the time of 
repurchasing the shares motivates them to obtain debt financing (H9). 
Subsequent stock returns should be more positive for unlevered repurchase 
firms than levered repurchase firms (H10). For the levered repurchase firms, 
high investing firms are likely to be associated with more positive stock returns 
than low investing firms (H11). These hypotheses are discussed in Section 4.5 
of Chapter 4. Here the dependent variables that explore the hypotheses are 
discussed.  
i. Levered and Unlevered repurchase (LEVD) 
Repurchase is defined as levered/unlevered in relation to the level of 
borrowings that firms are predicted to have committed to finance the share 
repurchase. Thus, in this context changes in debt capital within the period of 
the repurchase represent borrowings with a view to financing the repurchase. 
According to Minninck and Zhao (2007), levered repurchases are those that are 
iX
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financed by debt issues. The debt issues must be made within one year prior to 
two years post share repurchases. Thus, changes in long-term debt capital on 
the balance sheet are used to determine whether or not debt-financing 
influences repurchase. Firms that issued bonds or increased their borrowing 
within the repurchase time period specified are classed as levered repurchase 
(debt-financed); otherwise they are unlevered repurchase (cash-financed). 
The sample is then classified in terms of levered or unlevered share repurchase 
based on the increase in the total debt. Levered share repurchase occurs when 
bond issues finance the repurchase. Share repurchase is defined as levered if 
there is a positive change in the debt capital one year prior to and/or two years 
after the repurchase announcement.32 Following this definition, the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable that is 1 for levered and 0 for unlevered 
repurchase. The use of indicator variable for levered repurchase measures the 
probability that a firm conducts levered share repurchase given other firm 
characteristics. These firm characteristics are discussed under the explanatory 
and control variables sections. Studies such as Minnick and Zhao (2007), Dong 
et al. (2012), and Balachandran et al. (2013) use indictor variable as dependent 
variable in their studies of either equity issues or share repurchase.  
ii. Stock returns 
Prior research finds positive abnormal stock returns around the announcements 
of share repurchase programs. Signalling, free cash and undervaluation 
hypotheses are all consistent with the stock returns subsequent to share 
repurchase. Positive information signals are transmitted to the market because 
these theories posit that share repurchase decisions indicate that firms have 
positive future prospect in terms of earnings. Also, the agency theory/free cash 
flow hypothesis asserts that excess cash flows are distributed to shareholders 
when there are limited investment opportunities in order to preserve 
shareholder value. Therefore, share repurchase announcements mean managers 
do not waste resources on negative NPV projects. Maxwell and Stephens                                                         
32 Share repurchase in the highest quintile- in either one year prior to or two years after 
repurchase announcements- are classified as levered repurchase whereas those in the other 
quintiles are unlevered repurchase.  
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(2003) find that not only does repurchase increase stock returns but it also 
transfers wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Minnick and Zhao (2007) 
report similar evidence in respect of levered repurchase and unlevered 
repurchase. Unlevered share repurchase is associated with high abnormal stock 
returns than levered share repurchase. Chen and Wang (2012) find that 
abnormal stock returns increases more for unconstrained firms than for 
constrained firms. Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2007) also report evidence of 
abnormal stock performance following buyback announcements. The 
dependent variables are the initial and long run abnormal returns defined 
below.  
a. Initial Abnormal Returns 
Following previous studies, the study uses 3-day event window to estimate the 
initial abnormal returns associated with share repurchase announcement. 
Studies such as Chen and Wang (2012) use the 3-day window for initial 
returns. Initial announcements date abnormal stock is computed as the three-
day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the period from day -1 through 
day +1. Thus, initial abnormal returns is defined as CAR(-1,1). 
 
b. Long Run Abnormal Returns  
Long-run abnormal stock returns are computed over 12 to 36 months following 
repurchase announcements, based on Barber and Lyon‟s (1997) 
methodology.33 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are estimated as the difference 
between buy and hold returns for the repurchase firm and buy and hold returns 
for the control firm as discussed in Section 5.3.2.1.  Control firm must be 
within the same size decile, book-to-market (B/M) quintile, and KZ index 
quintile as the repurchasing firm (similar to Chen and Wang, 2012). In line 
with Lyon et al. (1999), t-statistics are bootstrapped skewness-adjusted.  
                                                        
33 Refer to section 5.2.2.1 for discussions on cumulative abnormal returns and buy and hold 
abnormal returns. 
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5.3.3.2. Explanatory Variables  
The following sections discuss the explanatory variables that are used to test 
the hypotheses about the levered share repurchase behaviour of internally 
financially unconstrained firms.  
i. Internal Financial constraints (KZ index and WW index) 
Corporate events are impacted by the degree of financial constraints. However, 
Chen and Wang (2012) find evidence which indicates that a sample of 
internally financially constrained firms repurchase their shares. Repurchase for 
undervalued firms are also associated with less financially constrained firms. 
Internally financially constrained firms would be more likely to borrow in 
order to repurchase their shares. However, the study predicts that unconstrained 
firms that undertake investment projects would also be likely to conduct 
levered repurchase. Consistent with the hypothesis, the study explores the 
extent to which internally financially unconstrained firms engage in levered 
repurchase. In line with Chen and Wang (2012), share repurchase in the highest 
quintile are classified as internally financially constrained whereas those in the 
other quintiles are internally financially unconstrained.34 
ii. Bond Ratings (RATINGS) 
Share repurchase increases leverage and therefore results in debt ratings 
downgrades. It follows that the bond ratings at the time of share repurchase 
would determine the extent of debt-financed repurchase. Interest payments for 
firm borrowings will be influenced by the creditworthiness of the firms, 
including other factors. Investment grade firms will more likely obtain debt 
financing at a cheaper cost than speculative grade firms. Maxwell and Stephens 
(2003) and Minnick and Zhao (2006) both find that bond ratings are twice 
likely to be downgraded as upgraded after the announcement of repurchase 
programs. This is due to the relatively increased risk of excessive debt capital. 
These downgrades are inspired by the likely risk of financial distress following                                                         
34 See subsection 5.2.1.2 for comprehensive discussion on the measurement of the KZ index 
and WW index. Chapter 4 examines the literature review about the effects of financial 
constraints on share repurchase programs. 
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debt issuance and repurchase. Following from this evidence, we expect levered 
repurchasing firms to report significant downgrades especially when they are 
internally financially constrained.  
iii. Financial Distress (Z score)  
Excessive leverage capital increases the risk of bankruptcy. Repurchase 
reduces the share capital and invariably increases the debt component of the 
capital of the firm. Even though repurchase does not necessary change firm 
value, it results in distress risk. Opler and Titman (1994) find a significant and 
positive relationship between leverage and financial distress. Internal financial 
constraints in relation to repurchase will have a far greater effect on distress 
risk than unconstrained firm. Chen and Wang (2012) find that constrained 
firms with high actual repurchase ratios report significantly greater distress risk 
than unconstrained firms. This is due to the lower cash levels and higher 
leverage ratios occasioned by the repurchase transaction. Moreover, increased 
debt levels increase the probability of default on the bonds and expose the firm 
to financial distress. The likelihood of downgrades is related to the increase 
distress risk (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003; Minnick and Zhao, 2006). 
Purnanandam (2008) asserts that following debt issuance firms immediately 
institute risk-management policies due to probable financial distress risk. It is 
predicted that financial distress risk will increase for repurchase especially for 
levered repurchase conducted by internally financially constrained firms.  
Financial distress is measured using the Altman (1968) Z-score for US data.35 
This is given as  
 
X1 is working capital divided by book value of assets; X2 is retained earnings 
over book value of assets; X3 is the earnings before interest and taxes over 
book value of assets; X4 is the market value of equity over book value of assets 
and X5 is the net sales over book value of assets. 
                                                        
35 Studies that use Altman (1968) Z-score to measure financial distress include Purnanandam 
(2008), Chen and Wang (2012); among others.  
54321 999.06.03.34.12.1 XXXXXscoreZ  
  
 
138 
Firms with value less than 1.81 as distressed. Financial distress dummy is 1 for 
Z-score value less than 1.81 and 0 otherwise. It must be stressed that Taffler‟s 
Z-score is used as proxy for financial distress for UK data whereas Altman‟s Z-
score is used for US data.  
iv. Investment (INV) 
 Investment is the total capital expenditure plus research and development 
(R&D) over lagged total assets. Share repurchasing firms should invest less in 
capital projects as more cash are distributed to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; 
Hahn and Lee, 2009). However, debt-financed share repurchase should allow 
firms to also invest more. Therefore, firms investing more are likely to borrow 
to finance share repurchase.  
5.3.3.3. Control Variables  
The following variables are included in the regressions to control for the effects 
on share repurchase announcements. 
i. Undervaluation (MB) 
Market to book ratio is a proxy for undervaluation (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
Dong et al, 2012; Li and McNally, 2007; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Market 
to book ratio relates to undervaluation hypothesis by which undervalued firms 
are more likely to repurchase their shares. It is cheaper to purchase because the 
suppressed market price of the shares means firms pay significantly low price 
for the same number of shares than they would for overvalued shares. Thus, 
low market to book ratio indicates undervaluation and also correlates positively 
with low prior stock returns.  
According to the agency hypothesis, firms disgorge excess cash when there are 
limited positive net present value projects to invest the cash flow. Thus, 
available growth opportunities compete with cash paid to shareholders by way 
of dividends and repurchase. High growth opportunities reduce the probability 
of share repurchase (Boudry et al. 2013). We expect high stock returns 
following share repurchase for firms with low growth opportunities. Ikenberry 
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and Vermaelen (1996) assert that positive stock returns following repurchase 
explains that management commit resources in a way to benefit long term 
shareholders when there are no growth opportunities. Undervalued firms are 
more likely to repurchase their shares because the shares trade at relatively 
lower prices than their fundamental values (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; 
D‟Mello and Shroff, 2000). Thus, low MB firms are more likely to repurchase 
their shares than high MB.  
ii. Firm size (SIZE) 
Large firms are more likely to repurchase their shares due to lack of growth 
opportunities. Cash distributions are made in respect of investment financing 
including acquisitions, dividend payments and share repurchase, among others. 
Free cash flow hypothesis enjoins firms to disgorge excess cash flow to 
shareholders especially when positive net present value projects are limited. 
Firm size (SIZE) is given as natural logarithm of market value of equity. Firm 
size is computed as follows: 
 
Where: 
LogMV is natural logarithm of book value of total assets  
All else equal, large firms that are also mature have limited growth 
opportunities and therefore are likely to distribute excess cash flow to 
shareholders. As firms increase in size and become mature, the limited 
investment opportunity creates free cash flow that can be distributed to 
shareholders. Thus, firm size positively correlates with share repurchase 
announcements and is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis (Grullon 
and Michaely, 2004; Chen and Wang, 2012; Liang et al, 2013). 
iii. Prior returns (Prior AR) 
According to the undervaluation hypothesis, firms with prior poor stock 
performance have the incentive to repurchase their shares. The repurchase 
signals quality information and causes the share price to rise. Li and McNally 
(2007) Grullon and Michaely (2002) find evidence consistent with this 
SIZEit = LogTAit
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prediction. In the same view, prior stock returns should also motivate whether 
or not firms borrow to finance to repurchase. Thus, prior stock returns are 
positively related to announcement date stock returns. Following prior studies 
such as Maxwell and Stephens (2003), Dong et al (2012), the prior AR is the 
cumulative abnormal returns from day -30 through day -2.  Thus, the AR is 
defined as CAR (-30,-2).  
iv. Share repurchases ratio (REP_RATIO)  
This is the ratio of repurchase amount to market value of equity. This variable 
estimates the repurchase value relative to firm size. Firm size correlates 
positively with amount of share repurchase since large firms have limited 
growth opportunities but huge amount of free cash flows. Chen and Wang 
(2012) report that high repurchase ratio is associated with positive initial 
abnormal returns. It is therefore expected that high repurchase value should be 
associated with levered share repurchase. All else equal, unconstrained firms 
that borrow should be able to repurchase more as a percentage of firm size. 
Thus, high repurchase ratio is consistent with unconstrained firms, debt-
financed repurchase, and large firms.  
5.3.3.4. Model Specification  
As stated in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4, the study predicts that internal financial 
constraints and investments influence the share repurchase financing of firms. 
The testable hypotheses are as follow:  
H8: Internally financially constrained firms are more likely to 
conduct debt-financed repurchase than unconstrained firms 
H9: Internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to repurchase 
especially when they also undertake investments  
Logistic regression estimation is used to empirically test the above hypotheses 
about the effects of internal financial constraints on levered share repurchase. 
The logistics regression model is stated as follows: 
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Where: 
  is the constant term 
  is the proxy for internal financial constraints (KZ index) 
  is the investment expenditure of the firm during the repurchase 
period  
 is the interaction term between financial constraints (KZ index) 
and investment expenditure (INV) 
  is the set of control variables: market-to-book ratio (MB), pre-
announcement abnormal returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), 
firm size (LMV), share repurchase ratio (RPR), time dummies, and industry 
dummies   
The second part of the research objective explores the stock returns associated 
with levered share repurchase programs. It focuses on both the initial and long 
run stock returns of firms that conduct levered repurchase and simultaneously 
invest in capital projects. The hypotheses are thus stated below:  
H10: Cash-financed repurchase is associated with more positive 
abnormal returns than debt-financed repurchase, especially when the 
firm is internally financially unconstrained.  
H11: All else equal, internally financially unconstrained firms which 
conduct levered share repurchase should be associated with more 
positive returns for high investing firms than low investing firms.  
The following pooled OLS regression model is used to test the above 
hypothesis about the post-repurchase stock returns similar to Stephens and 
Weisbach (1998), Maxwell and Stephens (2003), Chen and Wang (2012), 
Dong et al. (2012),  
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  is the constant term 
 is the indicator variable for levered repurchase 
  is the investment expenditure of the firm during the repurchase 
period  
 is the interaction term between indicator variable levered 
repurchase (LEVD) and investment expenditure (INV) 
  is the set of control variables: market-to-book ratio (MB), pre-
announcement abnormal returns (AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), 
firm size (LMV), share repurchase ratio (RPR), time dummies, and industry 
dummies. 
 
 5.4. Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the research design including definition of variables and 
the methodology for carrying out the empirical analyses. It provided overview 
of the data and sources and justified the choice of the data. The study uses two 
datasets for equity issues on one hand and repurchase on the other hand. Data 
on equity issues are made up of a sample of UK listed firms and collected from 
SDC and Datastream. The final sample is 1257 equity issues from the period 
January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2010. For the analysis of operating 
performance and stock returns associated with equity issuance methods, the 
data is restricted to the period from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2010 and 
divided into rights issues, open offers, and private placement. For the share 
repurchase sample, the data consist of US firms repurchase announcements 
made between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012. The final sample 
consists of 5874 share repurchase announcements and collected from SDC. For 
this dataset, the accounting data and stock prices are collected from Compustat 
and CRSP, respectively.  
The chapter also presented and defined the variables that explain the 
hypotheses developed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Since the research objectives 
examine the probability of equity issues and share repurchase, the dependent 
variable is an indicator variable. This means the logistic regression model and 
0E
iLEVD
iINV
iINVLEVD *
iX
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multinomial logit regression (for equity issuance methods) are used to test the 
first part of the research objectives as summarised in Chapter 1. The second 
part of the research objective examines the stock returns associated with equity 
issues and repurchase and for that the appropriate dependent variable is 
determined as abnormal stock returns. The analysis of stock returns is carried 
out using OLS regression analyses. The above methodology is discussed in line 
with previous studies.  
Finally, the explanatory and control variables are discussed in this chapter. 
Also, the models for testing the hypotheses are specified. Logistic regression 
models are specified to test the effects of mispricing and internal financial 
constraints on equity issues including the effects of operating performance on 
equity issuance methods. Chapters 6 and 7 provide empirical results for the 
models proposed for equity issues. The models for testing the levered share 
repurchase behaviour of financially unconstrained firms are also defined.  
Chapter 8 provides empirical results for the model stated to analyse the share 
repurchase announcements.  
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Chapter 6  
SHARE ISSUANCE AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS  
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical analysis of the effects of financial 
constraints on share issuance decisions of UK listed firms. A number of studies 
explore whether firms‟ share issuance decisions reflect mispricing. The market 
timing (e.g., Taggart, 1977; Marsh, 1982; Asquith and Mullins, 1986) is the 
prevalent developed theory, stating that managers issue equity when firms‟ 
share prices are overvalued. Several studies (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002) empirically support the market timing theory, 
showing that overvalued equity is associated with significant negative 
abnormal announcement returns. For example, the empirical evidence by Baker 
and Wurgler (2002) highlights the long-term effects on capital structure of 
firms‟ market timing behaviour of equity issues. Their evidence indicates that 
not only do firms time their equity issues but also that the equity issues 
determine the long-term changes in the capital structure.  
The recent financial crisis provides a new dimension to equity market timing 
phenomenon. The argument explored in this thesis is whether the market 
timing theory is incomplete, since it does not capture firms‟ financial 
constraints according to which managers time their equity issuance as long as 
their firms are in good enough financial condition to pay for the costs 
associated with external equity financing. In particular, the effects of the 
financial crisis not only reduced available financing in the market but it also 
increased the costs of such financing. For example, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) 
assert that firms are better placed to obtain external financing during periods of 
favourable market conditions. Thus, whether or not firms time their equity 
issues should be influenced by both the firm‟s own internal financial 
constraints and the external financial conditions.  
Within a mature market, most listed firms have rather limited financial 
constraints, and this thesis focuses on the variation of distress during the 
financial crisis to test whether financial constraints influence firms‟ equity 
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issuance decisions. Ivashina and Scharfstein‟s (2010) highlight the significant 
drop of bank lending during the financial crisis showing that bank lending 
reduced by 47 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 in relation to its prior 
quarter. Campello et al. (2010) also survey CFOs from US, European, and 
Asian firms and reported significant difficulties in accessing external funding 
during the recent financial crisis, even for funding profitable projects. More 
than half of the firms in their sample faced difficulties to access funding during 
the crisis.36  
Studies such as Frank and Goyal (2003), Fama and French (2005), and Dong et 
al. (2012) look at equity issues of listed firms relative to the level of financial 
constraints. In particular, Dong et al. (2012) use Canadian firms‟ issuance 
decisions between 1998 and 2007 and support that the issue of overvalued 
equity is conditional on the level of firms‟ financial constraints during the 
whole sample period. However, Fama and French (2005), using data between 
1973 and 2002, and Frank and Goyal (2003), between 1971 and 1998, find no 
evidence that financial constraints affect the decision of US firms to issue 
equity. They argue that in anticipation of investment opportunities, firms could 
retain cash even if they are financially constrained. These mixed results cast 
doubt on whether firm financial constraints impact equity issuance decisions. 
Using UK firm sample, this analyses the extent to which financial constraints 
influence market timing‟s predictions as long as focusing on the recent 
financial crisis. This chapter presents both univariate and multivariate analyses 
to explain the effects of financial constraints on share issuance decisions.  
The chapter consists of four parts. Section 6.2 describes the sample used to 
perform the empirical analysis and treats outliers. Section 6.3 presents the 
multivariate analysis of the effects of financial constraints on share issuance 
decisions. Section 6.4 discusses additional results, performs logit regression 
diagnostic tests, and undertakes robustness checks using different estimation 
techniques. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.  
                                                        
36  According to Howcroft et al. (2014) even the level of syndicated banks loans, which 
involves a group of banks borrowing to a single party, was reduced significantly during the 
financial crisis among European banks.    
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6.2. Sample Statistics  
In this section, the descriptive statistics of the variables selected to undertake 
the empirical analysis are discussed. The variables presented here are used in 
prior studies to explain equity issuance decisions of firms. Thus, the variables 
allow the study to test the effects of market timing and financial constraints on 
share issuance among listed UK firms. Section 6.2.1 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the final sample after outliers are considered.  
6.2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of independent and control 
variables used to undertake the empirical analysis. It focuses on the statistics of 
the firm characteristics of both equity issuing and non-issuing firms.  
6.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample   
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables selected to estimate 
the effects of financial constraints on share issuance decisions. In the presence 
of extreme values/outliers, the regression analysis will produce spurious results 
that will distort analysis. In other words, outliers are deviations from the 
normal value that would produce meaningful results, both in statistical terms 
and in theory. However, even when outliers are due to errors by removing them 
do not necessarily reduce estimation bias (Bollinger and Chandra, 2003). The 
method of treating outliers depends on the magnitude and the potential effects 
on the analysis of the regression estimations. Therefore, for this sample, most 
of the variables are winsorised. Whereas trimming and truncation of data 
reduces the sample size, winsorising variables only restricts the magnitude of 
the outliers while maintaining the sample size.  
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics of some firm characteristics that 
distinguish equity issuing from non-issuing firms. It also performs independent 
sample t-test of the mean difference between issuing and non-issuing firms. 
This mean difference test provides preliminary differences in firm 
characteristics that define issuing and non-issuing firms. Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics for the issuing firms whereas Panel B displays the 
descriptive statistics for the matched non-issuing firms. The mean difference 
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tests are reported in Panel C.  Firms issue equity to coincide with periods of 
high stock price run-ups. Thus, market timing of equity issues occurs when 
firms have significantly high stock prices in the period leading up to the 
issuance decisions.  These firms issue overvalued equity in an attempt to profit 
from the temporary high stock prices.  
Table 6.1: Comparison of Issuing and Non-issuing Firms 
Panel A: Issuing firms      
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 1144 4.32 2.08 6.07 0.00 28.36 
Prior AR 1252 0.07 0.04 0.28 -0.44 0.75 
ED 868 1.15 0.60 1.88 0.00 10.18 
SIZE 1144 5.12 5.06 0.73 3.13 8.08 
PROF 1257 -0.21 0.01 0.81 -4.61 2.12 
CAPX 1137 0.05 0.02 0.11 -0.02 2.16 
KZ 815 3.31 1.22 6.30 -1.39 38.63 
Z  1154 -5.42 2.14 20.19 -87.00 19.25 
LIQD 1257 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Panel B: Non-issuing 
firms 
    
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 779 2.04 1.69 1.34 0.57 3.89 
Prior AR 1248 0.01 0.00 0.32 -1.31 1.61 
ED 790 0.47 0.26 0.38 0.10 0.99 
SIZE 1257 4.29 4.34 1.90 -2.12 10.94 
PROF 1070 0.08 0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.20 
CAPX 1017 0.09 0.04 0.24 0.00 6.45 
KZ 992 0.06 -0.05 0.25 -0.05 1.32 
Z  1045 1.28 2.88 13.04 -53.55 34.68 
LIQD 1257 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
Panel C: Test of Mean Difference of issuing and non-issuing 
Variables  N Mean difference t-stat 
MB 1923 2.28*** (10.32) 
AR 2500 0.06*** (5.15) 
ED 1658 0.68*** (10.01) 
SIZE 2401 0.84*** (13.97) 
PROF 2327 -0.28*** (-11.34) 
CAPX 2154 -0.04*** (-5.55) 
KZ 1807 3.25*** (16.23) 
Z  2199 -6.69*** (-9.13) 
LIQD 2514 0.00 (0.00) 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis for both issuing and non-issuing firms after winsoring 
extreme values or outliers. Variables included market to book ratio (MB), 
pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), earnings deviation measure 
of asymmetric information (ED), logarithm of book value of total assets 
(SIZE), the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to total 
assets (PROF), ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX), financial 
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constraints measure (KZ), Taffler’s Z score measure of financial distress (Z), 
and market liquidity (LIQD). T-statistics are shown in parenthesis.  *** 
denote significance at the 1% level. 
 
As can be seen from Table 6.1, the mean MB for issuing firms is 4.32 
compared to 2.04 for non-issuing firms. AR is 0.07 or 7% for issuing firms and 
0.01 or 1% for non-issuing firms. The mean difference for MB is 2.28 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. For AR, the mean difference is 6% and 
significant at the 1% level. The table also shows mean difference of 0.68 for 
ED at 1% significance level. The difference in firm size is also positive (0.84) 
and significant at 1% level whereas PROF and CAPX differences are negative 
and significant at 1% level. Mean difference for KZ and Z score are 
significantly positive and negative respectively at the 1% level. Finally, the 
difference in LIQD is not statistically significant.  
These results provide preliminary evidence consistent with the extant evidence 
on issuance of overpriced equity. Both MB and AR show that issuing firms are 
more overvalued and subsequently are more likely to time their issues than no-
issuing firms. Market timing of equity issues should be consistent with low 
information asymmetry (Lucas and McDonald, 1990; Korajczyk, et al., 1992; 
Baker and Wurgler, 2002). However, the results on ED indicate that issuing 
firms have high information asymmetry than non-issuing firms. This could 
possibly explain the post issue stock returns. It also appears that issuing firms 
are large firms, unprofitable and do not spend much on capital expenditure. 
Again, the low profitability could indicate that such firms are in need of 
external financing without which they would be unable to undertake 
investment projects. Thus, the need for “near term” cash flow is consistent with 
equity issuing (DeAngelo et al. 2010). It also appears that issuing firms are 
more internally financially constrained than non-issuing firms but not 
internally susceptible to financial distress. Thus, issuing firms have internal 
cash flow limitations and external financing is readily needed. The findings 
about equity issuing firms are in line with prior literature about market timing 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2010; Dong et al., 2012).  
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6.2.1.2. Yearly Average of Equity Issues   
Table 6.2 presents the number of yearly equity issues during the sample period, 
the average value of the equity proceeds, and the average ratio of the proceeds 
to market value. As can be seen from the table, the annual issues are generally 
stable during the early part of the sample period from 1994 to 1999. During 
years 2000 and 2001, the number of equity issues increases significantly and 
drops to the levels in the 1990s between years 2002 and 2008. For the equity 
issue proceeds, the table show that much of the proceeds were generated 
between the periods from 2006 to 2009. This result is rather interesting given 
that the same period experienced the effects of the financial crisis.  However, 
the ratio of proceeds to market value (PMV) indicates a stable value of 
proceeds per unit of firm value. It appears the large firms issued more equity 
during the financial crisis compared to small firms. This evidence implies that 
the effects of financial crisis less constrained large firms in obtaining external 
equity financing than would for small firms. 
Table 6.2: Yearly Average Amounts and 
Ratio of Equity Issues 
Year  N Proceeds PMV 
1994 63 67.24 0.30 
1995 63 122.70 0.35 
1996 83 57.97 0.35 
1997 51 44.57 0.20 
1998 49 57.00 0.23 
1999 58 61.67 0.26 
2000 126 76.12 0.29 
2001 104 136.19 1.80 
2002 51 153.04 0.69 
2003 77 25.92 0.11 
2004 65 31.38 0.33 
2005 44 76.41 0.34 
2006 47 100.67 0.36 
2007 83 129.40 0.30 
2008 54 113.38 0.45 
2009 159 250.36 1.95 
2010 80 59.37 0.23 
Total 1257 103.84 0.66 
Notes: This table shows the annual equity issues of 
sample firms. It also indicates the average yearly 
proceeds from equity issues (PROCEEDS) and the 
ratio of proceeds to market value of firms (PMV).  
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6.2.1.3. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Variables  
Logistic regression is used to estimate the model that tests the effects of 
internal financial constraints on share issuance (H1, H2, and H3) as explained in 
Section 5.3.1.4. However, OLS is used to test hypothesis H4 and H5 about the 
stock returns following share issuance. „No multicollinearity‟, which is an 
important assumption for the OLS, requires that the explanatory variables and 
control variables are not perfectly or highly intercorrelated with each other. In 
estimating regression coefficient using OLS, everything else being equal, it is 
better to have less correlation between independent variables (Wooldridge, 
2009, p. 98). A correlation coefficient close to or equal to +1 and -1 suggests 
high collinearity or perfect multicollinearity among the variables. Table 6.3 
provides the Pearson‟s correlation matrixes of independent and control 
variables for the sample of equity issues.  
As the shown in Table 6.3, none of the variable indicates high collinearity with 
the highest being 0.61 for ED and KZ. In the multivariate analysis, separate 
results are run excluding the ED. Most of the variables are correlated at either 
the 1% or 5% level, with most of the correlations lying close or below 0.20. 
This results implies low multicollinearity and thus tolerable for OLS 
estimation. The high correlation between ED and KZ indicates perhaps high 
correlation between asymmetric information and internal financial constraints. 
Also, MB seems to indicate high internal financial constraints with correlation 
coefficient of 0.44. Overall, the results show that multicollinearity is not a 
problem for estimating the regression model using OLS. 
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Table 6.3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Variables 
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KZ  1.00          
MB 0.44*** 1.00         
Prior AR 0.10*** 0.14*** 1.00        
ED 0.61*** -0.12*** 0.03 1.00       
SIZE -0.02 0.01 0.06** -0.01 1.00      
PROF -0.28*** -0.23*** 0.10*** -0.01 0.23*** 1.00     
CAPX 0.06* 0.01 -0.06** -0.02 -0.03 -0.13*** 1.00    
PMV 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.06** -0.01 -0.01 1.00   
CRISISdum -0.05 -0.13*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.05* 0.01 0.04 1.00  
MKTLIQ 0.05 -0.08*** 0.01 0.09*** -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
Notes: Variables are defined as KZ index measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal 
returns (Prior AR), earnings deviation as measure of asymmetric information (ED), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), profitability 
(PROFIT), capital expenditure (CAPX), ratio of issue value to market value (PMV), financial crisis dummy (CRISISdum) and measure of market 
liquidity (MKTLIQ). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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6.3. Testing the Effects of Financial Constraints on Share Issuance  
This section tests the hypotheses specified in Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 of Chapter 
2 using the logit regression model (Model 1) stated in Chapter 5.  
Model 1 discussed in Section 5.3.1.4 tests the effects of internal financial 
constraints on equity issues. The model is re-stated below: 
 
The model tests the probability of equity issuance given a set of firm 
characteristics for both the issuing and non-issuing firms. Since the model 
represent logit regression estimation, the dependent variable is 1 for issuing 
firm and 0 for non-issuing firm.  
6.3.1. Internal Financial Constraints and Share Issuance  
[Hypothesis H1] 
Hypothesis H1 is re-stated below: 
H1: There is high probability for less internally financially 
constrained firms to issue overvalued equity  
Table 6.4 presents the logit regression results about the probability of equity 
issues when firms are both mispriced and internally financially constrained. 
Regression Model 1 shows the results for the effects of internal financial 
constraints on equity issues holding constant the firm level variables including 
market to book ratio. Model 2 gives the results of the logit regression when 
internal financial constraints and mispricing are interacted (MB*KZ). Models 3 
and 4 uses prior AR to proxy for stock price run-ups as alternative measure of 
mispricing. Here the regression outputs also contain control variables as well as 
year and industry dummies to control for year and industry specific effects.  
The coefficient of KZ is negative but statistically insignificant in Models 1 and 
1. Consistent with the hypothesis, this negative coefficient indicates that 
internally financially constrained firms are less likely to issue equity. First, 
constrained firms might have significant asymmetric information effects and 
second they will be less likely to pay the costs of equity issuance. However, it 
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can be argued that constrained firm‟s even need external financing to enable 
them invest, especially when the investments are value-increasing. But the 
evidence seems to suggest that financial constraints limit the demand for 
external equity financing. Also, the coefficient of MB is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. More importantly, MB*KZ is 
significantly positive. Overall, the results provide strong evidence for market 
timing of equity issues. For Models 3 and 4, where ED is excluded from the 
control variables (due to high correlation between KZ and ED), the coefficient 
of KZ significant at the 5% level in Model 3. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term MB*KZ which tests the probability of equity issues given 
simultaneous effects of mispricing and internal financial constraints. The 
coefficient of MB*KZ is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, the results are similar with or without the ED variable.   
Consistent with the developed hypothesis (H1), constrained firms are less likely 
to take advantage of issuing overvalued equity. This implies issuing overvalued 
equity dominates the presence of internal financial constraints. For example, 
whereas financially constrained firms will less likely issue equity, when this 
same equity is mispriced, the firms are more likely to issue even when they are 
financially constrained. These results do not support the findings by DeAngelo 
et al. (2010) and Dong et al. (2012) who assert that due to costs of equity 
issuance only unconstrained firms are likely to issue overvalued equity. In 
other words, financially unconstrained firms undertake market timing of equity 
issues. Constrained firms might issue overvalued equity when the overall 
market liquidity is high or general economic environment is favourable. These 
results could also mean that constrained firms are willing to trade short term 
advantage of issuing overvalued equity for subsequent stock price 
underperformance following the equity issues. The results of the odds ratios 
presented in Table 6.5 highlight the effects of internal financial constraints and 
mispricing on the probability to issue equity. For example, the odds ratio for 
MB*KZ of 5.257 in Model 2 implies constrained firms and overvalued firms 
are about 5 times more likely to issue equity than unconstrained and 
undervalued firms. 
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Table 6.4: Logit Regression Estimates of Internal Financial 
Constraints (KZ index)  and Share Issuance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ  -1.003*** -1.931*** -0.091 -0.451** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.03) 
MB 0.479*** 0.433*** 0.485*** 0.453*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*KZ  1.660***  0.937*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01) 
SIZE 0.287*** 0.288*** 0.354*** 0.349*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 1.160*** 1.186***   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
PROF -4.314*** -4.191*** -5.377*** -5.203*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -8.631*** -8.800*** -7.993*** -8.208*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -2.061*** -1.989*** -1.825*** -1.727*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1366 1366 1477 1477 
Pseudo R2 0.315 0.322 0.254 0.258 
chi2  241.753 278.796 185.602 194.979 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the logit regression results for equity issues. The dependent 
variable is 1 for share issuance and 0 for non-issuance. Variables included in the 
regressions include KZ-index measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), market-to-
book ratio (MB), the interaction term (MB*KZ), logarithm of book value of total assets 
(SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, 
profitability (PROFIT), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. ** 
and  *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6.5: Logit Regression Estimates (Odds ratio) of Share Issuance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ  0.367*** 0.145*** 0.913 0.637** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.03) 
MB 1.614*** 1.542*** 1.624*** 1.574*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*KZ  5.257***  2.552*** 
  (0.00)  (0.01) 
SIZE 1.332*** 1.334*** 1.425*** 1.418*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 3.190*** 3.275***   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
PROF 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1366 1366 1477 1477 
pseudo R2 0.315 0.322 0.254 0.258 
chi2 241.753 278.796 185.602 194.979 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the exponentiated coefficients of the logit regression results for 
equity issues. The dependent variable is 1 for share issuance and 0 for non-issuance. 
Variables included in the regressions include KZ-index measure of internal financial 
constraints (KZ), market-to-book ratio (MB), interaction term (MB*KZ), logarithm of 
book value of total assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric 
information effects, profitability (PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and 
industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are 
shown in parenthesis. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
6.3.2. The Effects of External Financial Constraints   
[Hypotheses H2 and H3] 
The analysis and results produced in this section tests the following hypotheses 
about the effects of external financial constraints on share issuance decisions 
given the level of firm‟s internal financial constraints.  
H2: Firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity when external 
financial constraints are low (non-financial crisis period or periods of 
high market liquidity) 
H3: The probability of issuing overvalued equity during periods of 
high external financial constraints increases for firms with low 
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internal financially constraints than those with high internal 
financial constraints  
The results in Table 6.6 represent the analysis of the effects of external 
financial constraints on the interaction between mispricing and internal 
financial constraints on share issuance decisions. Financial crisis and market 
liquidity measure external financial constraints. Pre-crisis period is defined as 
the period between 1994 and 2007 whereas crisis period is from 2008 to 2010. 
Thus, between 2008 and 2010 there are external financial constraints compared 
to the period prior to year 2008. Similarly, low market liquidity represents 
external financial constraints compared to period of high market liquidity (refer 
to Section 5.3.1.2 of Chapter 5. for discussions on market liquidity). The 
independent and control variables are the same as those used in Table 6.4. 
Again, Table 6.6 provides the results when financial crisis is used as proxy for 
external financial constraints whereas Table 6.7 gives the results for when 
market liquidity is a measure of external financial constraints. The results for 
the crisis period are shown in Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.6 respectively. Models 
3 and 4 are the results for non-crisis period. Hypothesis H2 asserts that firms 
issue overvalued equity during non-crisis or periods of high market liquidity. 
Conversely, hypothesis H3 argues that unconstrained firms are able to issue 
overvalued equity during external financial constraints.  
The coefficient for KZ is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
for Models 1 and 3. This implies, as already hypothesised, that internally 
financially constrained firms are less likely to issue equity. Since these effects 
are consistent in both crisis and non-crisis periods, it also implies that the 
equity issuance behaviour of internally financially constrained firms is 
independent of the level of external financial constraints. On the other hand, 
and in line with the market timing literature, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for MB in both Models 1 and 3 suggests that regardless 
of the level of external financial constraints, firms are more likely to issue 
overvalued equity. These results also show that large firms and firms with high 
asymmetric information are likely to issue equity regardless of external 
financial constraints. However, less profitable firms and those that undertake 
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less capital expenditure are more likely to issue equity. It appears profitable 
firms do not need external financing since they would have accumulated 
internal funds to undertake corporate expenditure. It also suggests that 
profitable firms follow the pecking order theory of external financing by which 
firms would issue equity only after exhausting both internal funds and debt 
capacity. 
 
Table 6.6: The Effects of External Financial Constraints (Financial 
Crisis) on Share Issuance 
 Crisis  Non-Crisis 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ  -3.233*** -1.059***  -1.254*** -0.251 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.38) 
MB 0.248*** 0.461***  0.458*** 0.443*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*KZ -3.045*** -1.099  1.337*** 1.239*** 
 (0.00) (0.12)  (0.00) (0.01) 
SIZE 0.325*** 0.377***  0.315*** 0.393*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 2.255***   0.807***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
PROF -7.120*** -11.726***  -3.337*** -3.958*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -10.353*** -8.098***  -8.691*** -8.421*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -2.273** -1.990***  -2.358*** -2.430*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 368 394  998 1083 
Pseudo R2 0.502 0.342  0.291 0.263 
chi2 130.816 72.249  175.377 172.479 
p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table displays the logit regression results for equity issues given internal and 
external financial constraints. The results for the crisis period are given in Model 1, non-
crisis period subsample in Model 2, low market liquidity in Model 3 and high market 
liquidity in Model 4. The dependent variable for this logit regression is 1 for share issuance 
and 0 for non-issuance. Variables included in the regressions include KZ-index measure of 
internal financial constraints (KZ), market-to-book ratio (MB), the interaction term 
(KZ*MB, logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which 
measures asymmetric information effects, profitability (PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) 
and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values 
are shown in parenthesis.  ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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Additional variable, MB* KZ, measures the simultaneous effects of mispricing 
and internal financial constraints for both low and high external financial 
constraints. For the crisis period in Model 1, the coefficient of MB* KZ is -
3.045 which is significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient of MB*KZ 
for the non-crisis period is 1.337 and significant at the 1% level. In Model 4 
where ED is excluded, the coefficients of MB*KZ is still positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 6.7 produces the logit regression 
using market liquidity as a measure of external financial constraints. The 
coefficient of MB* KZ is again negative and significant at the 1% level for the 
low market liquidity subsample given in Model 2. This is different for the high 
market liquidity subsample where the coefficient of MB* KZ is positive and 
significant at the 5% level as given in Model 3. Thus, the two definitions of 
external financial constraints produce similar results for the effects of 
mispricing and internal financial constraints on share issuance decisions.  
Consistent with the developed hypothesis, and prior study by McLean and 
Zhao (2014), frictions in the external equity market or the general economic 
conditions seem to have significant effects on the share issuance decisions of 
firms. Whereas internal financial constraints determine the demand for external 
financing, the level of external financial constraints influences the amount of 
capital that investors would be willing to provide to firms through equity 
offerings. Thus, market timing behaviour depends to a large extent on the 
overall economic conditions when firms will be better off to issue equity 
during periods of favourable market conditions (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003). 
According to the conjecture about the effects of external financial constraints, 
the benefits of issuing overvalued equity seem to overshadow the effects of 
external financial constraints for financially unconstrained firms. Similarly, for 
the constrained firms, the effects of internal financial constraints do not seem 
to impact the issue of overvalued equity when the overall external market 
conditions are favourable. 
Overall, these results provide strong support for the hypothesis about the 
issuance of equity and the effects of mispricing and financial constraints. 
Therefore, the hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are accepted based on the results in 
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this section of the study. Unlike previous studies, this thesis performs analysis 
of equity issues for simultaneous effects of internal and external financial 
constraints. In other words, the issue of overvalued equity in the equity 
marketplace reflects both the degree of internal cash flows and external costs 
associated with such issues. 
Table 6.7: The Effects of External Financial Constraints (Market 
Liquidity) on Share Issuance 
 Low Market Liquidity  High Market Liquidity 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variables is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ  -2.038*** -0.414  -1.910*** -0.542 
 (0.00) (0.11)  (0.00) (0.20) 
MB 0.426*** 0.420***  0.527*** 0.591*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*KZ -1.689*** -0.918**  1.667** 0.829 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.03) (0.22) 
SIZE 0.224*** 0.285***  0.452*** 0.534*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 1.298***   1.060***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)  
PROF -3.448*** -4.680***  -6.762*** -7.032*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -9.049*** -8.509***  -6.856 -6.910 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.21) (0.14) 
Constant  -1.781*** -1.338***  -2.749** -2.920*** 
 (0.00) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 962 1033  404 444 
Pseudo R2 0.296 0.223  0.425 0.367 
chi2 196.177 130.704  120.903 113.487 
p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table displays the logit regression results for equity issues given internal and 
external financial constraints. The results for the crisis period are given in Model 1, non-
crisis period subsample in Model 2, low market liquidity in Model 3 and high market 
liquidity in Model 4. The dependent variable for this logit regression is 1 for share 
issuance and 0 for non-issuance. Variables included in the regressions include KZ-index 
measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), market-to-book ratio (MB), the interaction 
term (KZ*MB), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) 
which measures asymmetric information effects, profitability (PROF), capital expenditure 
(CAPX) and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  
P-values are shown in parenthesis. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
These results are consistent with the evidence of prior studies about market 
timing of equity issues (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Dong et al., 2012). 
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Thus, internally financially constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued 
equity. The evidence in this section further demonstrates that unconstrained 
firms issue overvalued equity even during periods of significant external 
financial constraints. Also, for the constrained firms the probability of issuing 
overvalued equity is evidenced only during periods of favourable economic 
conditions. These findings are similar to studies such as Corwin (2003); Butler 
et al. (2005); McLean and Zhao (2014) which argue that during crisis periods, 
market liquidity dampens and increases the costs of raising external equity 
financing. For instance, Naes et al. (2011) show that U.S. stock market 
liquidity is countercyclical, and argue that during recessions there is a “flight to 
quality” in equities. Moreover, the results of the control variables seem to 
provide further evidence of market timing of equity issues among UK listed 
firms.  
6.3.3. Share Issuance, Financial Constraints and Stock Returns    
[Hypothesis H4 and H5]  
The hypotheses about stock returns are discussed in Section 2.5.4 of Chapter 2. 
This section tests these hypotheses using the pooled OLS regression model 
(Model 2) stated in Section 5.3.1.4 of Chapter 5. The hypotheses are re-stated 
below:  
H4: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative abnormal 
returns, especially for firms with high internal financially constraints 
H5: Issuance of overvalued equity is associated with more negative abnormal 
returns, especially for firms with high internal financially constraints and 
during periods of high external financial constraints  
The pooled OLS estimation model used to test the hypothesis about stock 
returns as discussed in Section 5.3.1.4 of Chapter 5 is stated below. 
 
From the model above, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) over 6 months post equity issue. KZ and MB are the main 
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independent variables with set of control variables defined in Section 5.3.1.3 of 
Chapter 5.  
6.3.3.1. Univariate Results for Stock Returns    
The extant literature provides substantial evidence of stock price 
underperformance following equity issues. Various explanations have been 
advocated to justify the stock price performance of equity issuing firms as 
discussed in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. Overall, evidence suggests that stock 
underperformance is consistent with market timing hypothesis and 
overvaluation for both initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2000, 2002; Dong et al. 2012). Thus, by issuing overvalued equity, 
firms suffer from adverse market perception that the value of the firm does not 
reflect the true value of the fundamentals. It seems to follow that overvalued 
equity persists when there is significant information asymmetry associated with 
the equity issuing firms.  
This section provides results about the short-term stock returns associated with 
equity issues depending on both mispricing and internal financial constraints. It 
further looks at how the returns behave when there are external financial 
constraints, particularly during the financial crisis. According to the developed 
hypotheses, all else equal, constrained firms that issue overvalued equity 
should underperform counterpart unconstrained firms. Also, the returns should 
be more negative for financially constrained firms that issue overvalued equity 
during periods of financial crisis. The rationale for this expectation is that the 
firm suffers from both internal constraints and possible adverse effects of 
friction in the external equity market and the general unfavourable economic 
conditions (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; and McLean and Zhao, 2014).  
Table 6.8 shows the univariate results. Panel A examines the abnormal stock 
returns for the full sample partitioned into high/low MB/KZ in line with 
hypothesis H5. According to H5, overvalued firms are associated with more 
negative abnormal returns, especially when they are faced with high internal 
financial constraints. The total abnormal returns are -9.8% (significant at the 
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1% level) and insignificant -0.8% for high MB and low MB respectively. The 
mean difference returns between high and low MB is -9.5% which is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. For the KZ partition, high and low KZ 
subsamples record abnormal returns of respectively -6.0% and 3.4%, with both 
significant at the 1% level. The mean difference is -2.5% which is 
insignificant. For the high KZ subsample, the abnormal returns for high MB 
and low MB are -10.2% (significant at 1% level) and 0.2% (not significant) 
with a mean difference which is statistically significant the 1% level. This 
evidence is similar to Lamont et al. (2001) who argue that financially 
unconstrained firms report less negative stock returns than more constrained 
firms. However, these results contradict Whited and Wu (2006) who explain 
that the financial-constraints effects dominates the firm size effects. For the 
low KZ firms, the mean difference returns between high and low MB is 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the abnormal returns 
indicate that internal financial constraints and mispricing determines the level 
of stock price underperformance following equity issues. In particular, it 
appears that financially constrained firms perform worse when they issue 
overvalued equity than when the equity overvaluation is low.  
Panels B and C show the abnormal returns based on the period of financial 
crisis and pre-crisis, respectively. Thus, the sample is split into two subsamples 
for crisis and non-crisis period to investigate the effects of external financial 
constraints on the results. The mean abnormal stock returns difference between 
high KZ and low KZ, during crisis period as shown in Panel B, is -11.4% and 
is significant at 5% level. However, for non-crisis subsample in Panel C, the 
mean difference returns between high KZ and low KZ firms is insignificant. 
For the high KZ firms, the mean difference returns between high and low MB 
is negative and significant at 1% level for the non-crisis period. The same 
evidence is true for the low KZ firms. It appears the market is unable to 
differentiate between high and low KZ during the pre-crisis period. Therefore, 
the market seems to react unfavourably to both firms when equity issues are 
made.  
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Table 6.8: Univariate Results of Abnormal Stock Returns 
PANEL A: Full Sample MB and KZ 
   High KZ  Low KZ  Total  Mean diff. 
 N  1  2  3  t-stat 
High MB 408  -0.102  -0.068  -0.098  -0.033 
   (-6.41)***  (-1.53)  (-8.21)***  (-0.72) 
Low MB  404  0.002  -0.024  -0.008  0.025 
   (0.09)  (-0.97)  (-1.64)  (0.86) 
Total  812  -0.060  -0.034  -0.053  -0.025 
   (-4.16)***  (-6.30)***  (-5.89)***  (-1.06) 
Mean diff   -0.104***  -0.087***  -0.095***   
t-stat   (-5.09)  (-2.98)  (-5.16)   
PANEL B: During Crisis MB and KZ 
 N  High KZ  Low KZ  Total  Mean diff. 
High MB 62  -0.099  0.022  -0.083  -0.121 
   (-3.56)***  (0.30)  (-3.05)***  (-1.54) 
Low MB  168  -0.047  0.023  -0.006  -0.070 
   (-0.90)  (0.41)  (-0.29)  (-0.87) 
Total  230  -0.091  0.023  -0.063  -0.114 
   (-3.38)***  (0.05)  (-2.76)***  (-2.26)** 
Mean diff   -0.052  -0.011  -0.066   
t-stat   (-0.93)  (-0.15)  (-1.48)   
PANEL C: Pre-Crisis MB and KZ 
 N  High KZ  Low KZ  Total  Mean diff. 
High MB 240  -0.139  -0.105  -0.109  -0.035 
   (-2.69)**  (-5.49)***  (-7.65)***  (-0.62) 
Low MB  342  -0.038  0.007  -0.008  -0.045 
   (-1.41)  (0.40)  (-0.49)  (-1.41) 
Total  582  -0.057  -0.048  -0.050   -0.009 
   (-3.84)  (-4.66)***  (-5.21)***  (-0.34) 
Mean diff   -0.109  -0.116  -0.108   
t-stat   (-3.41)***  (-5.16)***  (-5.26)***   
Notes: The table shows the abnormal stock returns associated with share issues. Panel A 
displays the results for the short run returns based for the full sample partitioned into 
high/low KZ and MB. Panel B shows the stock returns for crisis period (2008-2010) and 
Panel C for the non-crisis period (1994-2007). T-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ** and 
*** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with prior findings about post-issue stock 
returns. But importantly, internal financial constraints seem to explain the level 
of stock underperformance for overvalued firms. Given that the results in 
Section 6.5.1 suggest that financially constrained firms are less likely to issue 
overvalued equity, the more negative stock returns associated with such firms 
justify why these firms would rather not issue overvalued equity. Financially 
unconstrained firms are better off than constrained firms when they issue 
overvalued equity. These findings are consistent with Dong et al. (2012) who 
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indicate that due to issuance costs, unconstrained firms rather than constrained 
firms should issue overvalued equity. However, the univariate results on post-
issue stock returns do not entirely support the findings by Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003) and McLean and Zhao (2014) about the effects of external financial 
constraints on equity issuance. This can be extended to imply that the market is 
unable to differentiate better performing firms from poor performing firms 
when there are adverse general economic conditions. In sum, the equity 
issuance decisions and the subsequent stock price performance is determined 
by the combined effects of both mispricing and internal/external financial 
constraints.  
6.3.3.2. Cross-Sectional Regression Results for Stock Returns    
Table 6.9 reports the results for pooled cross-sectional regressions estimation 
of the short run abnormal stock returns associated with equity issues. The 
dependent variable is short-run abnormal stock returns, CAR (2,120) using 
Model 2 discussed in Section 5.3.1.1 and Section 5.3.1.4 of Chapter 5 
respectively. According to hypothesis H4 financially constrained firms that 
issue overvalued equity are associated with more negative abnormal stock 
returns than unconstrained firms. Hypothesis H5, on the other hand, explores 
the effects of external financial constraints on the stock returns of equity 
issuing firms given the level of internal financial constraints. Model 1 provides 
the results for the full sample, Model 2 gives the results for the sample period 
during the financial crisis and Model 3 restricts the sample period to the pre-
crisis period. As usual, pre-crisis period is defined as the period between 1994 
and 2007 whereas crisis period is from 2008 to 2010. The independent and 
control variables are the same as those used in Table 6.4.  
From Model 1 for the full sample, the coefficient of KZ is not statistically 
significant. Also, MB has a coefficient of 0.008 that is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficients of SIZE and ED are not significant with 
PROF also showing a positive and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% 
level. CAPX shows a positive and marginally significant coefficient at the 10% 
level. These results imply that the level of internal financial constraints do not 
affect stock returns of equity issuing firms. MB does not show the expected 
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sign for negative effects of overvaluation on stock returns. It also shows that 
profitable firms are associated with positive stock price response whereas 
capital expenditure has marginal positive effects on stock returns. Finally, the 
coefficient of MB*KZ is not statistically significant for the full sample. 
Table 6.9: Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Share 
Issuance and Short Run Stock Returns 
 Full  Crisis  Non-Crisis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable is the Post-announcement CAR(2,120) 
KZ 0.068 0.322*** -0.048 
 (0.26) (0.01) (0.45) 
MB 0.008*** 0.009 0.008*** 
 (0.00) (0.14) (0.01) 
MB*KZ -0.065 -0.296** 0.030 
 (0.27) (0.02) (0.63) 
SIZE 0.027 0.026 0.036* 
 (0.11) (0.47) (0.08) 
ED -0.013 -0.042** -0.005 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.65) 
PROF 0.056*** 0.024 0.054*** 
 (0.00) (0.59) (0.00) 
CAPX 0.240** -0.040 0.302** 
 (0.05) (0.89) (0.02) 
Constant -0.198* -0.117 -0.293** 
 (0.05) (0.54) (0.02) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 756 226 530 
adj. R2 0.125 0.150 0.132 
Notes: This table shows the cross-sectional regression results for stock 
returns. The results for the full sample are given in Model 1, crisis period 
subsample in Model 2 and non-crisis period subsample in Model 3. The 
dependent variable CAR (2,120). Variables included in the regressions 
include KZ measure of internal financial constraints, market-to-book 
ratio (MB), the interaction term (KZ*MB), prior stock returns (Prior 
AR), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), earnings deviation 
(ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, profitability 
(PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
The results for the crisis and non-crisis subsamples shed more light on the 
stock returns impacts of equity issuance decisions. In Models 2 and 3, the 
coefficient of KZ is positive and significant at 1% level and negative and 
insignificant respectively. MB is positive in both models but only significant in 
Model 3. The coefficient of ED is negative and statistically significant at the 
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5% level in Model 2 indicating the adverse selection costs of equity issues. 
Profitable firms and capital expenditure are associated with positive post issue 
returns in the non-crisis period. More importantly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term MB*KZ is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level 
for the crisis period whereas it is not significant during the non-crisis period. 
It appears the multivariate analysis suggests that the effects of internal financial 
constraints and mispricing on stock returns of equity issuing firms are 
influenced by the crisis period. Periods of financial crisis between 2008-2010 
are characterised by significant slump in stock prices. Moreover, the supply of 
equity financing is low with high associated transaction costs. Taken together, 
these features of the stock market during financial crisis mean that firms 
issuing equity are likely to generate low post-issue stock returns. Given that 
overvaluation and internal financial constraints are associated with stock price 
underperformance of equity issuing firms, the hypothesis about stock price is 
accepted. Hence, the issue of overvalued equity by internally financially 
constrained firms is associated with stock price underperformance, especially 
during significant external financial constraints. 
6.4. Robustness Checks and Additional Results  
This section provides additional analysis to ensure the results are robustness to 
alternative definitions of internal financial constraints. It also presents logit 
regression diagnostic tests and the results using alternative estimation 
technique for the main results.  
6.4.1. Internal Financial Constraints (WW index) and Share Issuance  
The results in Table 6.10 analyses the effects of financial constraints on share 
issuance in testing hypothesis H1. Here, the financial constraints measure is the 
Whited and Wu (2006) index. Using alternative measure of internal financial 
constraints enhances the robustness of the results when the KZ-index was used. 
Studies such as Chen and Wang (2012) use this measure together with the KZ-
index to test the effects of financial constraints on share repurchase. Models 1 
and 2 use market to book ratio as proxy for mispricing, whereas Models 3 and 
4 use prior stock returns as measure of mispricing. This is similar to Table 6.4 
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and also includes the interaction term MB*WW to measure the effects of 
mispricing and internal financial constraints on share issuance as shown in 
Models 2 and 4.  
Table 6.10: Logit Regression Estimates of Internal Financial 
Constraints (WW index) and Share Issuance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
WW  0.171 0.651** -0.047 0.391* 
 (0.38) (0.01) (0.78) (0.06) 
MB 0.433*** 0.479*** 0.414*** 0.449*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*WW    1.049***   0.988*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.317*** 0.332*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 1.003*** 0.981***   
 (0.00) (0.00)   
PROF -3.858*** -3.850*** -4.598*** -4.697*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -9.552*** -9.512*** -5.679*** -5.655*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -1.399** -1.535*** -0.897* -1.083** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.02) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1176 1176 1517 1517 
Pseudo R2 0.301 0.307 0.226 0.232 
chi2  203.286 208.807 117.392 127.065 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the logit regression results for equity issues. The dependent 
variable is 1 for share issuance and 0 for non-issuance. Variables included in the 
regressions include WW-index measure of internal financial constraints (WW), market-
to-book ratio (MB), the interaction term (MB*WW), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, 
profitability (PROFIT), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. ** 
and  *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
From the table, the coefficient of the interaction term MB*WW is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that financially 
constrained firms issue overvalued equity. But perhaps, as argued in hypothesis 
H2 the effects of external financial constraints might drive the issue of 
overvalued equity beyond the effects of internal financial constraints. What the 
results show is both KZ index and WW index provide similar outcome of the 
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effects of internal financial constraints on share issuance. The positive 
coefficient of MB*WW in Model 4 is similar to that in Model 2 and indicates 
that excluding ED due to high correlation with KZ does not affect the results. 
6.4.2. Share Issuance and the Effects of Financial Distress  
Additional tests of the probability of equity issues use financial distress to 
proxy for internal financial constraints. Firms that have high costs of financial 
distress are highly levered firms with limited debt capacity to issue debt 
financing and hence suffer from significant costs of bankruptcy. As explained 
earlier, financially distressed firms are more likely to require external equity 
financing unless high costs of external financing restricts their ability to issue 
overvalued equity. Also, given that equity issues are associated with high 
transactions costs, financially distressed firms may be unable to afford such 
issues. In the logit regression in Table 6.11, Z is the Taffler‟s Z score measure 
of financial distressed discussed in Section 5.3.1.2 of Chapter 5. The control 
variables are the same as used in the previous regressions. 
In line with the hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction term MB*Z is 
negative for the full sample (Model 1) and the crisis period subsample (Model 
2) and statistically significant at the 1% level and 5% level respectively.  In 
Model 3, which represents the non-crisis period subsample, the coefficient of 
Z*MB is positive and significant at the 1% level. Like previous results, this 
result indicates that financially distressed firms are less likely to issue 
overvalued equity, especially during financial crisis. However, in the non-crisis 
period these firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity apparently 
because the external market conditions favour stock price performance than 
during crisis period. Thus, costs of external financing play a key role in market 
timing. Costs of external financing reflect lack of available finance and low 
investor sentiments such that investors are less likely to purchase shares that 
are riskier during financial crisis and/or low market liquidity. Overall, the 
findings are consistent with financial constraints impact on market timing. 
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6.4.3. Tobit Regression Estimation of Equity Issues   
Table 6.12 provides the tobit regression results for equity issues given financial 
constraints and mispricing. The dependent variable is the dollar value of equity 
issues divided by the market value of equity. This variable explains the effects 
of financial constraints and mispricing on the amount of shares issued. Model 1 
give the results of the effects of internal financial constraints (KZ) and market 
to book ratio (MB) on the value of equity issued whereas Model 2 examines 
Table 6.11: The Effects of Financial Distress on Share Issuance 
 Full  Crisis  Non-crisis 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
Z 0.132 0.883** -0.352 
 (0.52) (0.04) (0.20) 
MB 0.550*** 0.386*** 0.543*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*Z -1.406*** -1.514** 1.045*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.293*** 0.319** 0.333*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
ED 0.977*** 1.912*** 0.637*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PROF -4.568*** -6.808*** -3.976*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -8.317*** -10.147*** -8.097*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -1.729*** -2.340** -2.048*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 1299 354 945 
Pseudo R2 0.311 0.464 0.290 
chi2 227.144 92.252 157.826 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the logit regression results for equity issues given financial 
distress. The results for the full sample are given in Model 1, crisis period 
subsample in Model 2 and non-crisis period subsample in Model 3. The dependent 
variable for this logit regression is 1 for share issuance and 0 for non-issuance. 
Variables included in the regressions include Taffler’s Z score measure of 
financial distress (Z), market-to-book ratio (MB), the interaction term (Z*MB), 
prior stock returns (Prior AR), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), 
earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, 
profitability (PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
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the simultaneously effects of mispricing and internal financial constraints 
(MB*KZ) on the value of equity issued. Models 3 and 4 exclude ED as a 
control variable due to high correlation with KZ. As can be seen from the table, 
the coefficient of MB*KZ is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in Models 1 and 3, indicating that financially constrained firms issue 
overvalued equity.  
Table 6.12: Tobit Regression Analysis of Internal Financial 
Constraints and Share Issuance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable is Proceeds over Market Value (P/MV) 
KZ 1.697*** 0.324 1.205*** -0.130 
 (0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.54) 
MB -0.000 -0.013 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.99) (0.31) (0.24) (0.36) 
MB*KZ  1.665***  1.966*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
SIZE -0.880*** -0.876*** -0.831*** -0.840*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ED -0.187*** -0.095**   
 (0.00) (0.01)   
PROF  0.234*** 0.254*** 0.166** 0.211*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
CAPX -0.269 -0.407 -0.148 -0.396 
 (0.78) (0.67) (0.88) (0.68) 
Constant  8.530*** 8.448*** 7.956*** 8.017*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 752 752 763 763 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the Tobit regression results for equity issues. The dependent 
variable is the dollar value of share repurchase divided by the prior year market value 
of equity. Variables included in the regressions include KZ-index measure of internal 
financial constraints (KZ), market-to-book ratio (MB), the interaction term (MB*KZ), 
prior stock returns (Prior AR), the interaction term (AR*KZ), logarithm of book value 
of total assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information 
effects, profitability (PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in 
parenthesis. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
6.4.4. Random and Fixed Effects Logit Regression Estimation  
The random and fixed effects regressions are estimated as robustness check. 
Whereas logit regression is the main estimation technique and estimates as 
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cross-sectional regression, random and fixed effects accounts for the time 
series aspect of the data. Fixed effects estimation leads to significant loss in 
efficiency that is compensated by consistent coefficients. Thus, standard errors 
are larger for fixed effects estimation because of loss of observations by 
dropping all time-invariant regressors. Coefficients of time-varying 
independent variables may even be difficult to identify in nonlinear models 
with fixed effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 715). Fixed effects use only 
within variation of the regressors and are much less precise compared to 
random effects model. This contrasts with the random effects estimation that 
corrects for individual correlation over time.  
The random effects logit regression model is stated as follows:  
 
And the fixed effects logit regression model is given below.  
 
The results presented in Table 6.14 are the random and fixed effects estimation 
of the main results.  
From the table, Models 1, 2, and 3 are for random effects whereas fixed effects 
estimation results are given in Models 4 to 6. Both the random effects and 
fixed effects results confirm the previous findings reported in the chapter about 
the effects of financial constraints and mispricing on share issuance decisions. 
Here again, the coefficient of KZ is significantly negative for all the models 
whereas MB is significantly positive. Also, the coefficient of the interaction 
term KZ*MB is significantly positive in all the models. These results provide 
further emphasis that internally financially constrained firms are less likely to 
issue equity. It also shows that firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity. 
However, given overvalued equity, internally financially constrained firms are 
more likely to issue equity indicating that internally financially constrained 
firms probably derive significant benefits from issuing overvalued equity. Thus, 
the results after using alternative estimation techniques still support the 
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hypotheses about the effects of internal financial constraints and mispricing on 
share issuance decisions. 
 
 
Similarly, further analysis of the effects of external financial constraints on 
equity issuance given the interaction of internal financial constraints and 
mispricing is robust to random and fixed effects estimations. Table 6.14 shows 
Table 6.13: Random and Fixed Effects Logit Regression 
Estimation (Financial Constraints and Share Issuance) 
 Random Effects  Fixed Effects  
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ -0.943*** -1.831***  -0.867*** -2.161*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB 0.434*** 0.392***  0.217*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB*KZ   1.556***   2.201*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
SIZE 0.288*** 0.289***  0.412*** 0.397*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 1.169*** 1.179***  0.811*** 0.860*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
PROF -4.122*** -4.008***  -1.483*** -1.506*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -7.667*** -7.839***  -8.463*** -8.561*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.268*** -2.184***    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1366 1366  1366 1366 
pseudo R2    0.255 0.267 
chi-squared 232.996 235.243  449.709 471.257 
p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the random and fixed effects logit regression results for 
equity issues. The results for random effects logit regression are given in Models 
1 to 3 whereas fixed effects logit regression results are shown in Models 4 to 6. 
The dependent variable for this logit regression is 1 for share issuance and 0 for 
non-issuance. Variables included in the regressions include KZ measure of 
internal financial constraints (KZ), market-to-book ratio (MB), the interaction 
term (MB*KZ), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), earnings 
deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, profitability 
(PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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that constrained firms are likely to issue overvalued equity only during periods 
of economic upturn. However, during crisis periods, as shown in both the 
random and effects models, only financially unconstrained firms are likely to 
issue overvalued equity. 
Table 6.14: Random and Fixed Effects Logit Regression Estimation 
Financial Constraints and Share Issuance (Crisis and Non-crisis) 
 Random Effects   Fixed Effects 
 Crisis  Non-crisis  Crisis  Non-crisis 
Variables  1 2  3 4 
Dependent Variable is Issuance (1) vs Non-Issuance (0) 
KZ -3.523*** -1.027**  -3.672*** -1.071*** 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) 
MB 0.268*** 0.398***  -0.036 0.301*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.53) (0.00) 
MB*KZ 3.173*** 1.249**  4.260*** 1.358*** 
 (0.00) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.01) 
SIZE 0.326*** 0.289***  0.321*** 0.341*** 
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
ED 2.149*** 0.799***  1.171*** 0.710*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
PROF -7.300*** -3.020***  -2.921*** -1.752*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CAPX -9.739*** -7.853***  -7.685*** -8.221*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -2.424*** -2.157***    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 368 998  368 998 
pseudo R2    0.422 0.262 
chi-squared 80.140 150.627  200.488 337.112 
p 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table displays the random and fixed effects logit regression results for 
equity issues given internal and external financial constraints. The results for the 
random effects estimation are given in model 1 (crisis) and 2 (non-crisis) and for fixed 
effects in model 3 (crisis) and 4 (non-crisis). The dependent variable for this logit 
regression is 1 for share issuance and 0 for non-issuance. Variables included in the 
regressions include KZ-index measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), market-to-
book ratio (MB), and the interaction term (MB*KZ), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), earnings deviation (ED) which measures asymmetric information effects, 
profitability (PROF), capital expenditure (CAPX) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. 
** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
These results demonstrate the robustness of the earlier results using the logit 
regression estimation. Overall, the results in this chapter are robust to the 
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alternative estimation technique and further strengthen the hypothesis that both 
internal and external financial constraints play important roles in the market 
timing of equity issues. It is only when there are external financial constraints 
will financially constrained firms be restricted in their attempts to time their 
equity issues. 
A formal test of the appropriateness and comparison of random and fixed 
effects models is carried. Appendices 6A to 6C present the hausman test output 
for comparing random and fixed effects estimations. The starting point for the 
hausman test is that the two models do not produce significantly different 
coefficients. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient is not different 
between random and fixed effects in which case both estimations are 
appropriate otherwise the fixed effects is chosen because it gives consistent 
coefficients. As can be seen from the hausman test output in Appendix 6A, the 
chi-square is 185 and probability is 0.0000 indicating that the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, the difference in the 
coefficients between random and fixed effects is systematic. Hence, the fixed 
effects output is more appropriate with consistent coefficient.  
6.5. Conclusion  
This chapter presented empirical results to explore the share issuance decisions 
of firms. It specifically investigated the simultaneous effects of financial 
constraints and mispricing on share issuance decisions. The main hypothesis 
tested in this chapter was that financial constraints limits market timing of 
equity issues. Thus, financially constraints firms are less likely to issue 
overvalued equity, especially when market conditions are unfavourable. This 
hypothesis emphasised that the costs of issuing equity increases substantially 
when there is economic crisis that also limits the availability of financing. The 
implication of this hypothesis was that financially unconstrained firms would 
be in a better position to issue overvalued equity even when the market 
conditions are less favourable. The results used the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index and Whited and Wu (2006) index as well as Taffler‟s Z score as the 
proxies for internal financial constraints. Financial crisis and market liquidity 
are proxies for external financial constraints. 
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Consistent with prior studies, the results of this chapter support the developed 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 about share issuance and financial constraints. The 
results presented in this chapter show that financially constrained firms are 
more likely to issue overvalued equity. Results further support the effects of 
external financial constraints on the interaction between internal financial 
constraints and mispricing. Specifically, the results showed in this chapter 
stress that firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity during periods of 
favourable market conditions or during non-crisis period, even when they are 
financially constrained. Thus, favourable market conditions allow firms to, 
regardless of their internal financing constraints, to exploit overvaluation 
advantages. However, only unconstrained firms are able to issue overvalued 
equity during periods of significant external financing constraints. Moreover, 
the chapter addresses issues with estimation assumptions and also presented 
results using alternative proxies for financial constraints. Finally, the chapter 
presented robust results for alternative estimation techniques.  
The findings in this chapter highlight the market timing activities of firms.  
Studies such as Stein (1996), Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002), Dong et al. (2012), all find evidence about equity market timing by 
which firms issue overvalued equity. Also, Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Dong 
et al. (2012) and (McLean and Zhao, 2014) assert that internal financial 
constraints restricts external financing. However, the results in this chapter 
differ markedly from prior studies on several fronts. For example, Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) do not explore the effects of financial constraints on equity 
market timing and Dong et al. (2012) only investigate the effects of internal 
financial constraints on equity issues. The results presented in this chapter, on 
the other hand, synthesise the effects of both internal and external financial 
constraints and demonstrate how these two determine the issuance of 
overvalued equity. This evidence has not previously been explored in the 
literature and therefore the results presented in this chapter extend the extant 
literature on equity issuance and market timing.  
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Chapter 7  
SHARE ISSUANCE METHODS AND OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE  
7.1. Introduction  
This section presents the empirical results and discusses the effects of 
operating performance on the choice of share issuance methods and the 
subsequent long run stock returns associated with rights issues, open offers, 
and private placement.  Firms that issue equity tend to be associated with poor 
long-term stock performance (Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Kabir and 
Roosenboom, 2003; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011). Three main explanations 
have been suggested for this price pattern. According to the information 
asymmetry hypothesis (e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984), managers have superior 
knowledge about their firms, compared to market participants, and use their 
private information to issue equity prior to public knowledge. Loughran and 
Ritter (1997) assert that investor over-optimism at the time of equity issue 
causes firms to overweigh recent good operating performance consistent with 
the over-optimism hypothesis. Finally, according to the window of opportunity 
hypothesis (Choe et al., 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), overvalued 
firms issue equity during favourable market conditions. Long-term stock 
returns tend to be poor after issuance, and are significantly in the magnitude 
based on the equity issuance method used. 
This study sheds light on why long-term stock returns after issuance tend to be 
poor and, more importantly, why alternative issuance methods are associated 
with different levels of long-term stock returns. As argued in this thesis, firms 
that make rights issues have less incentive to sell equity with poor prospects, 
since existing shareholders sell shares to themselves in comparison to 
counterpart private placements and open offers. Based on the information 
asymmetry hypothesis, managers are therefore expected to use their inside 
information to select the issuance method. Since operating performance may 
vary after the issuance of alternative methods, the long-term stock returns 
would vary accordingly. In line with a number of studies in the literature (e.g., 
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Cooper et al., 2008), operating performance is related positively with stock 
returns, and therefore rights issues are expected to result in better operating 
performance and long-term stock returns after issuance compared to 
counterpart private placements and open offers.        
Several studies demonstrate that the method of equity issuance has implications 
for post-issue stock returns (Slovin et al., 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006; 
Armitage, 2010; Capstaff and Fletcher, 2011) and operating performance 
(Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Hertzel et al., 2002; Kabir and Roosenboom, 
2003). These findings suggest a direct relationship between the post-issue long 
run stock returns and the operating performance. Hence, as argued in the extant 
literature, not only does the issuance method choice affect the long run stock 
performance but this performance is largely dependent on the level of 
operating performance. It is argued that firms‟ expectations about future 
operating performance can be exploited in the choice of issuance method. If 
firms were motivated to maximise shareholder value, then they would more 
likely choose rights offerings when operating performance is anticipated to be 
good. The choice of rights issues transfers part of the benefits to the existing 
shareholders.  Stated another way, for anticipated poor operating performance, 
issuance which involves outside investors will be preferred in order to exploit 
less informed investors, all other things being equal. Thus, this study tests the 
effects of long-term operating performance on the decision to choose one 
equity issuance method over other(s).   
Unlike UK, where three issuance methods exist for firms, rights issues are the 
main equity issuance method in many European countries (e.g., Gajewski and 
Ginglinger, 2002; Bohren et al., 1997; Tsangarakis, 1996; Pastor-Llorca and 
Martin-Ugedo, 2004), but is uncommon in the US where firm commitments are 
the method most commonly used. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Kothare 
(1997) explain that US firms‟ non-selection of rights offerings may be due to 
relatively high transaction costs and capital gain taxes, and they estimate that 
more than 80% of US equity issuance is for non-rights offerings. Therefore, 
UK equity issues constitute three widely used equity issuance methods and 
offer an ideal environment to explore whether information asymmetry and 
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firms‟ operating performance after issuance is aligned with differential long-
term stock returns. 
The literature on the choice of equity issuance has been widely explored in the 
UK where firms are entitled to issue equity through rights issues, open offers, 
and private placement. Largely, such decisions have been attributed to the 
motivations of the market timing theory by which firms issue overvalued 
equity. However, the evidence is mixed even though most studies (for example 
Slovin et al. 2000; Barnes and Walker, 2006) find that rights issues are more 
likely to be timed. Information asymmetry is a related theory to market timing 
by which firms are deemed to have inside information about the issue more 
than the investors. Therefore, firms are likely to be influenced by such 
information to exploit potential investors through the issuance method. 
Operating performance is one variable which firms can have a better forecast 
than outside investors who will need more information, mostly at a cost, to 
determine the true value of an issuing firm. Thus, the hypotheses explained in 
Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 explore the influence of expected operating 
performance in determining whether a firm chooses rights issues, open offers, 
or private placement at the time of equity issues. Specifically, the study 
predicts that firms are more likely to choose rights issues than open offer or 
private placement when they anticipate high operating performance.  It follows, 
therefore, that rights issuing firms are associated with less negative post-issue 
long run stock price performance compared to open offers and private 
placement.  
The chapter consists of four parts. Section 7.2 describes the sample used to 
perform the empirical analysis. Section 7.3 presents the multivariate analysis of 
the effects of operating performance on the choice of equity issuance method 
and the subsequent stock price performance. Section 7.4 discusses additional 
results and performs robustness checks using alternative definitions of 
operating performance and estimation techniques. It also conducts logit 
regression diagnostic tests to determine the appropriateness of the models. 
Section 7.5 concludes the chapter.  
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7.2. Sample Statistics and Diagnostics  
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the variables used to 
undertake the empirical analysis. The study follows prior studies and uses 
variables that explain the choice of equity issuance method. Section 7.1.1 
presents the descriptive statistics for the final sample.  
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of independent and control 
variables used to undertake the empirical analysis. It focuses on the statistics of 
the firm characteristics of equity issues and issuance methods. Thus, the equity 
sample is divided into rights issues (RI), open offers (OO), and private 
placement (PP).  
7.2.1.1. Equity Issues by Issuance Method during the Sample Period  
Table 7.1 presents the number of yearly equity issues that are made through 
rights issues, open offers, and private placement over the sample period. It also 
includes the anticipated proceeds from the equity issues, and the average ratio 
of the proceeds to market value for each issuance method. The results in the 
table show that rights issues were relatively more dominant in the early part of 
the sample period. However, private placement increased significantly in the 
year 2000 and 2001 and was relatively dominant from 2008 to 2010. Thus, 
more issues are made through private placement and open offers than rights 
issues, und relying the „rights issues demise‟ phenomenon. Both Burton et al. 
(2005) and Armitage (2007) show that rights issue have significantly reduced 
as an equity issuance method at least in the period after the year 2000. Also, it 
can be seen from the table that the amount of proceeds from rights issues is 
higher than those generated from open offers and private placement.  This is 
surprising given that greater number of private placement and open offers are 
made by equity issuing firms than rights issues. It appears open offers and 
private placement attract higher issue price discount to appeal to or compensate 
the new investors.  
Finally, the ratio of proceeds to market value indicates a stable value of 
proceeds per unit of firm value. During the years 2001, 2002, 2004 2008, and 
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2009, the proceeds per market value for rights issues is greater than one 
indicating that the proceeds is more than 1 times the firm size. In fact, the total 
proceeds per market value for rights issues is 2.51 compared to 0.13 and 0.27 
for open offers and private placement respectively. This implies small firms 
make rights issues or that the proceeds far exceed the value of the firm. It could 
also suggest that the stock price of rights issues is relatively higher than that of 
open offers and private placement.  
7.2.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Table 7.2 provides the descriptive statistics for rights issues (Panel A), open 
offers (Panel B), and private placement (Panel C). It also shows the t-test of the 
mean difference between rights issues and open offers on one hand and rights 
issues and private placement on the other hand (as shown in Panel D). The 
variables include market to book ratio (MB), pre-issue announcement date 
abnormal returns (Prior AR), profitability (PROF), logarithm of market value 
(SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), accrual quality as a measure of earnings 
management (ACC_QUAL), idiosyncratic risk (RISK), issue proceeds 
Table 7.1: Yearly Average Amounts and Ratio of Equity Issues 
 Rights Issues   Open Offers  Private Placement  
Year N Proceeds PMV  N Proceeds PMV  N Proceeds PMV 
1994 42 73.36 0.23  0 0.00 0.00  21 55.00 0.43 
1995 39 86.86 0.42  0 0.00 0.00  24 180.92 0.24 
1996 48 71.48 0.46  0 0.00 0.00  35 39.44 0.19 
1997 29 54.97 0.20  10 30.29 0.29  12 31.34 0.15 
1998 17 94.52 0.39  27 37.55 0.14  5 34.50 0.15 
1999 16 100.32 0.28  26 36.55 0.22  16 63.84 0.31 
2000 18 284.13 0.98  47 32.29 0.18  61 48.52 0.19 
2001 19 493.61 9.21  44 16.23 0.08  41 99.31 0.23 
2002 13 569.76 2.80  29 4.55 0.03  9 29.58 0.19 
2003 11 23.99 0.15  41 15.18 0.06  25 44.40 0.18 
2004 11 80.39 1.55  29 8.89 0.06  25 35.91 0.21 
2005 19 135.71 0.45  4 20.55 0.11  21 33.40 0.28 
2006 11 203.24 0.55  4 51.59 0.19  32 71.55 0.32 
2007 2 163.38 0.64  10 110.82 0.30  71 131.06 0.30 
2008 7 241.07 1.16  8 46.23 0.22  39 104.23 0.36 
2009 24 872.36 12.08  29 77.79 0.17  106 156.75 0.38 
2010 2 196.01 0.41  13 16.97 0.13  65 63.65 0.24 
Total 328 200.95 1.96  321 30.39 0.13  608 90.24 0.28 
This table shows the annual equity issues of sample firms for rights issues, open offers, and private placement. 
It also indicates the average yearly proceeds from equity issues (PROCEEDS) and the ratio of proceeds to 
market value of firms (PMV). 
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(PROCEEDS) and the proceeds relative to market value (PMV). These 
variables measure both firm and issue quality and determines the choice of 
issuance method as discussed in Section 5.3.2.3 of Chapter 5.  
As can be seen from the table, rights issues firms report highest MB of 4.49 
compared to 4.02 and 4.31 for open offers and private placement, respectively. 
However, the mean difference tests show that the MB values are not different 
for rights issues, open offers and private placement. For the prior AR, rights 
also experience lower stock returns (Prior AR) prior to the issuance than open 
offers and private placement. In particular, the cumulative abnormal returns 
prior to each issuance are 2.0% for rights issues, 6.0% for open offers and 
10.0% for private placements. It also shows that private placement experience 
statistically significant higher returns than rights issuing firms with mean 
difference of 8.2% significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that private 
placement is more likely to be timed when firms experience stock price run-
ups. Moreover, PROF shows that rights issuing firms are better performing 
firms than those which conduct open offers and private placement. Overall, 
these results offer the first indication that managers that issue equity through 
rights issues have less of an incentive to time their equity issues using rights 
issues.  
Furthermore, rights issuers are also bigger firms than open offers, as indicated 
by SIZE. Rights issues are associated with lower discount (DISC), accruals 
quality (ACC_QUAL) and idiosyncratic volatility RISK than private 
placements, and rights issuers generated more proceeds both in money terms 
and per unit of market value. These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that rights issuing firms are less likely to exploit existing shareholders by 
issuing overvalued equity. On the contrary, it appears firms using private 
placement are of low quality seeking to exploit investors who might have 
insufficient about the firm. These results show that rights issues are perceived 
as a high quality issuance method, with lower information asymmetry.  
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Table 7.2: Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
PANEL A: Rights Issues (RI)  
Variables  N Mean Median  SD Min  Max 
MB 293 4.31 2.06 6.18 0.01 25.55 
Prior AR 327 0.02 0.01 0.24 -0.44 0.75 
PROF 313 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.12 
SIZE 307 11.24 11.43 1.89 6.58 18.15 
DISC 263 0.53 0.13 0.86 -0.34 1.64 
ACC_QUAL 240 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.65 
RISK 327 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 
PROCEEDS 328 200.95 43.49 872.84 0.12 12277.61 
PMV 285 1.96 0.24 15.31 0.00 202.51 
PANEL B: Open Offers  (OO) 
Variables  N Mean Median  SD Min  Max 
MB 291 4.02 1.88 5.87 0.04 28.36 
Prior AR 321 0.06 0.03 0.30 -0.44 0.75 
PROF 309 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.10 
SIZE 299 10.30 10.31 1.52 6.48 15.03 
DISC 274 1.44 0.79 1.65 -0.24 3.55 
ACC_QUAL 213 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.91 
RISK 320 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.11 
PROCEEDS 321 30.39 7.39 69.35 0.07 648.49 
PMV 294 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.00 1.18 
PANEL C: Private Placement   (PP) 
Variables  N Mean Median  SD Min  Max 
MB 560 4.48 2.21 6.12 0.00 28.31 
Prior AR 604 0.10 0.06 0.29 -0.44 0.75 
PROF 584 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.06 0.12 
SIZE 576 11.25 11.07 1.64 6.46 18.58 
DISC 518 0.53 0.21 1.00 -0.51 1.81 
ACC_QUAL 460 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.00 1.08 
RISK 603 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.10 
PROCEEDS 608 90.24 30.24 226.55 10.00 2815.26 
PMV 565 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.02 4.60 
PANEL D: Tests of Mean difference  
  Rights vs Open offers Rights vs Placement  
Variables  N diff. t-stat N diff. t-stat 
MB 584 0.287 (0.57) 853 -0.175 (-0.40) 
Prior AR 648 -0.032 (-1.51) 931 -0.074*** (-3.95) 
PROF 622 0.057*** (12.74) 897 0.042*** (9.19) 
SIZE 606 0.939*** (6.73) 883 -0.015 (-0.12) 
DISC 537 -0.904*** (-7.92) 781 0.005 (0.07) 
ACC_QUAL 453 -0.031*** (-2.90) 700 -0.013* (-1.67) 
RISK 647 -0.012*** (-7.08) 930 -0.008*** (-6.01) 
PROCEEDS 649 170.561*** (3.49) 936 110.706*** (2.95) 
PMV 579 1.835** (2.06) 850 1.685*** (2.62) 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis for the choice of equity issuance methods. Panel A provides results for rights 
issues, Panel B for open offers, Panel C for private placement, and Panel C tests the 
mean difference of variables between rights issues and open offers as well as rights 
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issues and private placement. Variables include market to book ratio (MB), pre-
announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), profitability (PROF), logarithm of book 
value of total assets (SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), measure of earnings 
management (ACC_QUAL), measure of idiosyncratic risk (RISK), issue proceeds 
(PROCEEDS), and ratio of issue value to market value (PMV). T-statistics are shown 
in parenthesis in Panel D. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  
7.2.1.3. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Equity Issue Characteristics  
Logistic regression is used to estimate the model that tests the effects of 
operating performance on the choice of equity issuance methods (H7) as 
explained in Section 5.3.3.4. However, OLS is used to test hypothesis H8 about 
the stock returns following equity issuance choice. As discussed in Chapter 6 
Section 6.2.1.3, a correlation coefficient close to or equal to +1 and -1 suggests 
high collinearity or perfect multicollinearity among the variables. Tables 7.3, 
7.4 and 7.5 provide the Pearson‟s correlation matrixes of independent and 
control variables for the sample of rights issues, open offers and private 
placement.  
High correlations are recorded for PROCEEDS and PMV simply because PMV 
is derived from PROCEEDS. However, only PMV is used in the regression 
analysis. Most of the variables are correlated at either the 1% or 5% level, with 
most of the correlations lying close or below 0.20. This results implies low 
multicollinearity and thus tolerable for OLS estimation. Overall, the results 
show that multicollinearity is not a problem for estimating the regression 
model using OLS.  
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Table 7.3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Equity Issue Characteristics (Rights Issues) 
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ROA 1.000          
MB -0.061 1.000         
Prior AR -0.008 0.242*** 1.000        
SIZE 0.364*** -0.049 -0.035 1.000       
DISC -0.058 -0.084 -0.028 -0.013 1.000      
ACC_QUAL -0.405*** 0.141* -0.079 -0.284*** 0.177** 1.000     
RISK -0.164** 0.112* 0.084 -0.174*** 0.304*** 0.314*** 1.000    
PROCEEDS 0.160** -0.026 0.014 0.465*** -0.007 -0.074 0.043 1.000   
PMV 0.121* -0.021 0.030 0.357*** -0.036 -0.059 0.055 0.961*** 1.000  
CRISISdum 0.095 -0.055 -0.042 0.280*** 0.274*** -0.090 0.298*** 0.180*** 0.143** 1.000 
Notes: Variables are defined as returns on assets (ROA), market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), measure of earnings management (ACC_QUAL), measure of idiosyncratic risk (RISK), issue proceeds (PROCEEDS), ratio 
of issue value to market value (PMV), and financial crisis dummy (CRISISdum). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.             
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Table 7.4: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Equity Issue Characteristics (Open Offers) 
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ROA 1.000          
MB -0.098* 1.000         
Prior AR 0.041 0.100* 1.000        
SIZE 0.195*** -0.139** -0.007 1.000       
DISC -0.176*** -0.034 -0.104* -0.065 1.000      
ACC_QUAL -0.314*** 0.066 0.038 -0.121* 0.089 1.000     
RISK -0.323*** -0.031 0.015 -0.103* 0.338*** 0.234*** 1.000    
PROCEEDS 0.141** -0.054 0.107* 0.445*** 0.063 -0.077 0.068 1.000   
PMV 0.112* 0.109* 0.148** 0.369*** -0.006 -0.085 0.019 0.760*** 1.000  
CRISISdum 0.073 -0.153*** -0.058 0.033 0.230*** -0.079 0.357*** 0.165*** 0.117** 1.000 
Notes: Variables are defined as returns on assets (ROA), market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), measure of earnings management (ACC_QUAL), measure of idiosyncratic risk (RISK), issue proceeds (PROCEEDS), ratio 
of issue value to market value (PMV), and financial crisis dummy (CRISISdum). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.           
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Table 7.5: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Equity Issue Characteristics (Private Placement) 
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ROA 1.000          
MB 0.018 1.000         
Prior AR -0.082* 0.106** 1.000        
SIZE 0.104** -0.005 -0.103** 1.000       
DISC 0.046 -0.067 -0.104** -0.008 1.000      
ACC_QUAL -0.043 0.210*** 0.073 -0.240*** 0.046 1.000     
RISK -0.110** 0.004 0.074* -0.238*** 0.226*** 0.205*** 1.000    
PROCEEDS 0.065 -0.002 -0.018 0.522*** 0.062 -0.126*** -0.053 1.000   
PMV 0.026 -0.075* 0.011 0.238*** 0.088* -0.077 0.043 0.633*** 1.000  
CRISISdum -0.049 -0.165*** -0.009 0.087** 0.209*** 0.040 0.291*** 0.115*** 0.180*** 1.000 
Notes: Variables are defined as returns on assets (ROA), market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), measure of earnings management (ACC_QUAL), measure of idiosyncratic risk (RISK), issue proceeds (PROCEEDS), ratio 
of issue value to market value (PMV), and financial crisis dummy (CRISISdum). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.        
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7.3. Testing the Effects of Operating Performance on the Choice of Equity 
Issuance Methods   
This section tests the hypotheses specified in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3 using the 
multinomial logit regression model (Model 3) stated in Chapter 5. The 
hypothesis is re-stated below:  
H6: Firms that anticipate positive operating performance are more 
likely to conduct rights issues than open offers or private placement  
Model 3 discussed in Section 5.2.2.4 tests the effects of operating performance 
on the choice of equity issuance method of UK listed firms. The model is re-
stated below: 
 
The model tests the probability of equity issuance through rights issues 
depending on the level of anticipated operating performance and set of firm 
characteristics. Since the model represents multinomial logit regression 
estimation, the dependent variable is 1 for rights issues and 0 otherwise.  
7.3.1. Multinomial Logit Regression Analysis of Equity Issuance Methods  
[Hypothesis H6] 
This section presents the results of the multinomial logit regression analyses 
about the choice of equity issuance method given operating performance. The 
main variable of interest is ROA (measure of operating performance) that 
measures the level of information asymmetry. Following the extant literature, 
factors that are controlled for include measures of issue quality using DISC, 
PMV or firm characteristics as indicated by SIZE, MB, Prior AR, RISK 
(Barnes and Walker, 2006; Dissanaike et al. 2014) and ACC_QUAL, which is 
an accounting measure, to capture the information asymmetry hypothesis 
(Armitage et al. 2014) or earnings management (Teoh et al., 1998; Chi and 
Gupta, 2009). CRISIS dummy is used to control for macroeconomic 
conditions. The parameter coefficient of ROA proxies for operating 
performance, since if managers have superior knowledge they will raise equity 
through private placements and open offers when their firms are expected to 
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perform poorly after issuance. Moreover, and as earlier argued, firms that issue 
rights issues have less of an incentive to sell equity to existing shareholders 
when their next period operating performance is poor.  
The MB and Prior AR also capture the over-optimism hypothesis (Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997), according to which investor over-optimism at the time of 
equity issue causes firms to overweigh conditions on the issuance day. Thus, 
high MB and Prior AR indicate a high level of optimism in a market and make 
investors optimistic about post-issuance stock performance. In addition, the 
model includes control for the recent financial crisis (CRISIS) by assigning the 
value of 1 if an issuance was made during the period 2008-2010 and 0 
otherwise. This variable captures the window of opportunity hypothesis (Choe 
et al., 1993; Bayless and Chaplinsky, 1996), according to which overvalued 
firms issue equity during favourable market conditions. Finally, the estimations 
include year dummies to control for different levels of usage among the 
issuance methods during the sample period and industry dummies to control 
for industry characteristics.  
Panel A of Table 7.6 presents the results for the multinomial logit regression 
for the choice between rights issues and open offers. Accordingly, the 
dependent variable is 1 for open offers (Panel A) and private placement (Panel 
B) and 0 for rights issues (the base outcome). This model explores whether 
managers select a rights issuance method based on their expectation of future 
operating performance. As can be seen from the table, the coefficient of ROA 
is significantly negative in year 1 (Models 1-3), year 2 (Model 4) and year 3 
(Model 5). Unexpectedly, MB and SIZE are not significant but AR is 
significantly positive in year 1. Also, DISC is positive and significant at 1% 
level in Models 1-5 of Panel A whereas DISC is significantly negative in Panel 
B at 5% level in all the Models except Model 4. ACC_QUAL is significantly 
negative in all the Models of Panel A but not Panel B whereas RISK is not 
significant. PMV is positive and significant and CRISIS is significantly 
positive in all the models.  
These results about ROA is consistent with the hypothesis that high operating 
performance increases the probability of rights issues at the expense of open 
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offers and private placement as shown in Panels A and B, respectively. Also, 
the evidence about AR means that high stock price run-ups increase the 
probability of open offers and high price discount is consistent with open offers 
but not private placement. These findings suggest that firms are less likely to 
time their rights issues. But the decision to issue equity through rights issues is 
negatively affected by the adverse market conditions. Thus, during periods of 
economic crisis, firms are more likely to make open offers and private 
placement than rights issues. As Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) argue, it seems 
rights issuing firms are quality firms compared to firms that undertake open 
offers and private placement.  Studies such as Slovin et al. (2000) and Barnes 
and Walker (2006) find evidence that is contrary to what this study reports. 
Both studies use sample period that is characterised by the dominance of rights 
issues, especially during the 1980s and early 1990s. The study uses sample 
period that mirrors Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) and reinforces the trend of 
rights issues demise (Burton et al. 2005; Armitage, 2007)  
Table 7.6: Multinomial Logit Regression Estimates of Choice of Equity 
Issuance Method 
PANEL A: Open Offers (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
 Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
ROA -15.706*** -14.138*** -15.739***  -11.558*** -8.817*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
MB 0.046 0.039 0.047  0.031 0.035 
 (0.29) (0.19) (0.28)  (0.45) (0.38) 
AR 1.854** 1.222* 1.794**  1.137 1.235 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.18) (0.11) 
SIZE -0.115 -0.103 -0.118  -0.145 -0.126 
 (0.41) (0.33) (0.39)  (0.31) (0.37) 
DISC 0.419*** 0.358*** 0.441***  0.493*** 0.414*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01) 
ACC_QUAL -3.007***  -2.949***  -2.489** -2.100* 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) (0.07) 
RISK  -7.233 -3.610  -1.066 -1.646 
  (0.39) (0.74)  (0.92) (0.88) 
PMV -7.851*** -5.711*** -7.915***  -7.113*** -7.187*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 17.433*** 18.283*** 17.473***  16.806*** 16.592*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -11.319*** -12.998*** -11.121***  -10.431*** -11.265*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
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PANEL B: Private Placement (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
 Year 1  Year 2 Year 3 
Variables  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
ROA -13.374*** -12.568*** -13.661***  -10.594*** -3.172 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.19) 
MB 0.091** 0.063** 0.092**  0.080** 0.085** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) 
AR 1.579** 1.162** 1.538**  1.189 1.127 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)  (0.13) (0.13) 
SIZE 0.029 0.072 0.006  0.014 -0.042 
 (0.82) (0.44) (0.96)  (0.92) (0.73) 
DISC -0.354** -0.282** -0.305**  -0.247 -0.288** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.14) (0.05) 
ACC_QUAL -1.543  -1.223  -1.346 -1.023 
 (0.17)  (0.29)  (0.31) (0.44) 
RISK  -8.131 -12.658  -10.182 -6.941 
  (0.26) (0.19)  (0.33) (0.47) 
PMV -2.686*** -2.183*** -2.680***  -2.758*** -2.402*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 4.044*** 4.315*** 4.248***  4.247*** 4.011*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  2.131 0.935 2.746*  2.594 2.498 
 (0.16) (0.45) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.12) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 601 772 601  548 555 
pseudo R2 0.391 0.355 0.394  0.392 0.377 
chi2 4041.922 4794.190 4066.833  4723.022 5682.218 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows multinomial logit results for equity issuance method. The dependent variable is 1 
open offers (OO) in Panel A and private placements (PP) in Panel B and 0 for rights issues. The main 
independent variable is ROA and the following control variables are included: MB is the market-to-book 
ratio, Prior AR is the cumulative returns, SIZE is the logarithm of book value of total assets, DISC is the 
issuing price discount, ACC_QUAL measures earnings management, RISK is idiosyncratic volatility of 
stock returns, PMV is the total proceeds relative to firm size, and CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 during the years 2008-2010. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. Year and 
industry dummies are included. P-values are shown in parentheses. *, **and *** show significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel B shows the results for the multinomial logit regression of the choice 
between rights issues and private placement. The results show that there is a 
high probability that firms‟ ROA subsequent to the issuance is higher when 
issuing equity through rights issues rather than private placements. In 
particular, the parameter coefficient of ROA is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level within most of the estimations, supporting the 
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economical interpretation of the information asymmetry hypothesis. When 
firms raise equity through rights issues, they tend to experience better operating 
performance after the issuance. MB is significantly negative indicating that 
firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity through private placement. 
Also, Prior AR increases the probability of private placement relative to rights 
issues. This result suggests that rights issuing firms are not likely to issue 
overpriced equity to the existing shareholders. In other words, issues that 
involve outside investors, such as private placement, are more likely to be 
timed to take advantage of significant overvaluation. 
However, the parameter coefficient of ACC_QUAL does not support the 
information asymmetry hypothesis in accounting terms, indicating that a 
conventional information asymmetry proxy does not capture the interpretation 
of asymmetric information. The positive coefficient of DISC implies rights 
issues are less likely to be associated with significant issue price discount.  This 
price discount compensates investors for the costs of obtaining information 
about the true value of the issuing firm. However, RISK has a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 1% level indicating asymmetric information does 
not increase the probability of rights issues relative to private placement. Also, 
rights issues generate larger PMV and have lower stock returns prior to the 
issuance, indicating that managers are less prone to take advantage of the 
timing of the issue when selecting rights issues. The negative parameter 
coefficient for CRISIS indicates that there is a lower probability for firms to 
issue equity through rights issues during the financial crisis, supporting the 
evidence that the use of rights issues in the UK market has become less 
common in recent years (e.g., Armitage, 2010).  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that expected operating 
performance determines the choice of equity issuance method. It further 
supports the extant evidence about market timing of equity issues through 
private placement. The study departs from most previous studies that look at 
the short-term returns associated with share issuance methods. Consistent with 
Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), the study finds that rights issuing firms 
outperform open offers and private placement in the long run. Unlike Slovin et 
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al. (2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006), rights issuing firms are associated 
with quality information signalling since it is unlikely that firms would issue 
overvalued equity to exploit existing shareholders. It appears rights issuing 
firms are not overvalued but significantly perform better than firms making 
open offers and private placement. In effect, the evidence implies that the 
hypothesis that high operating performance is associated with rights issues is 
accepted. Also, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that rights issues 
are less likely to be overvalued and hence less likely to be timed.  
7.3.2. Long-term Stock returns  
[Hypothesis H8] 
This section analyses the long run stock returns associated with rights issues 
(RI), open offers (OO), and private placement (PP). The hypothesis about stock 
returns associated with equity issues is re-stated below.  
H7: Equity issues through private placement generate more negative 
abnormal returns than rights issues 
Test of hypothesis H8 is carried out using the OLS regression model below, 
also discussed in Section 5.2.2.4 of Chapter 5.  
 
As discussed in Section 5.3.2.1 of Chapter 5, long run returns is the buy and 
hold abnormal returns (BHAR) computed as the excess of buy and hold returns 
of the issuing firm over that of its control firm. Table 7.7 provides the results of 
the BHAR for RI, OO, and PP as well as for RI-OO and RI-PP indicating the 
difference in returns between rights issues and open offers and between rights 
issues and private placement, respectively. The results show that BHAR for 
rights issues are not significantly different from zero over the three years after 
the issue. For the open offer sample firms, the BHAR is -7.9% (significant at 
the 5% level), -20.5% (significant at the 1% level), and -21.8% (significant at 
the 1% level) over year 1, year 2, and year 3, respectively. Similarly, the 
BHAR for private placement are -6.9%, -20.1%, and -32.7% all significant at 
the 1% level for year 1, year 2, and year 3, respectively.  
)4.......(*
1
3210 i
n
i
iiiiii XISSUEROAISSUEROABHAR HEEEEE ¦
 
 
  
 
193 
Table 7.7: Long Run Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns and Equity Issuance Method  
Year RI  OO  PP  All issues  RI-OO RI-PP 
1 -0.008  -0.079**  -0.069***  -0.056***  0.071 0.061* 
2 0.006  -0.205***  -0.201***  -0.148***  0.211*** 0.207*** 
3 -0.078  -0.218***  -0.327***  -0.234***  0.140 0.249*** 
N 327  321  608  1256    
This table shows the long run stock returns for each of the three years following the issuance of rights issues 
(RI), open offers (OO) and private placements (PP). Returns are buy-and-hold based on Barber and Lyon’s 
(1997) methodology, and t-statistics are bootstrapped skewness-adjusted. *, ** and *** show significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Together, long run post-issue stock returns are significantly negative for equity 
issues. Also, the mean difference in returns is significantly positive over year 2 
between rights issues and open offers and significantly positive over year 2 and 
3 between rights issues and private placement. These results support the 
findings by Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) that rights issuing firms outperform 
open offers and private placement and highlight the argument that rights 
issuing firms are not poor quality firms seeking to exploit investors by issuing 
overvalued equity. Stated differently, firms issuing equity through open offers 
and private placement are more likely to time their issues and subsequently 
report significant stock price underperformance.  
Table 7.8 presents results that explore the significance of operating 
performance for post-issuance stock returns. In particular, the long-term stock 
returns on firms are partitioned into firms with positive and negative ROA at 
each year after issuance. These results show that over the three-year period, 
rights issuing firms do not report operating losses which strengthen the earlier 
evidence that these firms are associated with less negative stock returns. 
Instead, around half of the firms issuing equity through open offers and private 
placements report deteriorating long-term operating performance after 
issuance. ROA also seems to influence the magnitude of stock returns after 
issuance, since poor stock returns are more prominent within firms that had 
negative ROA. It appears operating performance have significant implications 
for long-term stock returns after equity issuance. 
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 Table 7.8: Long Run Stock Returns and Operating Performance 
(Positive and Negative) 
Year RI  OO  PP  Total  
Negative ROA  
1 n/a  -0.109  -0.081  -0.092 
2 n/a  -0.213  -0.259  -0.242 
3 n/a  -0.394  -0.559  -0.493 
N 0  136  208  344 
Positive ROA  
1 -0.008  -0.057  -0.063  -0.042 
2 0.006  -0.200  -0.175  -0.119 
3 -0.078  -0.075  -0.170  -0.118 
N 327  185  400  912 
 T-test (Positive - Negative ROA)  
1 n/a  0.052  0.018  0.050 
2 n/a  0.013  0.084  0.123** 
3 n/a  0.319**      0.389***  0.375*** 
This table shows the returns for each of the three years following the issuance of rights issues 
(RI), open offers (OO) and private placements (PP). Panel A shows the returns of the full sample, 
Panel B separately for negative and positive ROA firms and Panel C separately for low and high 
ROA firms when the split is based on the median ROA. ROA is the return on assets. Returns are 
buy-and-hold based on Barber and Lyon’s (1997) methodology, and t-statistics are bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Further analysis of stock returns partitions the sample in terms of the level of 
operating performance. Table 7.9 shows long-term stock returns when firms 
are split into high and low ROA based on their median ROA. This test intends 
to offer further robustness, since no firm that issued rights issues had operating 
losses. Once again, firms with low ROA are associated with lower long-term 
stock returns after issuance than counterpart firms with high ROA. For 
example, the mean difference in BHAR between high ROA and low ROA over 
three years after issuance are 67.4%, 42.2%, and 58.7% for rights issues, open 
offers and private placements, respectively. These stock returns also provide 
further evidence that long run stock returns are significantly determined by 
operating performance. Moreover, the results demonstrate that rights issuing 
firms outperform their counterpart open offers and private placement.  
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Table 7.9: Long Run Stock Returns and Operating Performance (High and 
Low) 
Year  RI OO PP                      Total 
Low ROA 
1 -0.050  -0.094  -0.066  -0.069 
2 -0.125  -0.221  -0.238  -0.203 
3 -0.434  -0.345  -0.588  -0.485 
N 158  150  285  593 
High ROA 
1 0.027  -0.016  -0.070  -0.030 
2 0.158  -0.005  -0.171  -0.038 
3 0.240  0.076  -0.001  0.085 
N 157  171  284  591 
Test of Mean Difference T-test (High - Low ROA) 
 R1 OO PP                   Total  
1 0.077  0.078  -0.003  0.039 
2 0.283***  0.216**  0.067  0.165*** 
3 0.674***  0.422***  0.587***  0.570*** 
This table shows the returns for each of the three years following the issuance of rights issues 
(RI), open offers (OO) and private placements (PP). Panel A shows the returns of the full sample, 
Panel B separately for negative and positive ROA firms and Panel C separately for low and high 
ROA firms when the split is based on the median ROA. ROA is the return on assets. Returns are 
buy-and-hold based on Barber and Lyon’s (1997) methodology, and t-statistics are bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7.10 provides OLS regression results for long run abnormal stock 
returns. The dependent variable BHAR for Year 1, Year 2 and Year 3 after 
equity issuance and the main independent variable is ROA after issuance. The 
control variables are the same as those used in the multinomial logit regression 
estimation in Table 7.6. ROA*OO and ROA*PP are the interaction terms for 
returns on assets and open offers and returns on assets and private placement 
respectively. The interaction term for rights issues and returns on assets 
(ROA*RI) is the baseline. The OLS results show that ROA is positively related 
to long-term stock returns after equity issuance. The relation is significant at 
the 1% level for two years and three years following the issuance. The 
parameter coefficients for the interaction variables ROA*OO and ROA*PP also 
tend to be negative, especially during the second year of issuance, indicating 
that rights issues tend to be related to higher operating performance than 
counterpart open offers and private placements. Also, the coefficients for 
control variables tend to be statistically insignificant, indicating that ROA 
seems to have strong explanatory power for long-term stock returns after 
issuance. Overall, these results further show that operating performance 
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explains the long run stock returns associated with equity issues and more 
importantly rights issuing firms are associated with more positive operating 
performance and long run stock returns than open offers and private placement.  
Table 7.10: Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Long Run Stock Returns 
 Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable is the Long-run Buy and Hold Abnormal Return, BHAR 
ROA 1.805** 1.926  4.161*** 4.943***  6.298*** 8.619*** 
 (0.04) (0.17)  (0.00) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) 
OO 0.068 0.021  0.198 0.199  0.343*** 0.121 
 (0.38) (0.86)  (0.12) (0.30)  (0.00) (0.46) 
PP 0.066 0.099  0.105 0.204  0.053 -0.009 
 (0.37) (0.37)  (0.39) (0.27)  (0.61) (0.95) 
ROA*OO -0.887 0.218  -2.961** -3.975*  -3.513* -5.103** 
 (0.41) (0.89)  (0.03) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.02) 
ROA*PP -1.758* -1.915  -3.620*** -4.441**  -2.026 -2.485 
 (0.07) (0.18)  (0.00) (0.02)  (0.27) (0.21) 
MB  0.004   0.016**   0.007 
  (0.47)   (0.05)   (0.41) 
AR  0.006   0.020   -0.032 
  (0.95)   (0.90)   (0.86) 
SIZE  -0.046***   -0.074***   -0.076*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01) 
DISC  -0.003   -0.011   -0.017 
  (0.88)   (0.75)   (0.69) 
ACC_QUAL  0.026   -0.327   -0.714 
  (0.92)   (0.40)   (0.17) 
RISK  0.252   0.041   2.526 
  (0.87)   (0.99)   (0.40) 
PMV  0.002***   0.001   0.002 
  (0.01)   (0.32)   (0.29) 
CRISIS  -0.101   0.143   0.519* 
  (0.39)   (0.49)   (0.06) 
Constant  -0.136** 0.253  -0.327*** 0.044  -0.424*** -0.454 
 (0.05) (0.27)  (0.00) (0.91)  (0.00) (0.31) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 1184 662  1085 609  1086 618 
adj. R2 0.003 0.047  0.021 0.055  0.087 0.131 
Notes: This table shows the cross sectional regression results of long run abnormal returns associated with equity 
issues. The dependent variable is the 12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns BHAR (2, 12) for models 1 and 2, 
24-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns BHAR (2, 24) for models 3 and 4, and 36-month buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns BHAR (2, 36) for models 5 and 6. Variables included in the regressions are operating performance (ROA), 
dummy for open offers (OO), and private placement (PP), the interaction terms for operating performance and 
open offers (ROA*OO) and private placement (ROA*PP), market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior 
AR), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), issue price discount (DISC), accruals quality (ACC_QUAL), 
idiosyncratic risk (RISK), ratio of proceeds to market value (PMV), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), and year 
and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *, ** 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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7.3.3. Long-term Operating Performance   
Table 7.11 gives the results for the post-issue operating performance associated 
with equity issuing firms on whether the issue is made through rights issues 
(RI), open offers (OO), and private placement (PP). If managers select the 
issuance method in line with their expectations of firm operating performance, 
as argued above, rights issuing firms are more likely to have higher operating 
performance than counterpart firms that issue open offers and private 
placements. As discussed in Section 5.3.2.2 of Chapter 5, operating 
performance is the returns on assets of the issuing firm less the returns on 
assets of its control firm. As reported in the table rights issuing firms report 
higher average ROA than counterpart firms using open offers and private 
placements. The mean difference in ROA between RI and OO is significantly 
positive at the 1% level over the three-year period. Similarly, the ROA 
difference between RI and PP is also significantly positive over the three-year 
period. These results are to a large extent in line with the pattern previously 
found in returns after the issuance, offering further credence that firm managers 
select the equity issuance method based on a firm‟s future operating 
performance, which is then linked with differential long-term stock returns. 
Table 7.11: Post-issue Changes in Operating Performance 
Year  RI  OO  PP  Total   RI-OO RI-PP 
1 0.069***  0.013***  0.031***  0.036***  0.056*** 0.038*** 
2 0.082***  0.014***  0.031***  0.041***  0.069*** 0.051*** 
3   0.052***  -0.019***   0.018***   0.018***  0.071*** 0.034*** 
N 328  321  608  1257    
Notes: This table shows the average operating performance (ROA) for rights issues (RI), open offers (OO) 
and private placements (PP) after equity issuance. *** shows significance at the 1% level. 
 
         
  
 
198 
7.4. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis  
This section presents the results of a number of robustness and sensitivity 
analysis. These additional results provide further support for the main results 
and also ensure the results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. The 
section is divided into Subsection 7.4.1 which provides results for alternative 
measures of operating performance; Subsection 7.4.2 gives results for firms 
using multiple issuance method during the period and Subsection 7.4.3 shows 
the tests of tobit regression estimates.  
7.4.1. Logit Regression Results for Abnormal Returns on Assets (aROA) 
and Returns on Equity (ROE) 
Table 7.12 presents the results for choice of equity issuance method based on 
operating performance measured as abnormal returns on assets (aROA). aROA 
is measured as the difference between the returns on assets of equity issuing 
firm and the returns on assets of the control firms. Control firms are identified 
in line with Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and 
Capstaff and Fletcher (2011). Panel A provides the results for the abnormal 
returns on assets proxy for the choice between open offers and rights issues 
whereas Panel B gives the results for the choice between private placement and 
rights issues. Tables 7.12 and 7.13 show multinomial logit estimations with 
independent variables αROA and ROE. Similar to prior results and consistent 
with the predictions, the parameter coefficients of aROA and ROE are 
significantly negative, indicating that firms issuing open offers and private 
placements tend to anticipate poor operating performance at the time of 
issuance. Therefore, rights issuing firms are more likely to be profitable and 
better quality firms than those conducting open offers and private placement.           
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Table 7.12: Multinomial Logit Regression Estimates of 
Equity Issuance Method (abnormal ROA) 
 (Year 1) (Year 2) (Year 3) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Open Offers (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
aROA -12.770*** -9.137*** -5.254* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) 
MB 0.018 -0.042 -0.024 
 (0.68) (0.29) (0.54) 
AR 2.221** 2.091* 2.250** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.04) 
SIZE -0.183 -0.293* -0.132 
 (0.23) (0.09) (0.43) 
DISC 0.492*** 0.596*** 0.533*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ACC_QUAL -3.232** -3.980*** -2.918** 
 (0.03) (0.00) (0.04) 
RISK 7.605 11.678 8.849 
 (0.54) (0.40) (0.50) 
PMV -10.266*** -9.426*** -9.995*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 18.321*** 17.143*** 15.967*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -13.337*** -11.542*** -12.002*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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PANEL B: Private Placement (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
aROA -9.123*** -9.106*** -2.012 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.39) 
MB 0.071* 0.047 0.053 
 (0.09) (0.20) (0.13) 
AR 1.915** 2.027* 1.928* 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) 
SIZE -0.008 -0.008 0.018 
 (0.95) (0.95) (0.89) 
DISC -0.312* -0.295 -0.274 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.14) 
ACC_QUAL -0.615 -1.713 -1.461 
 (0.62) (0.27) (0.35) 
RISK -5.301 2.211 1.812 
 (0.64) (0.86) (0.88) 
PMV -3.212*** -3.258*** -2.911*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 4.182*** 3.895*** 3.645*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  1.224 1.094 0.961 
 (0.48) (0.56) (0.60) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 467 393 403 
pseudo R2 0.431 0.446 0.420 
chi2 3706.498 3328.775 4118.569 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows multinomial logit results equity issuance method 
during the sample period. The dependent variable is 1 open offers (OO) in 
Panel A and private placements (PP) in Panel B and 0 for rights issues. The 
main independent variable is aROA and the following control variables are 
included: MB is the market-to-book ratio, Prior AR is the cumulative 
returns, SIZE is the logarithm of book value of total assets, DISC is the 
issuing price discount, ACC_QUAL measures earnings management, RISK 
is idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, PMV is the total proceeds relative 
to firm size and CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during 
the years 2008-2010. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. Year 
and industry dummies are included. P-values are shown in parentheses. *, 
**and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
These results imply that the earlier results are robust to alternative definitions 
of operating performance. It further supports the hypothesis about the effects of 
anticipated operating performance on the choice of equity issuance method. 
Therefore, the hypothesis is confirmed regardless of the measure of operating 
performance, firms making rights issues anticipate high post-issue operating 
performance. This evidence is consistent with the overall outperformance of 
long run stock returns compared to open offers and private placements. P-
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values, like the main results, are also significant suggesting that the joint 
hypotheses about the coefficients are significantly different from zero. In other 
words, the variables significantly define the choice of equity issuance method.  
Table 7.13: Multinomial Logit Regression Estimates of 
Equity Issuance Method (ROE) 
 (Year 1) (Year 2) (Year 3) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Open Offers (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
ROE -4.117*** -2.281** -2.842** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) 
MB 0.033 0.034 0.016 
 (0.44) (0.41) (0.71) 
AR 1.665** 1.143 0.990 
 (0.03) (0.14) (0.26) 
SIZE -0.065 -0.215 -0.183 
 (0.65) (0.14) (0.28) 
DISC 0.415*** 0.442*** 0.609*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
ACC_QUAL -2.495** -2.369** -2.274 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.15) 
RISK -5.427 -5.386 -2.594 
 (0.60) (0.64) (0.84) 
PMV -7.715*** -6.894*** -7.526*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 18.817*** 17.635*** 31.812*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -14.103*** -11.386*** -12.438*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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PANEL B: Private Placement (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
ROE -1.370 -1.294 -0.880 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.47) 
MB 0.084** 0.087** 0.077** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
AR 1.501** 0.992 0.750 
 (0.04) (0.16) (0.33) 
SIZE 0.011 -0.110 -0.103 
 (0.93) (0.40) (0.49) 
DISC -0.275* -0.268* -0.232 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.20) 
ACC_QUAL -1.053 -1.453 -1.755 
 (0.40) (0.28) (0.26) 
RISK -10.225 -9.426 -6.302 
 (0.26) (0.36) (0.59) 
PMV -2.458*** -2.028*** -2.103*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 4.205*** 3.979*** 17.630*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  1.895 3.069* 3.409* 
 (0.22) (0.06) (0.07) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 597 534 443 
pseudo R2 0.379 0.369 0.401 
chi2 . 11235.336 . 
p . 0.000 . 
Notes: This table shows multinomial logit results equity issuance method 
during the sample period. The dependent variable is 1 open offers (OO) in 
Panel A and private placements (PP) in Panel B and 0 for rights issues. The 
main independent variable is ROE and the following control variables are 
included: MB is the market-to-book ratio, Prior AR is the cumulative 
returns, SIZE is the logarithm of book value of total assets, DISC is the 
issuing price discount, ACC_QUAL measures earnings management, RISK 
is idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, PMV is the total proceeds relative 
to firm size and CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during 
the years 2008-2010. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. Year 
and industry dummies are included. P-values are shown in parentheses. *, 
**and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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7.4.2. Multinomial Logit Regression Results for Multiple Equity Issuance 
Method during the Period  
If anticipated operating performance or asymmetric information determines the 
choice of equity issuance method, it can also be argued that managers may be 
reluctant to change their issuing approach. Thus, some firms may have selected 
the same issuance method throughout the sample period irrespective of 
managers‟ expectations of forthcoming operating performance. For example, 
Iqbal et al. (2013) contend that long-term stock returns after issuance for rights 
issues is influenced by whether firms had previously used the same equity 
issuance method. They find higher long-term stock returns after issuance for 
firms that had previously issued rights issues at least twice.  
Table 7.14 shows the results for the logit estimations using only firms that have 
changed their equity issuance method during the sample period. As noted in the 
reported results, the coefficient of ROA is significantly negative in Panels A 
and B indicating that anticipated operating performance actually influences the 
choice of rights issues method over open offers and private placement. The 
parameter coefficients of the control variables are similar to the main results 
for the full sample.  These results offer support to the acceptance of hypothesis 
about the effects of anticipated operating performance on the choice of rights 
issuance method.  
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Table 7.14: Multinomial Logit Regression Estimates of 
Changes in Firm's Issuance Method During the Sample Period 
 (Year 1) (Year 2) (Year 3) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
PANEL A: Open Offers (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
ROA -14.976*** -10.283*** -5.157 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) 
MB 0.015 0.005 0.006 
 (0.71) (0.91) (0.87) 
AR 1.579* 0.956 1.099 
 (0.09) (0.32) (0.22) 
SIZE -0.201 -0.207 -0.210 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.22) 
DISC 0.542*** 0.534*** 0.485*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
ACC_QUAL -2.912** -2.047 -1.630 
 (0.04) (0.15) (0.29) 
RISK 4.464 7.480 7.108 
 (0.68) (0.51) (0.55) 
PMV -7.517*** -6.883*** -6.805*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS 16.721*** 17.865*** 17.356*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  -11.460*** -12.693*** -12.869*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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PANEL B: Private Placement (1) vs Rights Issues (0) 
ROA -13.675*** -10.237*** -0.923 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) 
MB 0.065** 0.059* 0.066** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) 
AR 1.743** 1.395 1.385* 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) 
SIZE -0.040 -0.039 -0.084 
 (0.80) (0.81) (0.58) 
DISC -0.151 -0.100 -0.149 
 (0.38) (0.60) (0.36) 
ACC_QUAL -2.163 -2.437 -2.458 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) 
RISK -7.634 -5.014 0.489 
 (0.43) (0.65) (0.96) 
PMV -2.096*** -2.091** -1.811*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
CRISIS 3.494*** 3.544*** 3.438*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant  2.692 2.531 2.241 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.23) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 441 406 407 
pseudo R2 0.358 0.354 0.337 
chi2 4453.672 4609.836 5905.474 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows multinomial logit results for firms that used more 
than one equity issuance method during the sample period. Firms that only 
used one issuance method to raise equity are excluded. The dependent 
variable is 1 open offers (OO) in Panel A and private placements (PP) in 
Panel B and 0 for rights issues. The main independent variable is ROA and 
the following control variables are included: MB is the market-to-book ratio, 
Prior AR is the cumulative returns, SIZE is the logarithm of book value of 
total assets, DISC is the issuing price discount, ACC_QUAL measures 
earnings management, RISK is idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns, PMV 
is the total proceeds relative to firm size, and CRISIS is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 during the years 2008-2010. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity consistent. Year and industry dummies are included. P-
values are shown in parentheses. *, **and *** show significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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7.4.3. Tobit Regression Estimation of Main Results 
Table 7.15 provides the tobit regression results for equity issues given the level 
of operating performance. The dependent variable is the dollar value of equity 
issues divided by the market value of equity. This variable explains the effects 
of operating performance on the amount of shares issued. Model 1, 2, and 3 
give the results of the effects of operating performance on equity issues for 
year 1, 2, and 3 respectively. As can be seen from the table, the coefficient of 
ROA is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 2. 
Overall, the results indicate that high operating performing firms are more 
likely to increase the amount of equity issues.  
The coefficient of ROA*OO and ROA*PP are negative and significant at the 
1% level in Models 1 and 2. This result suggests high operating performing 
firms increase the amount generated from equity issues when they make rights 
issues rather than open offers and private placement. Thus, firms are more 
likely to generate greater value from rights issues when they have better 
operating performance. This result suggests that the level of operating 
performance not only determine the probability of equity issues but also the 
amount that can potentially be generated from such issues. Overall, the above 
results provide further evidence about the effects of operating performance on 
equity issuance decisions.  
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Table 7.15: Tobit Regression Analysis of Equity 
Issuance Method 
 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
ROA 9.659*** 2.438*** 1.342 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
OO 1.478** 2.197*** -2.007*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
PP 0.827 1.235* -2.911*** 
 (0.23) (0.07) (0.00) 
ROA*OO -3.066*** -3.091*** -2.847 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
ROA*PP -3.960*** -7.825*** -4.938 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) 
MB 0.064** 0.082** 0.042 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.41) 
AR 0.198 0.556 0.279 
 (0.74) (0.44) (0.70) 
SIZE 1.099*** 1.266*** 1.248*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DISC -0.016 -0.055 -0.075 
 (0.93) (0.77) (0.69) 
ACC_QUAL 1.095 0.432 0.444 
 (0.50) (0.82) (0.82) 
RISK 3.378 8.618 3.881 
 (0.70) (0.42) (0.73) 
CRISIS 2.476*** 2.048* 2.072** 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -12.835*** -14.718*** -10.052* 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 662 609 618 
pseudo R2 0.019 0.021 0.019 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows Tobit regression results for equity issuance 
method. The dependent variable is the total proceeds divided by 
market value of equity. The main independent variable is ROA, OO is 
1 for open offers and 0 for rights issues, PP is 1 for private 
placement and 0 for rights issues, ROA*OO is the interaction 
between returns on assets and 1 for open offers and 0 for rights 
issues, and ROA*PP is the interaction between returns on assets and 
1 for private placement and 0 for rights issues. MB is the market-to-
book ratio, Prior AR is the cumulative returns, SIZE is the logarithm 
of book value of total assets, DISC is the issuing price discount, 
ACC_QUAL measures earnings management, RISK is idiosyncratic 
volatility of stock returns, PMV is the total proceeds relative to firm 
size, CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 during the 
years 2008-2010. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent. 
Year and industry dummies are included. P-values are shown in 
parentheses. *, **and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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7.5. Conclusion  
This chapter presented empirical results to explore the information asymmetry 
effects on the choice of equity issuance methods of UK listed firms. It 
specifically investigated how anticipated or future operating performance 
determines firm‟s selection of the equity issuance methods. The main 
hypothesis tested in this chapter was that firms with anticipated high operating 
performance are more likely to choose rights issues in issuing equity. In other 
words, firms with high information asymmetry in the form of anticipated 
improved operating performance prefer to issue equity to the existing 
shareholders in order to transfer part of the future benefits to them. Conversely, 
firms with overvalued equity are more likely to issue equity through open 
offers and private placement that involve outside or new investors. The 
implication of this hypothesis was that better performing firms prefer to 
transfer the benefits to existing shareholders whereas firms which are likely to 
record poor performance are motivated to exploit outside investors who would 
have insufficient information about the performance of the firms. In addition to 
the traditional proxies for information asymmetry such as accruals quality, 
issue price discount, idiosyncratic risks, and market to book ratio (which all 
measure the quality of the issuing firms, operating performance is used as the 
main descriptor of information asymmetry.  
Consistent with prior studies, the results of this chapter find strong support for 
the preference for rights issues when operating performance is anticipated to 
improve. Thus, better performing firms are more likely to issue equity through 
rights issues than open offers and private placement. This evidence indicates 
that the firms do not exploit existing shareholders and that rights issuing firms 
are of better quality than open offers and private placement. Also, the chapter 7 
finds that rights issuing firms report more positive post-issue operating 
performance which is consistent with stock price outperformance over open 
offers and private placement. Moreover, the chapter addresses issues with 
estimation assumptions and also presented results using alternative measures of 
operating performance. Finally, the chapter presented robust results for 
alternative estimation techniques.  
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These findings are consistent with Kabir and Roosenboom (2003), Armitage 
and Snell (2004), Chi and Gupta (2009), and Capstaff and Fletcher (2011). 
However, the results in this chapter do not support the findings by Slovin et al. 
(2000) and Barnes and Walker (2006). Unlike previous studies, this chapter 
used operating performance to demonstrate that future anticipated changes in 
operating performance by which firms determine their choice of equity 
issuance method. Thus, holding the measures of firm and issue quality 
constant- such as mispricing, the decision to utilise a particular issuance 
method is influenced by operating performance. However, the results presented 
in this chapter demonstrate that firms choose equity issuance method based on 
specific firm and issue characteristics. This evidence complements the extant 
literature on the equity issuance method in the UK. It shows that operating 
performance does not only influence the post-issue stock price performance but 
also and more importantly determine the choice of the issuance method.  
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Chapter 8  
LEVERED SHARE REPURCHASE AND INTERNAL FINANCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS  
8.1. Introduction  
This section discusses the empirical results for levered share repurchase of 
internally financially unconstrained firms. During the last decades, share 
repurchases have become very popular as a means to return cash to 
shareholders. In 2007, share repurchases peaked at more than $700 billion near 
the market top.37 A large number of these repurchases were funded with debt 
issues. For instance, in 2009 alone 37 companies announced plans to spend $39 
billion on these levered repurchases.38 It may be understandable for internally 
financially constrained firms to repurchase their shares by borrowing due to 
limited financial resources available, but it seems puzzling for internally 
financially unconstrained firms to borrow money in order to repurchase 
shares. The empirical analysis in this chapter investigates why internally 
financially unconstrained firms borrow money to repurchase shares. It 
further explores the stock returns associated with share repurchase given the 
level of internal financial constraints and sources of repurchase financing.  
The extant empirical literature finds strong support for positive announcement 
period abnormal stock returns associated with share repurchase programs (see, 
for example, Vermaelen, 1981; Ikenberry et al., 1995). Theories such as the 
signalling hypothesis, the undervaluation hypothesis (see Vermaelen, 1981; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Dittmar, 2000; Chan et al., 2007) and the free cash 
flow hypothesis of Jensen (1986) all explain the positive price reactions 
subsequent to share repurchase announcements. Since internally financially 
unconstrained firms already have sufficient excess cash flow to finance share 
repurchases, managers may borrow at the time of share repurchase in order to 
fund wealth-maximizing projects. Also, stock returns of internally financially                                                         
37 See Michael Milken: “Why capital structure matters”, The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 
2009. 
38 Source: research by JP Morgan cited by Herb Greenbert in: “Debt to buy back stock”, 
CNBC, November 8, 2011. See: http://www.cnbc.com/id/45209702 (retrieved on March 30, 
2015). 
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unconstrained firms with a high level of investment should increase on the 
announcement of share repurchases; otherwise the increase in their stock 
returns will appear in the long-run stock returns when the benefits of the 
investments materialize, especially in an efficient market.   
It can be argued that internally financially unconstrained firms conduct levered 
share repurchases to support investment expenditures. A number of studies 
have shown that share repurchases involve a significant cost that may limit the 
availability of internal cash to fund investments. Grullon and Michaely (2004), 
for example, show that firms may reduce their investments after share 
repurchase activities due to limited available cash flows. However, according 
to the precautionary motive for holding cash, future uncertainties in the capital 
market motivate firms to build cash buffers that allow them to undertake future 
investments (See, Opler, et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2006). Hahn and Lee (2009) 
further argue that firms with a high debt capacity are able to borrow more, 
which in turn allows for more investments in assets that can serve as collateral 
for further borrowing. Since internally financially unconstrained firms both 
have the borrowing capacity and the access to attractive interest rates, it is 
hypothesised that they borrow externally to retain adequate capital for funding 
investments. Thus, the hypothesis explained in Section 4.5 of Chapter 4 
explores the share repurchase financing of internally financially unconstrained 
firms. Specifically, the study predicts that internally financially unconstrained 
firms are likely to conduct levered share repurchase when they also invest 
more. This behaviour should also have significant stock price implications for 
the levered share repurchasing firms, both in the short run and the long run. 
The hypotheses about the levered share repurchase are tested using both 
univariate and multivariate analyses.  
Recent evidence by Chen and Wang (2012) highlights the share repurchase 
behaviour of constrained firms and the subsequent post-repurchase stock price 
underperformance. The inference from their studies is consistent with debt-
financed repurchase of financially constrained firms. This study explores the 
levered share repurchase behaviour of internally financially unconstrained 
firms and tests the factors that drive cash-rich firms to finance their share 
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repurchases through borrowings. Minnick and Zhao (2007) find that firms 
borrow at the time of repurchase whereas De Jong et al. (2011) also assert that 
convertible bond issuers repurchase their stock in order to facilitate short 
selling. Both evidence shed some light on firm share repurchase financing. 
However this study contributes to the literature by focusing on unconstrained 
firms that undertake levered share repurchases.  
The chapter consists of four parts. Section 8.1 describes the sample used to 
perform the empirical analysis. Section 8.2 presents the empirical findings 
about why internally financially unconstrained firms borrow to conduct share 
repurchase. Section 8.3 discusses additional results and performs robustness 
checks using alternative definitions of internal financial constraints and 
estimation techniques. Section 8.4 concludes the chapter. 
8.2. Sample Statistics  
This section discusses the descriptive statistics of the variables selected to 
undertake the empirical analysis. The variables presented here are used in prior 
studies to explain share repurchase transactions of firms. Thus, the variables 
allow the study to test the reasons why internally financial unconstrained firms 
conduct levered or debt-financed share repurchase. Section 8.2.1 presents the 
descriptive statistics for the final sample.  
8.2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables  
This section presents the descriptive statistics of independent and control 
variables used to undertake the empirical analysis. It focuses on the statistics of 
the firm characteristics of share repurchasing firms. These repurchase firms are 
partitioned into constrained and unconstrained. The unconstrained firm 
subsample is further divided into levered and unlevered to draw meaningful 
comparisons about the characteristics of repurchase firms based on the source 
of financing.  
8.2.1.1. Share Repurchase during the Sample Period  
Table 8.1 presents the number of yearly share repurchase announcements 
during the sample period, the anticipated proceeds from the repurchase, and the 
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average ratio of the proceeds to market value. As can be seen from the table, 
the annual issues are generally stable during the early part of the sample period 
from 1990 to 1993. During years 1994 and 2000, the number of share 
repurchases announcements increases significantly and drops to the levels in 
the 1990s between years 2001 and 2006 with a marginal increase in 2007 and 
2008. Finally, the number drops significantly after year 2008; perhaps the 
financial crisis accounted for such drop as more firms faced significant cash 
constraints to even distribute to shareholders. The results on the proposed 
proceeds show a marked different picture from the volume of repurchase. 
Specifically, the proceeds are significantly lower during the first part of the 
sample period from year 1990 to 1999.  
 
Table 8.1: Yearly Average Proceeds and 
Ratio of Share Repurchase Proceeds 
Year N Proceeds PMV 
1990 233 336.82 0.13 
1991 113 58.31 0.08 
1992 194 81.82 0.07 
1993 170 92.44 0.05 
1994 253 106.19 0.07 
1995 308 110.89 0.08 
1996 442 185.46 0.06 
1997 416 153.68 0.22 
1998 642 145.78 0.08 
1999 468 122.69 0.09 
2000 256 251.05 0.09 
2001 155 289.08 0.08 
2002 123 268.01 0.09 
2003 100 243.81 0.07 
2004 153 570.20 0.08 
2005 229 553.56 0.08 
2006 193 980.25 0.08 
2007 298 720.96 0.11 
2008 394 418.06 0.15 
2009 135 545.49 0.08 
2010 188 758.96 0.09 
2011 264 648.55 0.11 
2012 147 1429.43 0.10 
Total 5,874 345.84 0.10 
This table shows the annual share repurchase of sample 
firms. It also indicates the average yearly proceeds from 
share repurchase announcements (PROCEEDS) and the 
ratio of proceeds to market value of firms (PMV). 
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However, between 2000 and 2012 the proceeds increase markedly. This 
amount of proceeds does not seem to depend on the number of repurchase 
announcements. In fact, during some periods when fewer repurchase 
announcements are made, the amount of proceeds is even larger than some 
periods of significantly higher number of repurchase announcements. Finally, 
the ratios indicate a stable value of proceeds per unit of firm value. It appears 
large firms announced more share repurchases than small firms. This evidence 
is consistent with free cash hypothesis that hold that large and mature firms 
(which have limited growth opportunities) are more likely to have significant 
free cash flows to distribute to shareholders (Jensen, 1986; Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004; Liang et al. 2013). 
8.2.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Table 8.2 provides descriptive statistics of some firm characteristics that affect 
share repurchase by internally financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. 39 It also performs independent sample t-test of the mean difference 
between constrained and unconstrained repurchasing firms. This mean 
difference test provides preliminary differences in firm characteristics that 
explain the share repurchase behaviour given the level of internal financial 
constraints. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the unconstrained firms 
whereas Panel B displays the descriptive statistics for constrained firms. The 
mean difference tests are reported in Panel C.   
As can be seen from Table 8.2, the mean MB for unconstrained firms is 2.77 
compared to 2.24 for constrained firms. AR is -4% and -6% for unconstrained 
and constrained firms, respectively. The mean difference for MB is 0.53 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, where as that of AR is 1% and 
significant at the 1% level. These results indicate that constrained firms are 
more undervalued than unconstrained firms. Perhaps, the level of 
undervaluation motivates constrained firms to conduct share repurchase. 
                                                         
39 The definition of financial constraints is given in Section Chapter 5. It further describes how 
repurchasing firms are classified as constrained or unconstrained.  
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Table 8.2: Summary Statistics: Comparison of Unconstrained and Constrained 
Firms 
Panel A: Unconstrained        
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 4700 2.77 2.11 2.12 0.44 10.26 
Prior AR 4700 -0.04 -0.03 0.17 -1.43 1.03 
INV 4700 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.68 
SIZE 4700 2.79 2.76 0.95 -0.06 5.80 
PROCEEDS ($‟m) 4623 388.61 30.00 2184.47 0.12 90000.00 
PMV 4611 0.08 0.06 0.16 0.00 8.46 
Panel B: Constrained       
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 1174 2.24 1.66 2.02 0.44 10.26 
Prior AR 1174 -0.06 -0.04 0.17 -1.00 0.50 
INV 1174 0.09 0.06 0.12 -0.02 1.09 
SIZE 1174 2.61 2.64 0.80 0.00 5.57 
PROCEEDS ($‟m) 1162 175.69 25.00 803.40 0.11 15000.00 
PMV 1160 0.16 0.07 1.91 0.00 64.94 
Panel C: Test of Mean Difference of unconstrained and constrained firms  
Variables  N Mean difference t-stat 
MB 5874 0.53*** (7.73) 
Prior AR 5874 0.01*** (2.60) 
INV 5874 -0.03*** (-12.59) 
SIZE 5874 0.18*** (5.92) 
PROCEEDS 5785 212.92*** (3.27) 
PMV 5771 -0.07** (-2.54) 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
testing levered share repurchase behaviour of firms. Panel A provides results for constrained firms, 
Panel B for unconstrained firms and Panel C tests the mean difference of variables. Variables include 
market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), ratio of capital 
expenditure and research and development expenditure to total assets (INV), logarithm of book value 
of total assets (SIZE), value of repurchase proceeds (PROCEEDS), and ratio of repurchase value to 
market value (PMV). T-statistics are shown in parenthesis in Panel C. ** and *** denote significance at 
the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Unexpectedly, the mean difference in INV between unconstrained and 
constrained is negative and significant at the 1% level indicating that 
constrained firms invest more than unconstrained firms. The table also shows 
mean difference of 0.18 for SIZE at 1% significance level. The difference in 
firm size is consistent with the theory that large firms are more likely to be 
unconstrained. Moreover, the proceeds from share repurchase are larger for the 
unconstrained firms than the constrained firms. Overall, these results show that 
unconstrained firms have more free cash flows and thus are more likely to 
disburse cash flows to shareholders. It appears the evidence is consistent with 
prior literature about share repurchase of firms.  
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Table 8.3: Summary Statistics: Comparison of Unlevered and Levered 
Repurchase 
Panel A: Unlevered       
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 3359 2.49 1.92 1.93 0.44 10.26 
Prior AR 3359 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 -1.43 1.03 
INV 3359 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.68 
SIZE 3359 2.46 2.43 0.84 -0.06 5.80 
PROCEEDS 3302 170.77 15.00 1750.08 0.12 90000.00 
PMV 3290 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.00 1.95 
Panel B: Levered      
Variables  N Mean Median S.D Min Max 
MB 1341 3.47 2.70 2.41 0.44 10.26 
Prior AR 1341 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 -0.60 0.51 
INV 1341 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.67 
SIZE 1341 3.60 3.57 0.70 1.65 5.59 
PROCEEDS 1321 933.14 224.40 2938.40 0.35 65000.00 
PMV 1321 0.09 0.06 0.25 0.00 8.46 
Panel C: Test of Mean Difference of levered and unlevered repurchase 
Variables  N Mean difference t-stat 
MB 1923 -2.28*** (-10.32) 
Prior AR 2500 -0.06*** (-5.15) 
INV 1658 -0.76*** (-7.74) 
SIZE 2401 -0.84*** (-13.97) 
PROCEEDS 2327 0.28*** (11.34) 
PMV 2154 0.04*** (5.55) 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis for 
testing levered share repurchase behaviour of unconstrained firms. Panel A provides results for 
unlevered, Panel B for levered repurchase and Panel C tests the mean difference of variables. 
Variables include market to book ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), 
ratio of capital expenditure and research and development expenditure to total assets (INV), 
logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), value of repurchase proceeds (PROCEEDS), and 
ratio of repurchase value to market value (PMV). T-statistics are in parenthesis in Panel C and  *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 8.3 provides the summary statistics of firm and repurchase 
characteristics of unconstrained firm subsample. The sample is further divided 
into unlevered and levered depending on whether share repurchase financing is 
from internal cash flows or external debt financing. Panel A presents the results 
for unlevered repurchase whereas Panel B gives the results for levered 
repurchase. The tests of the mean difference in the variables between unlevered 
and levered repurchase is provided in Panel C. 
It is found that the mean MB is 2.49 and 3.47 for unlevered and levered 
repurchase, respectively with a negative and significant mean difference at the 
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1% level. The average prior repurchase abnormal returns are -5.0% and -3.0% 
for unlevered and levered repurchase respectively with mean difference 
significant at the 1% level. These two results indicate that unlevered 
repurchase firms are more undervalued than levered repurchase firms. The 
table also reports that the mean difference in investment between unlevered 
and levered is negative and significant at the 1% level. This result implies 
levered repurchase firms expend more on investments than unlevered 
repurchase firms. Levered repurchase firms are bigger than unlevered 
repurchase firms but the ratio of repurchase amount is not statistically different 
between unlevered and levered repurchase firms. Generally, large firms have 
adequate debt capacity and collateral to enable them obtain external debt 
financing. Overall, evidence shows the first sign that levered repurchase firms 
are likely borrow to invest.  
8.2.1.3. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Variables    
Logistic regression is used to estimate the model that tests the effects of 
internal financial constraints on share repurchase (H8 and H9) as explained in 
Section 5.3.3.4. However, OLS is used to test hypothesis H10 and H11 about the 
stock returns following share repurchase. As discussed in Chapter 6 Section 
6.2.1.3, a correlation coefficient close to or equal to +1 and -1 suggests high 
collinearity or perfect multicollinearity among the variables. Table 8.4 provides 
the Pearson‟s correlation matrixes of independent and control variables for the 
sample of share repurchase.  
As the shown in Table 8.4, none of the variable indicates high collinearity with 
the highest being 0.507 for SIZE and LEVD. Most of the variables are 
correlated at either the 1% or 5% level, with most of the correlations lying 
close or below 0.20. This results implies low multicollinearity and thus 
tolerable for OLS estimation. The high correlation between SIZE and LEVD 
could explain that large firms possess collateral to obtain external borrowings. 
Overall, the results show that multicollinearity is not a problem for estimating 
the regression model using OLS.  
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Table 8.4: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix of Variables 
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LEVDdum 1.000         
KZ 0.110*** 1.000        
MB 0.174*** -0.265*** 1.000       
Prior AR 0.033** -0.053*** 0.021 1.000      
INV 0.107*** 0.136*** 0.080*** -0.055*** 1.000     
SIZE 0.507*** -0.164*** 0.469*** 0.097*** 0.023* 1.000    
VALUE 0.139*** -0.087*** 0.130*** 0.028** -0.012 0.314*** 1.000   
PMV -0.009 0.026** -0.021 -0.014 -0.011 -0.041*** 0.067*** 1.000  
CRISISdum 0.020 -0.034*** -0.025* 0.038*** -0.128*** 0.154*** 0.080*** 0.008 1.000 
Notes: Variables are defined as dummy for levered share repurchase (LEVDdum), KZ index measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), market to book 
ratio (MB), pre-announcement abnormal returns (Prior AR), ratio of capital expenditure and research and development expenditure to total assets (INV), 
logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), financial crisis dummy (CRISISdum), amount of share repurchase (VALUE), ratio of repurchase value value 
to market value (PMV). *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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8.3. Testing the Effects of Internal Financial Constraints on Levered Share 
Repurchase  
This section tests the hypotheses specified in Section 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of 
Chapter 4 using the logit regression model (Model 5) stated in Chapter 5. The 
hypotheses are re-stated below:  
H8: Financially constrained firms are more likely to conduct debt-
financed repurchase than unconstrained firms 
H9: Financially unconstrained firms borrow to repurchase especially 
when they also undertake investments  
Model 5 discussed in Section 5.2.3.4 tests the effects of internal financial 
constraints on levered share repurchase. The model is re-stated below: 
 
The model tests the probability of levered share repurchases given internal 
financial constraints and a set of firm characteristics that explain share 
repurchase behaviour of firms. Since the model represents logit regression 
estimation, the dependent variable is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 for 
unlevered repurchase firm.  
8.3.1. Logistic Regression Results for Levered Share Repurchase of 
Unconstrained Firms  
[Hypothesis H8 and H9] 
Table 8.5 presents the logit regression results about the probability that a firm 
conducts levered share repurchase given the level of internal financial 
constraints and a set of firm characteristics. The results for Models 1 and 2 use 
the full sample of share repurchase firms. Regression Model 1 shows the 
results for the effects of internal financial constraints on levered share 
repurchase holding constant the firm level variables including investment, 
INV. Model 2 gives the results of the logit regression when internal financial 
constraints and investments are interacted (KZ*INV). Both Models also contain 
control variables and year and industry dummies to control for year and 
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industry specific effects. Model 3 restricts the sample to only internally 
financially unconstrained firms that conducted share repurchase. The rationale 
is to detach the effects of investments on repurchase from the internal financial 
constraints variables that includes the constrained firm subsample. It also 
allows the study to investigate clearly how INV affects the levered share 
repurchase of internally financially unconstrained firms. In other words, Model 
3 answers the question about why unconstrained firms borrow to conduct share 
repurchases.  
As hypothesised, KZ has a positive and significant coefficient in Models 1 and 
2 indicating that internal financial constraints increase the probability of 
levered share repurchase. Also, the coefficient of INV is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in both Models 1 and 2. It shows that 
high investing firms are more likely to borrow to conduct share repurchase. 
The evidence about investment is consistent with building cash buffers at the 
time of share repurchase since repurchase reduces subsequent cash flows and 
hence stifle investment expenditure. Importantly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term KZ*INV is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level as shown in Model 2.  
Table 8.6 is similar to Table 8.5 with SIZE variable excluded due to high 
correlation with LEVD and MB variables. The coefficients are similar to what 
is reported in Table 8.5. The results about the interaction term may produce 
two conclusions: They could imply that internally financially unconstrained 
and high investing firms are more likely to conduct levered share repurchase or 
that internally financially constrained firms which invest less are likely to 
conduct levered repurchase. The former conclusion is consistent with the 
developed hypothesis about share repurchase as explained in Sections 4.5.1 
and 4.5.2 of Chapter 4. 
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Table 8.5: Logit Regression Estimates (Raw Coefficient 
Estimates) of Levered Repurchase and Internal Financial 
Constraints 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
KZ 1.162*** 0.873***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
INV 0.466*** 0.424*** 0.384*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
KZ*INV  -2.673***  
  (0.00)  
MB -0.101*** -0.085*** -0.119*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.651*** -0.633*** -0.408 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) 
CRISIS -1.018*** -1.082*** -1.589*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 1.995*** 2.021*** 2.106*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.030 0.033* 1.072** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.02) 
Constant  -6.496*** -6.470*** -6.548*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5771 5771 4611 
pseudo R2 0.319 0.324 0.346 
chi-squared 1302.556 1306.272 1043.698 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates of the logit regression for 
share repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 
for unlevered repurchase. Models 1 and 2 provide results for the full sample 
whereas model 3 uses only the subsample of unconstrained firms. Variables 
included in the regressions include KZ-index measure of internal financial 
constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), the interaction term between 
internal financial constraints and investment (KZ*INV), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), 
logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), the ratio of repurchase 
proceeds to market value (PMV), and year and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *, 
** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
222 
Table 8.6: Logit Regression Estimates (Raw Coefficient 
Estimates) of Levered Repurchase and Internal Financial 
Constraints 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
KZ 0.692*** 0.565***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
INV 0.361*** 0.346*** 0.249*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
KZ*INV  -1.139***  
  (0.00)  
MB 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.221*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR 0.189 0.202 0.530*** 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.01) 
CRISIS 0.659** 0.652** 0.230 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.47) 
PMV -0.035 -0.035 0.469*** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.01) 
Constant  -2.338*** -2.313*** -2.367*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5771 5771 4611 
pseudo R2 0.107 0.108 0.116 
chi-squared 638.615 638.383 528.748 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates of the logit regression for 
share repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 
for unlevered repurchase. Models 1 and 2 provide results for the full sample 
whereas model 3 uses only the subsample of unconstrained firms. Variables 
included in the regressions include KZ-index measure of internal financial 
constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), the interaction term between 
internal financial constraints and investment (KZ*INV), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), the 
ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV), and year and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are 
shown in parenthesis.  ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
 
Tables 8.7 and 8.8 provide the odds ratios of the logit regression estimations 
with SIZE and without SIZE respectively. From these results, the odds ratio for 
KZ*INV indicates that constrained firms which invest more are 0.48 times 
likely to conduct levered repurchase. The inverse produces higher odds ratio 
for unconstrained high investing firms indicating that these firms would more 
likely conduct levered repurchase.  
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Table 8.7: Logit Regression Estimates (Odds Ratio) of 
Levered Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
KZ 3.197*** 2.393***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
INV 1.594*** 1.528*** 1.468*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
KZ*INV  0.480***  
  (0.00)  
MB 0.904*** 0.919*** 0.888*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR 0.522*** 0.531*** 0.665 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.13) 
CRISIS 0.361*** 0.339*** 0.204*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 7.355*** 7.544*** 8.213*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 1.030 1.033* 2.921** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.02) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5771 5771 4611 
pseudo R2 0.319 0.324 0.346 
chi-squared 1302.556 1306.272 1043.698 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the exponentiated coefficient estimates (odds ratio) of 
the logit regression for share repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for 
levered repurchase and 0 for unlevered repurchase. Models 1 and 2 provide 
results for the full sample whereas model 3 uses only the subsample of 
unconstrained firms. Variables included in the regressions are KZ-index 
measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), 
the interaction term between internal financial constraints and investment 
(KZ*INV), market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy 
for financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), the 
ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV), and year and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are 
shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
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Table 8.8: Logit Regression Estimates (Odds Ratio) of 
Levered Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
KZ 1.998*** 1.760***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
INV 1.435*** 1.414*** 1.283*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
KZ*INV  0.124***  
  (0.00)  
MB 1.206*** 1.217*** 1.248*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR 1.208 1.224 1.698*** 
 (0.27) (0.24) (0.01) 
CRISIS 1.933** 1.920** 1.259 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.47) 
SIZE 0.965 0.966 1.599*** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.01) 
PMV Yes Yes Yes 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies  5771 5771 4611 
Industry Dummies  0.107 0.108 0.116 
N 638.615 638.383 528.748 
pseudo R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
chi-squared 1.998*** 1.760***  
p (0.00) (0.00)  
Notes: This table shows the exponentiated coefficient estimates (odds ratio) of 
the logit regression for share repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for 
levered repurchase and 0 for unlevered repurchase. Models 1 and 2 provide 
results for the full sample whereas model 3 uses only the subsample of 
unconstrained firms. Variables included in the regressions are KZ-index 
measure of internal financial constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), 
the interaction term between internal financial constraints and investment 
(KZ*INV), market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy 
for financial crisis (CRISIS), the ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value 
(PMV), and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
 
The other variables give the expected signs for the effects on the probability of 
a levered share repurchase. For example, the coefficients of MB and AR are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 2. These 
evidence support the undervaluation hypothesis of share repurchase 
transactions (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; D‟Mello and Shroff, 2000). More 
undervalued firms are likely to conduct levered repurchase. It seems firms take 
advantage of undervalued equity to borrow to enable them buy back 
undervalued shares in order to gain from subsequent price appreciations. The 
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CRISIS coefficient is also negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
in all the outputs indicating that firms are likely to repurchase during periods of 
favourable economic conditions. Moreover, during crisis periods, firms are 
likely to be internally financially constrained internally which will imply less 
available free cash flows to distribute to shareholders. It further means that 
debt capital would be expensive such that borrowings become suboptimal. 
SIZE is also positive and significant at the 1% level in all three models 
consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis that explain that large firms with 
limited growth opportunities are more likely to have significant amount of free 
cash flows to distribute to shareholders to avoid investing in value-destroying 
projects. Repurchase ratio is positive and significant at 10% and 5% levels for 
Models 2 and 3 respectively. 
These results are consistent with hypotheses about the effects of internal 
financial constraints on levered share repurchase and I argue that firms do not 
only utilize internal cash flows to finance share repurchase but also a 
significant number of firms borrow to finance share repurchase (Chen and 
Wang, 2012; Lei and Zhang, 2015; Farre-Mensa et al. 2015). These findings 
extend the evidence by Chen and Wang (2012) that some internally financially 
constrained firms repurchase their shares. Moreover, this study highlights the 
effects of investments in the decisions for internally financially unconstrained 
firms to finance their share repurchase programs through borrowings. Whereas 
unconstrained firms have internal cash flows to distribute through share 
repurchase programs, levered share repurchase by these firms are accompanied 
by significant investments expenditure. Thus, by obtaining external debt 
finance unconstrained firms build cash buffer sufficient to finance both share 
repurchase and investments. The rationale for unconstrained firms to borrow is 
that the external debt financing is more likely to be cheaper for these firms than 
it will be for constrained firms that might not even have debt ratings.  
It further suggests that for unconstrained firms, there is no motivation to 
borrow to finance share repurchase since that will encourage excess perquisites 
and hence the agency costs of free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). The increased 
corporate liquidity is an advantage to obtain cheap debt financing which allows 
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the firm to invest more than constrained firm counterpart. Thus, to the extent 
that there is positive stock price reaction following announcements of share 
repurchase, levered repurchase of unconstrained firms should be combined 
with investments. Constrained firms cannot borrow cheap and this constraint 
limits the ability to combine share repurchase with investments. The stock 
reactions associated with levered repurchase of constrained firms is that the 
cash constraint is the only reason these firms will borrow. Share repurchase 
limits subsequent investment in capital projects since more internal cash flows 
are disbursed to shareholders (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). In other words, by 
taking advantage of potential cheap debt financing, unconstrained firms 
generate sufficient funds to also undertake investments. Thus, levered share 
repurchase allows the firm to simultaneously distribute cash flows to 
shareholders and also undertake investments.  
Overall, evidence indicates that the decision to conduct levered share 
repurchase extends to the possibility of firm not foregoing investment projects 
at the time of share repurchase announcements. Share repurchase generally 
utilises internal cash flows and reduces available funds for subsequent 
investments (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010). Therefore, these findings about the 
effects of internal financial constraints on borrowings and investments are 
consistent with the effects of repurchase on investments. It also indicates that 
the effects of investments on the decision to finance repurchase through 
borrowings is driven by the unconstrained firms. It is only when firms are 
unconstrained will they be able to obtain sufficient amount of debt financing to 
undertake both share repurchase transactions and investments. Unconstrained 
firms have higher debt capacity that allows them to borrow more and increase 
investments expenditure (Hahn and Lee, 2009).  
8.3.2. Share Repurchase and Stock Returns  
This section discusses the post repurchase stock returns associated with 
repurchasing firms. It analyses both the announcement date abnormal returns 
and the long run abnormal returns. If the market underreacts to initial 
announcement of repurchase, then the long run returns should be more positive 
for these repurchasing firms. The analyses further consider the returns based on 
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whether the repurchase is unlevered or levered for unconstrained firms. The 
hypotheses about stock returns are re-stated below: 
H11: Cash-financed repurchase is associated with more positive 
abnormal returns than debt-financed repurchase, especially when the 
firm is internally financially unconstrained.  
H12: All else equal, unconstrained firms which conduct levered share 
repurchase should be associated with more positive returns for high 
investing firms than low investing firms.  
As discussed in Section 5.2.3.4 of Chapter 5, the above hypotheses about stock 
returns are tested using the following cross-sectional regression model.  
 
From the model above, the dependent variable is the 3-day cumulative 
abnormal returns for announcement date abnormal returns and 36-month buy 
and hold abnormal. KZ and MB are the main independent variables with set of 
control variables defined in Section 5.2.1.3 of Chapter 5.  
8.3.2.1. Share Repurchase and Announcement Date Abnormal Returns   
[Hypothesis H11 and H12] 
The extant literature finds significant support for positive announcement date 
abnormal stock returns associated with share repurchase programs. These stock 
returns are explained by undervaluation hypothesis (Vermaelen, 1981; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998), information 
signalling hypothesis (Vermaelen, 1981 and 1984; Grullon and Michaely; 
2004; Liang et al. 2013) as well as the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; 
Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Chan et al. 2004; Bozanic, 2010). Thus, each of 
the theories emphasises that repurchase constitutes positive information to the 
market about the future prospects of the repurchasing firms. This section 
explores whether the selection of unconstrained firms to borrow to repurchase 
shares influence their announcement date returns. Borrowing to repurchase 
may signal future investment prospects because firms are able to build cash 
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buffers during the share repurchase announcements without depleting the 
internal cash flows.  
Table 8.9: Univariate Analysis of 3-day Announcement Date Abnormal Returns 
(CAR(-1,1)) following Share Repurchase 
Panel A: Full sample - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  1700  0.030  0.014  0.025  0.015  
   (18.29)***  (9.53)***  (20.42)***  (5.78)***  
Low investment    4700  0.017  0.015  0.016  0.002  
   (4.88)***  (4.24)***  (6.40)***  (0.44)  
Total  5874  0.027  0.014  0.023  0.013  
   (18.58)***  (10.12)***  (21.06)***  (5.48)***  
Mean diff   0.012  -0.000  0.008    
t-stat   (3.16)***  (-0.29)  (3.07)***    
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  835  0.030  0.014  0.026  0.016  
   (17.33)***  (9.57)***  (19.36)***  (5.36)***  
Low investment    3865  0.014  0.014  0.014  -0.000  
   (3.28)***  (4.14)***  (4.61)***  (-0.08)  
Total  4700  0.027  0.014  0.024  0.013  
   (17.04)***  (10.34)***  (19.41)***  (4.91)***  
Mean diff   0.017  0.000  0.012    
t-stat   (3.84)***  (0.06)  (3.79)***    
Panel C: Constrained Firms - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  339  0.026  0.014  0.021  0.012  
   (6.03)***  (3.44)***  (6.93)***  (1.97)**  
Low investment    835  0.031  0.017  0.023  0.014  
   (4.52)***  (2.25)**  (4.60)***  (1.38)  
Total  1174  0.027  0.015  0.022  0.012  
   (7.42)***  (4.04)***  (8.32)***  (2.35)**  
Mean diff   -0.005  -0.003  -0.002    
t-stat   (-0.54)  (-0.38)  (-0.37)    
Notes: This table shows the univariate analysis of initial abnormal returns associated with share 
repurchase. The abnormal return measure is the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(-1,1). 
Panel A of Table 8.9 shows the 3-day abnormal returns associated with share 
repurchase based on investment and levered repurchase. Levered repurchase 
firms are associated with more positive stock returns (2.7%) compared to 
levered repurchase firms (1.4%), both significant at the 1% level. The mean 
difference is 1.3% and significant at the 1.0% level. Firms investing more show 
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abnormal returns of that are 1.5% significant at the 0.8% level more than those 
investing less. For the unconstrained firm subsample, as reported in Panel B, 
unlevered firms report more positive stock returns than levered repurchase 
firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis (H11) that cash-financed 
share repurchase is associated with more positive stock returns than debt-
financed share repurchase. The reason is that the additional debt increases 
leverage and risks of financial distress and bankruptcy (Fama and French, 
1992; Daniel and Titman, 1997). 
Table 8.10 presents the cross-sectional regression analysis of the initial 
abnormal returns following share repurchase announcements. The dependent 
variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal stock returns during the repurchase 
announcement period. LEVD is the dummy variable that equals 1 for levered 
share repurchase and 0 otherwise whereas LEVD*INV is the interaction term 
for levered repurchase and investments. INV is continuous variable for 
investment expenditure. MB is the market to book ratio, AR is the pre-
announcement stock returns, CRISIS is dummy variable for financial crisis, 
SIZE is the firm size and REP_RATIO is the repurchase value relative to firm 
size. In addition to the control variables, we also include one-digit SIC and 
year dummies in the regressions to control for the potential effects of industry-
specific and time-specific differences. 
The coefficient of LEVD is significantly negative in Models 1 and 3 indicating 
that levered repurchase of internally financially unconstrained firms is 
associated with less positive stock returns. However, the coefficient is positive 
in Models 4 (significant) and 5 (insignificant). INV is significantly negative in 
all outputs suggesting that investment is associated with less positive stock 
returns. This evidence is consistent with market perception about investment in 
value-destroying projects of internally financially unconstrained firms. The 
free cash flow hypothesis also describes this phenomenon about the stock 
reactions of investing firms, especially when they are internally financially 
unconstrained. The coefficient of LEVD*INV is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Model 3 and insignificant in Model 5. This result 
indicates that high investing of levered share repurchase firms is associated 
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with more positive stock returns. AR is significantly negative which is in line 
with the extant evidence. Large firms are associated with lower stock returns as 
shown by the negative coefficient of the SIZE variable. This result is consistent 
with the firm size effects and stock returns. 
Table 8.10: Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Announcement Date 
Abnormal Returns 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable is the 3-day CAR(-1,1) 
LEVD -0.013***  -0.018*** 0.006** 0.001 
 (0.00)  (0.00) (0.03) (0.75) 
INV  -0.063*** -0.086*** -0.048** -0.071** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) 
LEVD*INV   0.088**  0.065 
   (0.03)  (0.11) 
MB    0.000 0.000 
    (0.84) (0.83) 
Prior AR    -0.023** -0.023** 
    (0.04) (0.04) 
CRISIS    0.013 0.013 
    (0.14) (0.15) 
SIZE    -0.015*** -0.015*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV    0.008 0.008 
    (0.36) (0.38) 
Constant 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4700 4700 4700 4611 4611 
adj. R2 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.029 0.029 
p 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the cross sectional regression results of initial abnormal returns 
associated with repurchase of unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is the 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns, CAR(-1,1). Variables included in the regressions dummy for 
levered repurchase (LEVD), investment expenditure (INV), the interaction term between 
levered repurchase and investment (LEVD*INV), market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock 
returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV), and year and industry 
dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in 
parenthesis. ** and *** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
These findings support the hypothesis that levered repurchase of internally 
financially unconstrained firms affects the announcement period abnormal 
returns. Unconstrained firms should finance share repurchase with internal 
finance and not borrow from external debt market. The additional leverage and 
the effects on firm risk mean these firms will be associated with less positive 
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announcement date abnormal returns. Share repurchase of these firms will be 
associated with poorer stock performance when they finance the repurchase 
through borrowings, unless there is a simultaneous expenditure in more capital 
investments. The evidence provided in the regression output implies the 
hypotheses about post-repurchase stock returns are accepted. 
8.3.2.2. Share Repurchase and Long Run Abnormal Returns   
The long-run returns are given as the buy and hold abnormal returns 36-months 
post share repurchase announcements. Generally, unlevered share repurchase is 
associated with more positive long-term stock price performance than levered 
repurchase. This evidence is consistent with the adverse effects of increased 
leveraged on firm financial distress risk. In essence, the level of investment at 
the time of levered share repurchase has long-run impact on stock price 
reactions. For levered repurchase firms, it appears investment motivates firms 
to borrow in order to undertake investment projects that have long run benefits 
to the firms. This finding also implies investors initially underreact to levered 
share repurchase and the level of investment at the repurchase announcement.  
For example, Grullon and Michaely (2004) report that investors underreact to 
repurchase announcements because they initially underestimate reduction in 
the costs of capital. The increased investments of levered repurchase firms also 
indicate no or limited agency costs of debt that results in underinvestment 
(Myers, 1977). These findings suggest that investors react positively in the 
long run to levered share repurchase of unconstrained firms especially when 
these firms invest. 
Table 8.11 reports the univariate analysis of long run abnormal returns 
associated with share repurchase announcements. Panel A analyses the stock 
returns for the full sample and examines whether or not the returns differ based 
on investment expenditure and levered share repurchase. The stock returns are 
13.0% and 2.6% for unlevered and levered repurchase firms, respectively 
(H11). The mean difference between the returns is 10.4% and significant at the 
10% level. High investing firms are associated with 18.0% returns more than 
low investing firms. Panel B provides the stock returns for unconstrained firms 
based on investment expenditure and levered share repurchase. Levered 
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repurchase firms that undertake more investment projects are associated with 
more positive abnormal returns of 25.9% significant at the 10% level than low 
investing firms. Again, high investing firms are associated with more positive 
abnormal returns of 21.5% significant at the 5% level, more than low investing 
firms. These results are consistent with the hypothesis (H12) that unconstrained 
firms that conduct levered share repurchase should be associated with more 
positive returns for high investing firms than low investing firms.  
Table 8.11: Univariate Analysis of 36-month Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR36-month) following Share Repurchase 
Panel A: Full sample - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  1089  0.253  0.221  0.240  0.032  
   (2.95)***  (2.48)**  (3.84)***  (0.25)  
Low investment    4361  0.103  -0.039  0.069  0.142  
   (2.93)***  (-0.53)  (0.51)  (1.97)**  
Total  5450  0.130  0.026  0.096  0.104  
   (3.96)***  (0.44)  (3.31)***  (1.66)*  
Mean diff   0.150  0.259  0.180    
t-stat   (1.75)*  (1.90)*  (2.47)**    
Panel B: Unconstrained Firms - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  775  0.252  0.270  0.258  -0.018  
   (2.51)**  (2.63)***  (3.45)***  (-0.11)  
Low investment    3581  0.103  -0.107  0.043  0.210  
   (2.69)***  (-1.23)  (1.18)  (2.57)**  
Total  4356  0.128  -0.029  0.082  0.157  
   (3.55)***  (-0.40)***  (2.46)**  (2.16)**  
Mean diff   0.149  0.377  0.215    
t-stat   (1.54)  (2.12)**  (2.48)**    
Panel C: Constrained Firms - Investments and Levered Share Repurchase 
   Unlevered  Levered  Total  Mean diff.  
 N  1  2  3  t-stat  
High investment  314  0.257  0.146  0.196  -0.111  
   (1.60)  (0.90)  (1.71)*  (-0.48)  
Low investment    780  0.103  0.181  0.135  0.078  
   (1.15)  (1.44)  (1.83)*  (0.52)  
Total  1094  0.139  0.169  0.152  0.030  
   (1.78)*  (1.69)*  (2.45)**  (0.24)  
Mean diff   0.154  -0.035  0.061    
t-stat   (0.83)  (-0.17)  (0.45)    
Notes: This table shows the univariate analysis of initial abnormal returns associated with share 
repurchase. The abnormal return measure  is the 36-month buy and hold abnormal returns, BHAR(2,36). 
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Table 8.12: Cross-sectional Regression Analysis of Long Run Buy 
and Hold Abnormal Returns 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable is the 3-year BHAR(2,36) 
LEVD -0.157*  -0.133 -0.149 -0.141 
 (0.05)  (0.25) (0.13) (0.29) 
INV  1.332*** 1.652*** 1.664*** 1.706*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
LEVD*INV   -0.590  -0.113 
   (0.57)  (0.91) 
MB    -0.045** -0.045** 
    (0.03) (0.03) 
Prior AR    -0.010 -0.010 
    (0.95) (0.96) 
CRISIS    -0.386 -0.388 
    (0.26) (0.26) 
SIZE    0.054 0.054 
    (0.23) (0.23) 
PMV    0.060 0.060 
    (0.79) (0.78) 
Constant 0.128*** -0.001 0.030 0.282 0.281 
 (0.00) (0.98) (0.54) (0.37) (0.37) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4356 4356 4356 4280 4280 
adj. R2 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.008 
p 0.052 0.007 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the cross sectional regression results of long run abnormal 
returns associated with repurchase of unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is 
the 3-year buy and hold abnormal returns. Variables included in the regressions 
dummy for levered repurchase (LEVD), investment expenditure (INV), the interaction 
term between levered repurchase and investment (LEVD*INV), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of 
book value of total assets (SIZE), ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV), 
and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-
values are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. 
 
Table 8.12 above reports the cross-sectional regression analyses of the long run 
stock price reactions to share repurchase announcements. The dependent 
variable is the BHAR over 36-month period post-repurchase announcements 
and independent/control variables are the same as in earlier regressions.40 Also 
year and industry dummies are controlled for to account for time and industry 
specific effects. Model 1 tests the effects on stock returns of levered 
repurchase. LEVD is marginally significant at the 10% level indicating that                                                         
40 Similar cross-sectional regression analyses are provided for buy and hold returns over 12-
month and 24-month. 
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levered repurchase is associated with less positive stock returns. INV is 
significantly positive at the 1% level showing that investment is associated 
with positive long run stock returns. However, LEVD is not significant in 
Models 3, 4, and 5. Importantly, LEVD*INV is not significant in Model 3 and 
5. 
These findings are consistent with the adverse effects of leverage on firm value 
and the associated stock price reactions. Studies such as Ikenberry et al. (1995, 
2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) and Chen and Wang (2012) all find 
strong support for the long-term abnormal returns associated with share 
repurchase. For example, Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) assert that the long run 
abnormal returns are a correction of prior overreaction to bad news about the 
firms at the time of repurchase. However, as hypothesised, the source of 
financing the repurchase of financially unconstrained could affect the 
magnitude of the long run stock returns. 
8.4. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis  
This section presents the results of a number of robustness and sensitivity 
analysis. These additional results provide further support for the main results 
and also ensure the results are robust to alternative estimation techniques. The 
section is divided into subsection 8.4.1 which provides results for alternative 
cut-off points for KZ, 8.4.2 which provides results for WW index measure of 
internal financial constraints, subsection 8.4.3 gives results for the effects of 
bond ratings on share repurchase; subsection 8.4.4 shows results for the effects 
of financial distress on share repurchase, Subsection 8.4.5 estimates tobit 
regression of the main model, and Subsection 8.4.6 provides results for random 
and fixed effects logit regression estimation techniques.  
8.4.1. Unconstrained firms defined using alternative cut-off point of KZ 
This section provides results for alternative cut-off points for classifying share 
repurchase firms as constrained or unconstrained. Results from previous 
sections define share repurchase firms within the bottom 80% as unconstrained 
and the top 20% as constrained. Here firms are classified as internally 
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financially unconstrained when they fall within the bottom 90%, 75%, and 
50% of KZ. In other words, internally financially constrained firms are those in 
the top 10%, 25% and 50% of KZ. Table 8.13 reports the results of the logit 
regressions for these alternative KZ cut-off points. In all three models, the 
coefficient of INV is significantly positive indicating that investment increases 
the probability that unconstrained firms will conduct levered share repurchase. 
MB is significantly negative in line with the undervaluation hypothesis of share 
repurchase. The coefficient of CRISIS and SIZE are significantly negative and 
positive, respectively. Overall, these results provide further evidence that the 
classification of internal financial constraints produce consistent evidence 
about the probability of levered share repurchase programs. 
Table 8.13: Logit Regression Estimates of Main Results 
(alternative cut-off points) 
 90% 75% 50% 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
INV 0.417*** 0.371*** 0.509*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MB -0.132*** -0.105*** -0.096*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.598** -0.395 -0.508 
 (0.02) (0.17) (0.21) 
CRISIS -1.336*** -1.486*** -2.075*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 2.073*** 2.142*** 2.289*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.954** 1.057** 0.550 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.42) 
Constant  -6.465*** -6.774*** -6.844*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5193 4323 2882 
pseudo R2 0.328 0.356 0.385 
chi-squared 1142.077 972.443 662.240 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the results of the logit regression for share 
repurchase using 95% (model 1), 75% (model 2) and 50% (model 3) cut-off 
points of KZ to classify firms as unconstrained. The dependent variable is 1 
for levered repurchase and 0 for unlevered repurchase. Variables included 
in the regressions are investment expenditure (INV), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), 
logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), ratio of repurchase proceeds 
to market value (PMV) and year and industry dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. ** and *** 
denote significance at the 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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8.4.2. Levered Share Repurchase and WW index Internal Financial 
Constraints  
As a robustness check, this section uses Whited and Wu (2006) index measure 
of internal financial constraints to analyse the effects of internal financial 
constraints on levered share repurchase. The logit regression results are shown 
in Table 8.14. Consistent with the results given in Table 8.2 using the KZ index 
measure of internal financial constraints, the coefficient of WW is positive and 
significant at 1% level in Model 1 and at 5% level in Model 2 for full sample.  
However, as shown in Model 2, the coefficient of the interaction term 
WW*INV is not significant. Investment INV is positive and significant in all 
the Models indicating that investment is drives levered share repurchase. In 
other words, firms that conduct debt-financed share repurchase are more likely 
to invest more. Overall, the findings are similar when KZ index and WW index 
are used as measure of internal financial constraints.    
Table 8.14: Logit Regression Estimates of Levered 
Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints (WW index) 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
WW 0.491*** 0.403**  
 (0.00) (0.01)  
INV 0.586*** 0.602*** 0.558*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
WW*INV  -2.604  
  (0.20)  
MB -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.124*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.726*** -0.730*** -0.817*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS -0.771** -0.775** -0.708** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
SIZE 1.813*** 1.803*** 1.804*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.046** 0.046** 0.770*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant  -5.737*** -5.710*** -5.749*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5678 5678 4547 
pseudo R2 0.297 0.298 0.240 
chi-squared 1224.464 1229.421 909.225 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Notes: This table shows the coefficient estimates of the logit regression for 
share repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 
for unlevered repurchase. Models 1 and 2 provide results for the full sample 
whereas model 3 uses only the subsample of unconstrained firms. Variables 
included in the regressions include WW-index measure of internal financial 
constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), the interaction term between 
internal financial constraints and investment (WW*INV), market-to-book ratio 
(MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), 
logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), the ratio of repurchase 
proceeds to market value (PMV), and year and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are in parenthesis. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
8.4.3. Levered Share Repurchase and Bond Ratings  
Prior studies assert that share repurchase have significant post-repurchase 
effects of bond ratings. Specifically, the increased leverage from repurchase 
results in credit ratings downgrades (Minnick and Zhao, 2007; Chen and 
Wang, 2012). This implies that levered share repurchase should be associated 
with significant credit rating downgrades. It also follows that investment grade 
rating firms will be more likely to borrow more to finance share repurchase 
programs. Firms with bond ratings and investment grade ratings would be 
internally financially unconstrained and therefore will be more likely to 
conduct levered share repurchase to allow them to also invest.  Firms are 
classed as internally financially constrained when they have positive debt but 
without S&P rating, whereas internally financially unconstrained firms have 
positive debt and an S&P bond rating.41 Bond ratings represent the Standard 
and Poor‟s ratings assigned to bonds one month prior to the share repurchase 
announcement. In addition to this definition, firms with ratings are further 
classified into investment and non-investment grade ratings where investment 
grade rating firms are unconstrained and non-investment grade firms are 
constrained. Rated and investment grade rated firms are able to borrow large 
amounts and at low interests than non-rated and non-investment grade rated 
firms. 
Table 8.15 presents the results for the probability of levered repurchase using 
bond ratings as internal financial constraints measure. Model 1 provides the                                                         
41 Whited (1992), and Hahn and Lee (2009) use the presence of bond ratings as a proxy for 
access to debt financing and financial constraints. 
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results for rated firms with INV significantly positive. Also, in Model 2 for 
investment grade firms INV is significantly positive. MB and AR are both 
negative and marginally significantly in Models 1 and 2 whereas SIZE is 
significantly positive in both models. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that investment increases the probability of levered share 
repurchase for internally financially unconstrained firms. This borrowing 
ability increases the probability that rated firms are likely to conduct levered 
share repurchase. This result suggests that rated firms that are unconstrained 
are likely to borrow to finance repurchase when they also invest more. Results 
are robust when investment grade and non-investment grade ratings definition 
is used. To the extent that financially constrained or non-rated firms will suffer 
downgrades and increase risk of financial distress, financially unconstrained 
(rated firms) are expected to borrow to finance share repurchase.   
Table 8.15: Logit Regression Estimates of 
Levered Repurchase and Bond Ratings 
Variables  (1) (2) 
INV 0.615*** 0.514*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
MB -0.045* -0.047 
 (0.10) (0.15) 
Prior AR -0.691* -0.425 
 (0.07) (0.41) 
CRISIS -0.685 -1.037* 
 (0.16) (0.09) 
SIZE 1.496*** 1.607*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.015 -0.155 
 (0.98) (0.83) 
Constant  -4.506*** -4.498*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes 
N 1978 1398 
pseudo R2 0.224 0.249 
chi-squared 415.344 312.294 
p 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the results of the logit regression for 
share repurchase using bond ratings to classify firms as 
unconstrained. The dependent variable is 1 for levered 
repurchase and 0 for unlevered repurchase. Variables 
included in the regressions are investment expenditure (INV), 
market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), 
dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value 
of total assets (SIZE), ratio of repurchase proceeds to market 
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value (PMV) and year and industry dummies. Standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in 
parenthesis. *, and *** denote significance at the 10% and 1% 
level respectively. 
8.4.4. Levered Share Repurchase and Financial Distress   
Financially distressed firms are highly leveraged with high costs of bankruptcy. 
These firms have limited debt capacity and as such more expensive to obtain 
external debt financing. The combined effects of additional leverage and lower 
cash levels as a result of share repurchase increase firm risk of financial 
distress (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Hovakimian, 2004; Chen and Wang, 
2012). All else equal, levered repurchase should increase financial distress risk. 
Stated differently, prior financial distress risk should limit debt financed share 
repurchase. Altman‟s Z score is used to proxy for financial distress as 
discussed in Section 5.2.3.2 of Chapter 5.  
The results in Table 8.16 provide tests of the effects of prior financial distress 
risk on the probability of levered share repurchase. Models 1 and 2 give the 
results for the full sample whereas Model 3 shows the results for less 
financially distressed firm subsample. The coefficient of Z-score is 
significantly negative for both Models 1 and 2. This evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that financially constrained firms are less likely to conduct debt 
financed share repurchase due to the significant increase in distress risk 
associated with debt increasing share repurchase program. INV is positive and 
significant at the 1% level indicating that investment is associated with levered 
repurchase. The coefficient of Z*INV is significantly negative which implies 
that less financially distressed firms will conduct levered repurchase when they 
invest more. This result also suggests the debt capacity associated with less 
distressed firms allows them to borrow more and provide cash buffer for 
investment expenditure at the time of distributing cash to shareholders. MB, 
AR, CRISIS, and SIZE all have the expected signs about the effects on share 
repurchase. INV in Model 3 is significantly positive indicating that for less 
financially distressed firms‟ investment determines the probability of levered 
share repurchase.  
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Overall, the above results provide further evidence about the levered share 
repurchase of financially unconstrained firms. It highlights the role of 
investment in conducting debt financed share repurchase. Thus, this evidence 
implies that the hypothesis that less financially distressed firms are more likely 
to conduct levered repurchase when they invest more is accepted. Less 
financially constrained firms have debt capacity and therefore are more likely 
to borrow to finance their share repurchase, especially when they have more 
investment expenditure. Hahn and Lee (2009) assert that higher debt capacity, 
a feature of non-distressed firms-allow firms to borrow and undertake more 
investments. Also as Chen and Wang (2012) point out, share repurchase 
depletes corporate liquidity and results in high leverage such that the firm is 
exposed to greater financial risk. Stated differently, unconstrained firms are 
less likely to suffer greater financial distress since the cash levels do not fall 
substantially following share repurchase.  
Table 8.16: Logit Regression Estimates of Levered 
Repurchase and Financial Distress 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Z score -0.211*** -0.244***  
 (0.00) (0.00)  
INV 0.615*** 0.422*** 0.446*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Z*INV  -0.361***  
  (0.00)  
MB 0.004 -0.001 -0.125*** 
 (0.84) (0.96) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.807*** -0.784*** -0.798*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CRISIS -0.967*** -0.945*** -0.769** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
SIZE 1.861*** 1.869*** 2.030*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.031 0.031* 0.045** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) 
Constant  -5.311*** -5.250*** -6.536*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
N 5771 5771 5088 
pseudo R2 0.334 0.335 0.311 
chi-squared 1245.789 1245.597 1134.734 
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the results of the logit regression for share 
repurchase using financial distress (Altman’s Z score) to classify 
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firms as unconstrained. The dependent variable is 1 for levered 
repurchase and 0 for unlevered repurchase. Variables included in 
the regressions are investment expenditure (INV), market-to-book 
ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for financial 
crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), 
ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV) and year and 
industry dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity 
consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
8.4.5. Tobit Regression Estimation of Main Results 
Table 8.17 provides the tobit regression results for share repurchase by 
internally financially unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is the dollar 
value of share repurchases divided by the market value of equity, indicating the 
effects of investment and borrowings on the value of shares firms are likely to 
repurchase in the market. Model 1 gives the results of the effects of levered 
(LEVD) and investment (INV) on the value of share repurchase whereas 
Model 2 examines the simultaneously effects of levered and investment 
(LEVD*INV) on the value of share repurchase. As can be seen from the table, 
the coefficient of LEVD is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that internally financially 
constrained firms are less likely to conduct debt financed share repurchase due 
to the significant increase in distress risk associated with debt increasing share 
repurchase program.  
The coefficient of LEVD*INV is positive and significant at the 5% level 
indicating that borrowings and increase the value of share repurchase even for 
high investing firms. This result suggests the increased cash flows from debt 
financing allow firms to repurchase greater amount of shares even when they 
also engage in investment projects. As argued earlier, the borrowings provide 
cash buffer for investment expenditure at the time of distributing cash to 
shareholders. The negative coefficients of MB and prior AR are consistent with 
the undervaluation and information signaling theories by which firms 
repurchase their shares when their shares are cheap. Overall, the above results 
provide further evidence about the levered share repurchase of internally 
financially unconstrained firms. It underlines the effects of debt financing on 
share repurchase decisions of firms. Thus, this evidence implies the hypothesis 
about debt financed share repurchase is accepted. 
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Table 8.17: Tobit Regression Analysis of 
Levered Share Repurchase 
Variables  (1) (2) 
LEVD 0.016** 0.004 
 (0.01) (0.65) 
INV -0.008 -0.071 
 (0.83) (0.14) 
LEVD*INV  0.180** 
  (0.03) 
MB -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.025* -0.025* 
 (0.08) (0.07) 
CRISIS 0.026*** 0.026*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.006* -0.005 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Constant  0.107*** 0.110*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes 
N 4611 4611 
pseudo R2 -0.017 -0.018 
chi-squared 64.026 68.886 
p 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the Tobit regression results for share 
repurchase of unconstrained firms. The dependent variable is 
the ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value of equity. 
Variables included in the regressions include dummy which 
is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 otherwise (LEVD), 
investment expenditure (INV), the interaction term between 
levered repurchase and investment (LEVD*INV), market-to-
book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior AR), dummy for 
financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value of total 
assets (SIZE), and year and industry dummies. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are in 
parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. 
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8.4.6. Random and Fixed Effects Logit Regression Estimation of Main 
Results 
The results presented in Table 8.18 are the random and fixed effects estimation 
of the main results. From the table, Models 1 and 2 are for random effects 
whereas fixed effects estimation results are given in Models 3 and 4. For a start 
the fixed effects eliminate time invariant variables (CRISIS variable has no 
output) and no constants are given. The chi-square and the probability statistics 
indicate the model is significant and that the coefficients are jointly 
significantly different from zero. Both the random effects and fixed effects 
results confirm the previous findings reported in the chapter about the share 
repurchase behaviour of internally financially unconstrained firms. Here again, 
the coefficients of KZ and INV are significantly positive for all the Models. 
Also, the coefficient of the interaction term KZ*INV is significantly negative 
in Models 2 and 4 for random and fixed effects, respectively. These results 
provide further evidence that internally financially unconstrained firms are 
more likely to conduct levered share repurchase when they also invest more. 
The parameter coefficient of MB, AR, CRISIS, and SIZE all give the expected 
signs. For example, MB and AR show that undervalued shares are more likely 
to be repurchased when firms also borrow. Overall, these results after using 
alternative estimation techniques still support the hypotheses about the levered 
share repurchase of internally financially unconstrained driven by investment 
expenditure.  
The results of the hausman test are shown in Appendix 8. The starting point for 
the hausman test is that the two models do not produce significantly different 
coefficients. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient are not different 
between random and fixed effects in which case both estimations are 
appropriate otherwise the fixed effects is chosen because it gives consistent 
coefficients. As can be seen from the hausman test output in Appendix 8, the 
chi-square is 11.77 and probability is 0.1083 indicating that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, 
the difference in the coefficients between random and fixed effects is not 
systematic. This implies the random effects output is efficient and fixed effects 
2F
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give consistent results for the coefficient. The coefficients of the two 
estimation techniques are comparable and not significantly different. 
Table 8.18: Random and Fixed Effects Logit Regression of Levered 
Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints 
 Random Effects Model  Fixed Effects Model 
Variables  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable is Levered (1) vs Unlevered (0) 
KZ 1.162*** 0.873***  1.156*** 0.868*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
INV 0.466*** 0.424***  0.464*** 0.422*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
KZ*INV  -2.673***   -2.660*** 
  (0.00)   (0.00) 
MB -0.101*** -0.085***  -0.101*** -0.084*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Prior AR -0.651*** -0.633***  -0.647*** -0.630*** 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
CRISIS -1.018*** -1.082***    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
SIZE 1.995*** 2.021***  1.985*** 2.010*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
PMV 0.030 0.033  0.030 0.032 
 (0.50) (0.46)  (0.50) (0.47) 
Constant -6.496*** -6.470***    
 (0.00) (0.00)    
Year Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 5771 5771  5771 5771 
pseudo R2    0.302 0.307 
chi-squared 1272.563 1284.977  2071.254 2103.090 
p 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Notes: This table shows the results of the random and fixed effects logit regression for share 
repurchase. The dependent variable is 1 for levered repurchase and 0 for unlevered 
repurchase. Variables included in the regressions are KZ index measure of internal financial 
constraints (KZ), investment expenditure (INV), interaction term between internal financial 
constraints and investment (KZ*INV), market-to-book ratio (MB), prior stock returns (Prior 
AR), dummy for financial crisis (CRISIS), logarithm of book value of total assets (SIZE), 
ratio of repurchase proceeds to market value (PMV) and year and industry dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity consistent.  P-values are shown in parenthesis. *** 
denote significance at the 1% level. 
 
Summarily, the results of the random and fixed effects as well as the main 
analysis using the logit regression provide strong support for the hypothesis 
about the levered share repurchase of internally financially unconstrained firms. 
The findings indicate that financially constrained firms are more likely to 
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conduct levered repurchase. Also, firms with significant investment 
expenditure at the time of share repurchase are also more likely to borrow to 
finance their share repurchase programs. And more importantly, unconstrained 
firms that do not require external financing to finance repurchase programs 
only borrow when they also invest more. The results seem to assert that the 
investment expenditure drives unconstrained firms to seek external financing 
as cash buffer during the repurchase period. Thus, the additional financing 
from borrowings enable to firm to invest without forgoing investment 
opportunities. This evidence reinforces the post-repurchase reduced cash flow 
and limited liquidity hypothesis. 
8.5. Conclusion  
This chapter presented empirical results to explore the share repurchase 
financing of firms. It specifically, investigated the levered share repurchase 
behaviour of internally financially unconstrained firms. The main hypothesis 
tested in this chapter was that internally financially unconstrained firms are 
likely to conduct levered share repurchase when they also invest more. This 
hypothesis emphasised that without investment expenditure, internally 
financially unconstrained firms will be less likely to borrow at the time of share 
repurchase because these firms would have sufficient internal cash flow to 
support their share repurchase programs. The implication of this hypothesis 
was that internally financially constrained firms would need external financing 
in order to conduct share repurchase. The results used the Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) index to proxy for internal financial constraints. In addition, bond 
ratings and Altman‟s Z score measure of financial distress are additional 
proxies that were used to measure financial constraints. Change in leverage 
was used to indicate whether a firm has financed share repurchase using 
external borrowings.  
Consistent with prior studies, the results of this chapter find strong support for 
the levered share repurchase of unconstrained firms when investment 
expenditure is high. Thus, unconstrained firms borrow at the time of share 
repurchase when they also invest more. This evidence indicates that the 
additional external financing provides cash buffer to preserve the post-
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repurchase cash and liquidity levels of the firm to support investment 
expenditure. Also, the chapter finds that unlevered repurchase firms 
outperform levered repurchase firms. However, the levered repurchase firms‟ 
investment seems to increase returns at least in the short run. Moreover, the 
chapter addresses issues with estimation assumptions and also presented results 
using alternative proxies for internal financial constraints. Finally, the chapter 
presented robust results for alternative estimation techniques.  
The findings in this chapter of the study are consistent with Minnick and Zhao 
(2007), De Jong et al. (2011), and Chen and Wang (2012). However, the 
results in this chapter differ markedly from prior studies on several fronts. For 
example, Minnick and Zhao (2007) focus on the wealth effect of levered share 
repurchases whereas De Jong et al. (2011) assert that convertible issuers 
repurchase their stock in order to facilitate short selling. Both studies examine 
the market as whole without differentiating their results for internally 
financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Also, Chen and Wang (2012) 
instead focus on share repurchases of internally financially constrained firms 
and report that managerial hubris drives constrained firms to repurchase their 
shares. However, the results presented in this chapter demonstrate the share 
repurchase financing of internally financially unconstrained firms. This 
evidence has not previously been explored in the literature and therefore the 
results presented in this chapter contribute to the extant literature on share 
repurchase.  
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Chapter 9  
CONCLUSION  
9.1. Introduction  
This chapter provides the conclusions in this thesis. It presents the main 
findings and the research implications for corporate financing decisions and 
policy changes. It also discusses the limitations of the current study, suggests 
areas of improvement including suggestions for future research. The remainder 
of the chapter is organised into four sections. Section 9.2 presents the main 
findings of the three empirical chapters. Section 9.3 discusses the research 
implications for corporate financing decisions and policy makers. Section 9.4 
outlines the limitations of the study. Finally, Section 9.5 proposes suggestions 
for future research.  
9.2. Main Findings of the Thesis 
9.2.1. Share Issuance and Financial Constraints  
The first empirical chapter (Chapter 6) explored the simultaneous effects of 
internal and external financial constraints on share issuance decisions of a 
sample of UK listed firms. Following the predictions of market timing-where 
firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity- this thesis tested the extent to 
which financially constrained firms are restricted in their attempts to issue 
overvalued equity. In this regard, the research hypothesised that internally 
financially constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity 
compared to counterpart financially unconstrained firms.  Financial constraints 
limit firms‟ ability to issue equity due to frictions associated with the external 
equity financing market. This effect arises because equity financing is 
associated with significant transaction costs in terms of commissions and fees 
as well as the adverse selection costs occasioned by such transactions. In 
essence, internally financially unconstrained firms should be able to afford 
such costs and will be likely to issue overvalued equity. However, given that 
internally financially constrained firms would more likely require external 
equity financing to finance investment projects, these firms would be equally 
  
 
248 
motivated to issue overvalued equity. Thus, the hypothesis (H1) tested in 
Chapter 6 (defined in Subsection 2.5 in Chapter 2) states that financially 
constrained firms are more likely to issue overvalued equity. This study 
contributes to the market timing and information asymmetry theories as 
explained in Section 2.2 of Chapter 2. 
In addition to internal financial constraints, the study also tested the share 
issuance behaviour of firms during periods of external financial constraints. As 
defined in the thesis, external financial constraints relate to the conditions of 
the external equity market including the general economic conditions and 
market liquidity. Consistent with hypothesis (H2), I find that firms that are 
internally financially unconstrained issue overvalued equity even when 
external financial constraints are high. Conversely, internally financially 
constrained firms are less likely to issue overvalued equity during periods of 
financial crisis or when there is low market liquidity. During periods of 
favourable market conditions, such as high market liquidity at times of no 
financial crisis, costs of equity issues are relatively low. This is because 
investor confidence in the market increases resulting in increases in the supply 
of financing in the market. Therefore, firms that intend to issue overvalued 
equity would be motivated during periods of favourable market conditions, 
even when these firms are internally financially constrained. The above effects 
of financial constraints on market timing of equity issues translate into the 
stock price reactions subsequent to the equity issues.  
A sample of UK listed firms is used to test the developed hypotheses about the 
effects of financial constraints on share issuance decisions. The study finds that 
both internal and external financial constraints are important factors that 
influence the market timing of equity issues. It also shows that post-issue stock 
price reactions are related to the level of financial constraints and mispricing. 
The findings of the study support the developed hypotheses indicating that 
internal financial constraints determine whether or not firm issues overvalued 
equity. It further shows that during periods of economic downturn, only 
internally financially unconstrained firms are likely to issue overvalued equity. 
The results are robust to alternative definitions of financial constraints and 
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estimation techniques. The study finds strong support for the simultaneous 
effects of internal and external financial constraints on market timing of equity 
issues.  
Overall, the findings in this study are consistent with prior studies about market 
timing of equity issues. Studies such as Stein (1992), Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) and Dong et al. (2012), all find evidence of equity market timing by 
which firms issue overvalued equity. For example, Baker and Wurgler (2002) 
stress that long-term changes in capital structure reflect the effects of persistent 
market timing of equity issues. Also, Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Dong et al. 
(2012) and (McLean and Zhao, 2014) assert that internal financial constraints 
restricts external equity financing. Favourable market conditions produce 
investor confidence and boost stock prices. Thus, all else equal, favourable 
market conditions motivate the issuance of overvalued equity even when the 
firm is financially constrained. The results, therefore, highlight the importance 
of external financing constraints on the equity issuance decisions of financially 
constrained firms. By this, the study synthesises the effects of both internal and 
external financial constraints and demonstrates how these two conditions 
determine the issuance of overvalued equity.  
9.2.2. Share Issuance Methods and Operating Performance   
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 7) focuses on the impact of operating 
performance on the choice of equity issuance methods among a sample of UK 
listed firms. Expectations of future operating performance have significant 
effects on the choice of equity issuance method. This is because information 
about future operating performance is unlikely to be available to outside 
investors who might have to incur substantial costs to obtain information about 
the firm. The choice of equity issuance method depends on both firm and issue 
characteristics. It is therefore argued that contemporaneous long-term operating 
performance might determine whether a firm chooses rights issues, open 
offers, and private placement. Firms would be more likely to choose rights 
offerings over open offers and private placement when operating performance 
is anticipated to be good, consistent with the objective of shareholder wealth 
maximisation. Stated differently, for anticipated poor operating performance, 
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issuance which involves outside investors will be preferred in order to exploit 
less informed investors, all other things being equal. Thus, it is hypothesised 
that rights issuing firms anticipate high operating performance than open offers 
and private placement (H6). Rights issuing firms are likely to be firms of better 
quality and are less likely to issue equity in order to exploit equity mispricing. 
In other words, open offers and private placement are likely to be undertaken 
by firms seeking to time the issue of overvalued equity. It further implies that 
rights issuing firms are more likely to outperform open offers and private 
placement subsequent to the equity issues (H7).  
The study finds that operating performance is an important determinant of the 
choice of equity issuance method. In effect, the findings provide strong support 
for the developed hypothesis about the effects of long term operating 
performance on the choice of equity issuance method. This study asserts that 
operating performance not only determines the choice of issuance methods but 
it also explains the post-issue long run stock returns associated with each 
equity issuance method. Operating performance explains better the firm quality 
theory over the long term. Subsequent to equity issues, firms conducting rights 
issues report better operating performance than open offers and private 
placement. Thus, firms associated with better operating performance seem 
more likely to conduct rights issues rather than open offers and private 
placements. Consistent with Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), the study further 
finds that rights issuing firms outperform open offers and private placement in 
the long run. 
Firms that make rights issues are associated with anticipated high operating 
performance than open offers and private placement. Through rights issues, 
firms return part of the potential benefit of better operating performance to 
existing shareholders. When the operating performance is eventually realised, 
stock prices rise accordingly causing shareholders value to increase in turn. For 
open offers and private placement, firms are motivated by the attempt to profit 
from temporary mispricing. These firms do not anticipate better operating 
performance but the pre-issue stock price run-up provides benefits to allow 
them to make the issue. The effects of long-term operating performance on the 
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choice of equity issuance method also explain the long run stock price 
performance. Rights issues outperform both open offers and private placement. 
Stated another way, open offers and private placement are associated with 
more negative stock returns than rights issues.  
These findings are consistent Capstaff and Fletcher (2011) about the relation 
between post-issue stock returns and operating performance associated with 
equity issuing firms. Both the operating performance and stock performance 
indicate that high quality firms undertake rights issues. However, unlike 
Capstaff and Fletcher (2011), the current study focuses on how operating 
performance determines the probability of equity issues through rights issues, 
open offers, and private placement as well as explaining the long run stock 
price performance. For instance, Loughran and Ritter (1997) find that long run 
operating performance explains stock returns subsequent to US equity issues 
that are dominated by firm commitments. Holding the measures of firm and 
issue quality constant, the decision to utilise a particular issuance method is 
influenced by operating performance. Thus, the current study offers insights 
into the choice of UK issuance methods explained by the differential long run 
operating performance.  
9.2.3. Share Repurchase and Internal Financial Constraints  
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 8) focuses on the effects of internal 
financial constraints on share repurchase financing among a sample of US 
listed firms. It is argued that firms borrow to finance share repurchase when 
they are financially constrained (H8). However, internally financially 
unconstrained conduct levered repurchase when they also undertake significant 
investment projects (H9). While internally financially constrained would obtain 
debt financing to provide sufficient cash flow to finance share repurchase 
programs, it is unlikely that internally financially unconstrained that have 
excess cash flows would seek debt financing when they repurchase their 
shares. The hypothesis is consistent with the prediction that additional cash 
flows from borrowings allow the firm to build cash buffers in order to finance 
investment projects.  
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As argued in prior studies, share repurchase transactions reduce subsequent 
cash flows for investment (Grullon and Michaely, 2004; Denis and Sibilkov, 
2010). Therefore, by borrowing the firm would be in better financial position 
to both disburse cash to shareholders without foregoing investment projects. In 
essence, the study explored the levered share repurchase behaviour of 
financially unconstrained firms and tests the factors that drive cash-rich firms 
to finance their share repurchases through borrowings. Consistent with 
hypotheses (H8) and (H9), I find that internally financially unconstrained firms 
borrow when they conduct share repurchase and undertake significant capital 
expenditure. Firms do not only utilise internal cash flows to finance share 
repurchase but also a significant number of firms borrow to finance share 
repurchase (Chen and Wang, 2012; Lei and Zhang, 2015; Farre-Mensa et al., 
2015). Whereas Chen and Wang (2012) assert that internally financially 
constrained firms conduct share repurchases due to managerial overconfidence 
and hubris, this study highlights that internally financially unconstrained firms 
also borrow during share repurchase programs. Similar to Farre-Mensa et al. 
(2015), firms undertaking share repurchases obtain external debt-financing. In 
particular, these unconstrained firms borrow during share repurchase 
announcements and potentially utilize the additional cash buffers to finance 
investment expenditure. The study further argued that the financing of share 
repurchase determines the post-repurchase stock returns associated the firm 
(H10) consistent with the undervaluation, information signaling, and the free 
cash flow hypotheses.   
A sample of share repurchase by US listed firms is used to test the hypothesis 
about levered share repurchase and financial constraints. The choice of US data 
is based on the evidence that a significant number of share repurchase 
programs involve debt financing (Milken, 2009). 42  In general, the results 
provide strong support for the hypothesis about why internally financially 
unconstrained firms conduct levered share repurchase. It further demonstrates 
the stock price reactions associated with share repurchase firms based on both 
the degree of financial constraints and the source of financing. Overall, the 
current research shed more light on share repurchase and notes that investment                                                         
42 See Section 1.3 of Chapter 3 for explanation of the choice of US data. 
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expenditure has explanatory power as to whether firms borrow during share 
repurchase programs, given the level of internal financial constraints. This is 
because unless firms are willing to undertake investment expenditures, it is 
unlikely that unconstrained firms would borrow during share repurchase 
programs. It also appears unconstrained firms have debt capacity and are also 
able to obtain cheap debt financing due to favourable credit ratings. Thus, the 
presence of debt capacity and credit ratings are both symptoms of 
unconstrained firms.  
Firms conducting share repurchases are undervalued and associated with low 
stock prices prior to the repurchase announcements. Thus, repurchase firms 
attempt to benefits from subsequent stock price appreciations. The study also 
finds that internally financially constrained firms are likely to borrow to 
finance share repurchase programs, all else equal. However, internally 
financially unconstrained firms are likely to conduct levered share repurchase 
when they also invest more. The results imply that the effects of share 
repurchase on reducing cash flow and stifling investments motivate firms to 
borrow to add to their cash buffers. Unconstrained firms also appear to be 
firms with investment grade bond ratings that allow them to borrow cheap in 
the external capital market. Internally financially constrained firms face 
significant costs of additional borrowings to the extent that would be sufficient 
to conduct share repurchase and also invest. Excessive borrowings would 
increase leverage ratios as to result in probability of financial distress. Unlike 
Chen and Wang (2012), this study not only show evidence of share repurchase 
by internally financially constrained firms, but it also provides evidence that 
debt financing affect the relation between share repurchase and internal 
financial constraints.  
The three empirical chapters provide new insights into share issuance and 
repurchase decisions of firms. Financial constraints- both internal and external- 
affect share issuance decisions. Firms systematically time their equity issues to 
coincide with periods of mispricing. Financially constrained firms issue 
overvalued equity in order to profit from the temporary overpricing. However, 
additional analysis indicates that issue overvalued equity by financially 
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constrained only occurs during periods of favourable economic conditions. 
Also, in regards to share issuance methods, the study show that expected long 
run operating performance influence the choice of equity issuance methods. 
Better quality firms are likely to conduct rights issues rather than open offers 
and private placement, and are associated with significant stock price 
outperformance. For share repurchase, financially unconstrained firms borrow 
to finance share repurchase programs insofar as they also invest more. In 
effect, the costs of investment expenditure motivate financially unconstrained 
to obtain additional cash flows from the debt market while also disbursing cash 
flows to existing shareholders.  
9.3. Research Implications and Recommendations  
This section outlines and discusses implications of the findings for theoretical 
underpinnings of corporate decisions and for policy directions. Subsection 
9.3.1 discusses the implications of the study for academics whereas Subsection 
9.3.2 presents the implications for practitioners and policy makers.  
9.3.1. Implications for Academics  
The study tested the market timing theory in relation to share issuance and 
choice of issuance methods. It also explored the information asymmetry impact 
on share issuance decisions and the choice of issuance methods. The study on 
share issuance and issuance methods provides implications for the market 
timing theory. Market timing implies firms are likely to issue overvalued 
equity. Whereas this phenomenon is extensively explored in the literature, the 
current research indicates that financial constraints are an important 
determinant of the extent to which firms can systematically time their equity 
issues. The study also shows that financial constraints are related to the degree 
of information asymmetry. Overall, the study finds that financial constraint is 
an important variable in determining equity issuance decisions. Financial 
constraints have strong explanatory power after controlling for firm 
characteristics that have been found in the empirical literature to affect share 
issuance decisions. Thus, the findings provide insights for academics in the 
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study of share issuance behaviour of firms and note that future research should 
consider the effects of financial constraints on market timing of equity issues. 
As regards share issuance methods, the study notes that operating performance 
reflects the degree of information asymmetry associated with equity issuing 
firms. After controlling for both firm and issue characteristics, the research 
finds that future expected operating performance is an important variable in 
choosing equity issuance methods. Operating performance measures 
information asymmetry that would not be captured by the traditional measures 
of information asymmetry such as accruals quality or idiosyncratic risk. 
Studies on the equity issuance methods should, therefore, consider the effects 
of operating performance. It should also examine how long run stock price 
reacts for each issuance methods given the level of anticipated long run 
operating performance. 
The study further asserts that academic research on share repurchase should 
consider the source of financing. By undervaluation hypothesis, firms are 
likely to repurchase cheap shares whereas excess free cash flows motivate 
firms to repurchase under the free cash flow hypothesis. Information signalling 
hypothesis states that firms choose repurchase programs in order to convey 
significant information about the prospects of the firm to the market. The level 
of financial constraints is an important variable that explains share repurchase 
behaviour beyond the predictions of the undervaluation, free cash, and 
information signalling theories. As emphasised in the study, financially 
constrained firms also undertake repurchase by engaging in debt financing. 
Thus, the ability of firms to borrow might motivate firms to conduct share 
repurchase contrary to predictions of the free cash flow hypothesis. Therefore, 
academics should account for the effects of firms financial conditions in future 
research on share repurchases. 
9.3.2. Implications for Practitioners and Policymakers  
The implications of this study for practitioners and policymakers are 
particularly important given the impact of the recent financial crisis on 
corporate decisions. Regulations and policies for capital structure should 
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ensure that firms are not significantly exposed to high leverage to the extent 
that they would be unable to finance important corporate events. The effects of 
the financial crisis meant that several firms could not undertake investment 
projects or employ people leading to overall downturn in economic activities. 
Most firms could only resort to the sale of assets in order to provide some 
liquidity to sustain the day-to-day running of their businesses. The study 
highlights that given the huge costs associated with equity issues; it might be 
suboptimal to issue them during periods of financial crisis. Therefore, 
practitioners need to appropriately time their equity issues to coincide with 
periods when costs of issuance are relatively low, especially during periods of 
favourable economic conditions with increased market liquidity.  
It is important that business strategies are aligned with financial strategies to 
obtain optimum operational and financial benefits. Firms should also consider 
the appropriate financial strategy that is consistent with the corporate life cycle. 
It is important that practitioners institute a borrowing behaviour that is in line 
with the level of internal financial constraints, share repurchase decisions, and 
corporate investment strategy. Aggressive borrowings by internally financially 
constrained firms could significantly distort capital structure, especially when 
such debt financing is used to finance share repurchase programs. Furthermore, 
corporate governance issues determine financial policy changes of firms. 
Therefore, corporate governance policies should be formulated to assess the 
impact of share issuance and repurchase decisions in obtaining the overall 
optimum capital structure. In carrying out their legally mandated 
responsibilities, boards influence the financial performance of firms. Therefore, 
the findings of this study would guide board decisions to achieve optimal 
financial performance for their firms.  
Share repurchase regulation in the US allows firms to exploit undervaluation 
by repurchasing cheap shares in the market. This phenomenon has given firms 
the latitude to systematically disburse excess cash to shareholders with the aim 
of buying them out of the ownership interest in the company. Also, the 
repurchase regulations make it possible for firms to engage in levered share 
repurchase even when they are significantly financially constrained. Increased 
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leverage adversely affects financial distress costs that could plunge the firm 
into bankruptcy. Regulations and policy changes could stifle the persistent 
attempts by firms to repurchase when it is suboptimal for the long-term 
sustainability of the firm.  
9.4. Limitations of the Study  
The empirical analysis of share issuance considers the probability of issuing 
and not issuing equity given the simultaneous effects of internal and external 
financial constraints. However, not issuing equity could imply issuing debt or 
even repurchasing equity. Thus, the dataset could consist of equity on one side 
and debt/repurchase on the other side of the dependent variable. For instance 
UK regulations restrict share repurchase announcements (Rau and Vermaelen, 
2002) whereas bank loans that are not normally traded dominate corporate 
lending.43 The unique features of UK share repurchase and debt issues make it 
difficult to model a choice analysis between equity issues on one hand and 
share repurchase and debt issues on the other hand. However, the study 
captures the effects of potential share repurchase and debt issues by selecting 
matching firms where the non-issue firm belongs to the same industry group 
and have comparable market to book ratio as the issuing firms.  
Other factors such as the level of corporate governance affect corporate 
decisions. Also, external factors such as regulation, institutional arrangements, 
and corporate governance have significant impact on corporate decisions (Rau 
and Vermaelen, 2002; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Cornett et al. 2009). For 
example, regulatory and institutional changes take time to reflect on corporate 
decisions and market conditions such that the timing of the impact is difficult 
to capture. Furthermore, corporate governance variables need to be hand 
collected since most of such variables- board size, committees, board 
independence etc.-are not reported in databases. But given that the sample size 
of equity issues used in this study, it is impossible to collect data on 
governance. This study excludes these variables due to the difficulty in 
collecting them and also in line with prior studies. It is also impossible to even                                                         
43 Bank of England (2009) 
  
 
258 
accurate measure human characteristics that define these variables. Therefore, 
their exclusion amounts to potential omitted variables bias in the models.  
9.5. Suggestions for Future Research  
Like all other studies, there are still avenues to extend and improve the 
predictions of both share issuance and repurchase decisions.  
Following Dong et al. (2012), this current study has investigated the effects of 
financial constraints on share issuance decisions. However, like previous 
studies, it does not look at how corporate governance issues can potentially 
affect the relationship between internal financial constraints and market timing 
of equity issues. Corporate governance issues have become more important in 
this era of financial crisis and the effects of corporate decisions cannot be 
overemphasised. As such, future research should focus on the moderating 
impacts of governance issues in determining how financial constraints relate to 
governance and the subsequent effects on equity market timing. Furthermore, 
corporate governance impact on the choice of equity issuance method could be 
analysed in future research.  
Given the global impact of the financial crisis, a cross-country study involving 
major European countries, Asian countries, Canada, and the US would provide 
an improved understanding of how external financing constraints moderate the 
relation between internal financing constraints and equity market timing. Since 
countries were affected and responded differently to the financial crisis, it can 
be argued that market timing of equity issues would be pursued in different 
fashions. For instance, this present study finds different predictions for the 
effects of financial constraints on market timing from the findings by Dong et 
al. (2012) who used Canadian data. Perhaps, regulatory differences and 
institutional arrangements impact differently on equity issuance decisions. 
Future research would help delineate these potential differences.  
Similarly, share repurchase decisions, like other corporate events, should relate 
to how the firm is governed. Thus, whether or not firms repurchase based on 
undervaluation, free cash flow, or information signalling would be explained 
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by the quality of corporate governance. Moreover, since levered share 
repurchase has significant impact on debt ratios with increased financial 
distress, corporate governance issues should determine the decision to borrow 
to finance share repurchase. It is even more important when the firm 
anticipating levered share repurchase program is internally financially 
constrained or not. Therefore, future research should consider how better 
governed firms behave in their share repurchase decisions. Thus, future 
research could empirically test the share repurchase behaviour of financially 
constrained given the level of corporate governance.  
The objective of the third empirical chapter was to investigate the levered share 
repurchase behaviour of a sample of financially unconstrained US listed firms. 
Share repurchase transactions have increased significantly over the last two 
decades among US firms. However, several European countries that previously 
did not permit share repurchase have recently allowed firms to repurchase their 
shares, albeit in a relatively controlled fashion. Thus, it is more likely firms in 
these countries pursue the notion of levered share repurchase. Therefore, future 
research could conduct a cross-country empirical analyse of levered share 
repurchase to present a holistic view of this corporate policy. Moreover, this 
research could focus on the effects of financial constraints on levered share 
repurchase for these countries.  
Given the importance of financial constraints on corporate decisions, including 
share issuance and repurchase, the potential effects on dividend policy could be 
explored. Generally, dividend payments are made from excess profits or cash 
flows that imply firms with high levels of profitability should be paying more 
dividends than low profitability firms. Also, given the adverse effects of 
decreasing dividends, firms that are cash-strapped would be in a difficult 
situation in retaining current dividends. It follows, therefore, that the degree of 
internal financial constraints would significantly affect dividend payments. 
Dividend payments relate the degree of internal financial constraints such that 
dividend-paying firms are classed as internally financially unconstrained. 
However, future research could explore how internally financially constrained 
firms finance subsequent dividend payments. Thus, the idea of levered 
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dividend payments could be investigated to provide empirical understanding of 
dividend payment financing.  
Future research could also explore the choice between dividend payment and 
share repurchase given the level of internal financial constraints. Since both 
payout policies are considered substitutes in the empirical literature, it would 
be ideal to investigate the effects of internal financial constraints on the 
decision to pay dividends or repurchase shares. Moreover, the idea of leverage-
financed corporate decisions could be extended to the choice between dividend 
payments and share repurchase. Thus, the research could examine the 
corporate events that are more likely to be financed using debt issues. For 
instance, it can be argued that since repurchase is less binding than dividend 
payments, internally financially constrained firms might be motivated to 
borrow to conduct share repurchase than they would for dividend payments 
unlikely to be sustained in the future.  
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APPRENDICES 
Appendix 6A 
Hausman Test for Random versus Fixed Effects 
 b B b-B sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Variables Random  Fixed  Diff. (b-B) S.E 
KZ -1.928 -1.645 0.283 0.288 
MB 0.433 0.147 -0.286 0.040 
KZ*MB 1.658 2.123 0.465 0.328 
SIZE 0.289 0.400 0.111 0.024 
ED 1.188 0.427 -0.762 0.135 
PROF -4.203 -1.379 2.824 0.496 
CAPX -8.727 -9.635 -0.908 . 
b = consistent 
under Ho and Ha 
    
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi-squared           = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =  185.02 
Prob>chi-squared =  0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Notes: This table displays the results for the hausman test for random versus fixed effects logit regression 
estimation given in Table 6.12 
 
 
 
Appendix 6B 
Hausman Test for Random versus Fixed Effects (Crisis Period) 
 b B b-B sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Variables Random Fixed Difference S.E 
KZ -3.241 -3.561 0.319 0.696 
MB 0.248 -0.027 0.275 0.077 
KZ*MB -3.033 -3.946 0.914 0.831 
SIZE 0.329 0.304 0.025 0.061 
ED 2.269 1.184 1.085 0.339 
PROF -7.102 -2.886 -4.216 1.344 
CAPX -10.393 -9.035 -1.357 . 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi-squared           = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =  21.66 
Prob>chi-squared =  0.1170 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Notes: This table displays the results for the hausman test for random versus fixed effects logit regression 
estimation given in Table 6.13. 
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Appendix 6C 
Hausman Test for Random versus Fixed Effects (Non-Crisis Period) 
 b B b-B sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Variables Random Fixed Difference S.E 
KZ -1.246 -1.240 -0.006 0.192 
MB 0.458 0.308 0.151 0.042 
KZ*MB 1.334 1.429 -0.095 0.218 
SIZE 0.318 0.359 -0.041 0.018 
ED 0.813 0.744 0.069 0.096 
PROF -3.360 -1.797 -1.563 0.484 
CAPX -8.557 -8.839 0.282 0.159 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi-squared           = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
=  16.06 
Prob>chi-squared =  0.3783 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Notes: This table displays the results for the hausman test for random versus fixed effects logit regression 
estimation given in Table 6.13 
 
Appendix 8A 
Hausman Test for Random versus Fixed Effects 
 b B b-B sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
Variables Random Fixed Diff. (b-B) S.E 
KZ 0.936 0.935 -0.001 . 
INV 0.342 0.33 -0.012 0.004 
KZ*INV -2.684 -2.707 -0.023 0.032 
MB -0.1 -0.098 0.001 0.001 
Prior AR -0.413 -0.424 -0.01 0.015 
SIZE 1.986 1.994 0.008 0.006 
PMV 0.035 0.034 0 . 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho 
Test: Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi-squared           = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                  =  11.77 
Prob>chi-squared =  0.1083 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Notes: This table displays the results for the hausman test for random versus fixed effects logit regression 
estimation.                                              
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